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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Questions
The research agenda involves examining how financing frictions and regulatory
frictions impact investment decisions, specifically in areas of mergers and acquisitions
(M&As). M&As are the most economically important and notable corporate invest-
ment. This thesis looks into the interplay of M&A activities, bankruptcy costs, and
the regulatory/political environment. Specifically, it addresses three research ques-
tions: (i) why financially distressed firms are acquisitive; (ii) how political connec-
tions of bidders affect the acquisition process of failed banks; and (iii) how political
connections of non-financial acquirers influence the outcomes of acquisitions.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 2 of this thesis examines how firms make investment decisions, acquisi-
tions versus internal investment, amid financial distress. Distressed firms have been
involved in an economically significant amount of total M&A transaction volume in
the light of covenant-lite debt and low interest rates. This chapter examines whether
and why financial distress drives firms to make acquisitions. On the one hand, di-
versification benefits in acquisitions are particularly valuable for firms in financial
distress (diversification hypothesis). On the other hand, economic distress justifies
acquisition decisions by firms that have exhausted internal growth opportunities to
capture external growth opportunities and revive growth via acquisitions (growth
opportunity hypothesis). It is difficult to empirically distinguish financial distress
from economic distress. Exploiting a novel natural experiment setting, the analysis
identifies a causal link between financial distress and acquisition activities. While
conventional wisdom implies that relief from financial distress boosts corporate in-
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vestment, including acquisitions, distressed firms surprisingly reduce cash spending
when faced an exogenous reduction in the probability of bankruptcy. Consistently,
the evidence based on bank loans show distressed firms get more focused with a
shift in use-of-funds from external acquisitions to inward investment. Overall, the
evidence strongly supports the diversification hypothesis that financial distress can
motivate firms to diversify financial risk via acquisitions.
The third chapter focuses on the political economy of acquisitions of distressed
banks during the recent financial crisis. Unlike in corporate bankruptcy, where the
creditors take full control of default firms, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) is the sole controller of the bank resolution process and has discretionary
power to relocate failed bank assets to certain acquiring banks. Based on hand-
collected bidding information of 430 private auctions held by the FDIC for the sale of
distressed banks, this chapter presents an interesting finding that lobbying banks are
significantly more likely to win the auctions. The chapter further tests whether the
underlying mechanism is regulatory capture whereby the FDIC sells failed banks to
lobbying banks, which results in additional costs to public deposit insurance funds, or
the information channel whereby lobbying mitigates information asymmetry between
regulators and bidding banks and reduces resolution costs. In general, the empirical
evidence is more in line with the regulatory capture hypothesis.
The fourth chapter looks into how regulatory frictions impact general M&A ac-
tivities. By documenting in detail the U.S. antitrust review process for mergers and
acquisitions, this chapter reveals that regulatory uncertainty is a significant source of
deal completion risk and significantly affects shareholder wealth of both bidding firms
and target firms. There is a positive link between corporate lobbying efforts and deal
outcomes, which highlights the role of political connections in corporate investment.
The evidence suggests that firms mitigate regulatory frictions in investment activi-
ties through lobbying efforts. The results highlight the investment channel through
which political connections add to firm value.
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
1.3 Declaration of Contribution
Chapter 2 is based on a single-authored paper, Zhang (2017), “Why do distressed
firms acquire?” (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786721). I completed the
paper independently, including research question formulation, data collection, em-
pirical analysis, and writing.
Chapter 3 is based on a co-authored paper by Igan, Lambert, Wagner, and Zhang
(2017), “Winning Connections? Resolution of Failed Banks and Lobbying” (available
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980742). I actively participated in research question
formulation and research design, independently collected data, and performed all
empirical analysis.
Chapter 4 is based on a co-authored paper by Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, and Zhang
(2017), “Lobbying in mergers and acquisitions” (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2484669). I formulated the research question, designed empirical analysis, indepen-
dently collected data, performed all empirical analysis, and actively participated in
writing.
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Chapter 2
Why Do Distressed Firms Acquire?*
2.1 Introduction
In contrast to the intuition that financial distress inhibits mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As), distressed firms contribute an economically significant proportion of
aggregate takeover activities. Between 2010 and 2014, large U.S. public firms earned
over $1.4 trillion in the total value of acquisitions from distressed firms, over 18%
of which came from distressed firms.1 The market capitalization of these distressed
firms only amounted to 9% of the aggregate market capitalization. The question of
why distressed firms acquire so much is intriguing. While distressed acquirers may be
able to revive growth via external investment, acquired assets tend to be complemen-
tary to their core businesses, which suggests that diversification through M&As could
play a role. One recent acquisition that involved a deeply distressed firm making a
diversifying acquisition was SoftBank’s acquisition of ARM Holdings. In July 2016,
SoftBank, a multinational telecommunications and Internet service company with
approximately $200 billion in total assets but only $20 billion in equity, announced
*This chapter is based on Zhang (2017), “Why do distressed firms acquire?” (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2786721). I am grateful to Nihat Aktas, Aurore Burietz, Sudipto Das-
gupta, Eric de Bodt, Abe de Jong, Thomas Lambert, Meziane Lasfer, Hang Li, Qinghao Mao,
David Mauer, Xiaoran Ni, Buhui Qiu, Anjana Rajamani, Peter Roosenboom, Frederik Schlinge-
mann, Peter Swan, Wolf Wagner, Teng Wang, David Yermack, participants at seminars at Aarhus
University, BI Norwegian Business School, Erasmus University, Glasgow University, SKEMA Paris,
Tinbergen Institute, University of Lille 2, University of Southern Denmark, Vrije Universiteit Am-
sterdam, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, and participants at 2016 Australasian
Finance and Banking Conference, 2016 Corporate Finance Day (Antwerp), 2016 EUROFIDAI Paris
December Finance Meeting, and 2017 EFA Annual Meeting (Mannheim) for valuable suggestions
and comments. All errors are mine.
1I aggregate the deal value for acquisitions announced between 2010 and 2014 covered by SDC
Platinum. I require that the shares acquired or sought in the acquisitions are above 50% and the
acquirers are non-financial and non-utility firms in Compustat/CRSP with total assets over $100
million and non-missing estimated Merton’s distance-to-default. Firms with distance-to-default in
the bottom tercile are highly distressed. In total, these distressed firms made acquisitions worth
$252 million.
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an all-cash acquisition of the British chip design company, ARM Holdings.2 This
$32 billion deal was the largest acquisition ever in Asia and Europe, and received
worldwide attention due to SoftBank’s poor financial status and the fact that the
company was new to the semiconductor industry. Nevertheless, SoftBank conducted
asset sales and arranged a $10 billion syndicated loan to finance the acquisition.
SoftBank’s CEO regarded the acquisition as a “paradigm shift”, while the 11% drop
in stock price suggested that the company’s investors did not agree.3 Such anecdotal
evidence motivates us to further investigate the acquisitions made by distressed firms.
This study focuses on what drives distressed firms to engage in such acquisitions.
Previous literature has offered various theories and evidence on acquisitions of
distressed assets,4 while the research on acquisitions by distressed firms is scant. De-
pending on the nature of the distress, firms may benefit from acquisitions in different
ways. On the one hand, prior research has suggested that acquisitions may have di-
versification benefits for financially distressed firms (diversification hypothesis). For
example, diversifying acquisitions smooth cash flows(Levy and Sarnat, 1970, Billett
et al., 2004, Duchin, 2010) and consequently result in a decrease in asset volatility
and bankruptcy risk (Lewellen, 1971, Rubinstein, 1973, Higgins and Schall, 1975).
Moreover, diversifying acquisitions can increase the optimal leverage ratio (Leland,
2007) and allow distressed firms to finance positive NPV projects that they are unable
to finance as stand‐alones in the presence of agency costs (Fluck and Lynch, 1999).
Such diversification benefits of acquisitions are valuable for distressed firms (Hub-
bard and Palia, 2002).5 The empirical evidence in line with such a rationale shows
2The numbers are from SoftBank’s 2015 annual report. At the end of the 2015 fiscal year,
SoftBank had total assets of 21.03 trillion yen and a book equity of 2.6 trillion yen.
3SoftBank was in apparent financial distress, with an Altman’s Z-score of less than 1.2 and
a recent credit rating downgrade from BBB to a non-investment grade BB+. When SoftBank
conducted a series of high-profile asset sales prior to the announcement of the deal, investors spec-
ulated that SoftBank would use the $20 billion proceeds to bolster its financial status or increase
the stake in one of its existing investments. There was speculation that SoftBank would use the
proceeds from selling its most valuable assets—Alibaba shares—to purchase more shares of Ya-
hoo Japan. See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-02/softbank-s-proceeds-from-
alibaba-stake-to-reach-8-9-billion. For more details, see the news coverage on the deal (http://www.
wsj.com/articles/softbank-agrees-to-buy-arm-holdings-for-more-than-32-billion-1468808434), and
SoftBank’s press release (http://www.softbank.jp/en/corp/news/press/sb/2016/20160906_01/).
4Studies on acquiring distressed assets includes Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998), Rhodes-Kropf
and Viswanathan (2002), Clark and Ofek (1994), Meier and Servaes (2015), Billett et al. (2004),
among others.
5Diversifying acquisitions can increase debt capacity and reduce the probability of default (Le-
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that underperforming acquirers are more likely to acquire an unrelated target rather
than a same-industry target (Gormley and Matsa, 2011, Bruyland et al., 2016, Park,
2003). However, no empirical evidence exists that diversification of financial risk
drives distressed firms to acquire. On the other hand, firms make acquisitions when
they have exhausted their internal growth opportunities (growth opportunity hypoth-
esis). The management literature describes acquisition activities in distress as a type
of “turnaround” strategy.6 Such arguments are especially relevant to economically
distressed firms. Financial research also shows that a lack of investment opportuni-
ties within firms are correlated with acquisitions (McCardle and Viswanathan, 1994;
and Moeller et al., 2004); however, empirical evidence is inconclusive on whether
capturing growth opportunities drives acquisitions in financial distress.7
There are two major challenges thus far in testing these two hypotheses empir-
ically. First, it is difficult to isolate financially distressed firms from economically
distressed firms. A large fraction of firms exhibiting financial distress are also eco-
nomically distressed (Andrade and Kaplan, 2002). The two types of distress may
exacerbate each other, adding to the difficulties in identifying the potential benefits
of acquisitions for distressed firms. Second, firms may become distressed due to a se-
ries of reckless acquisition activities (reverse causality). Since acquisitions are large
investments, acquiring firms normally take on additional debt to finance the cash
payment of acquisitions. Higher leverage ratios are more likely to max out firms’
debt capacity and induce financial distress.
Dealing with the empirical difficulties in a natural experiment setting, this study
analyzes the patterns of acquisitions by distressed firms and investigates whether
financial risk drives distressed firms to acquire. The identification strategy is to
evaluate the change in acquisition activities versus internal capital expenditures for
land, 2007, Lewellen, 1971). Thus, the increase in leverage ratio due to debt financing for acquisitions
does not necessarily add to the default risk. In contrast, if a firm uses riskless assets (e.g. cash) to
pay down its debt, the leverage ratio decreases while the asset volatility increases (Duchin, 2010).
As debt repayment using cash may not decrease default risk, the net benefits of spending cash on
acquisitions may outweigh those of paying down debt.
6See Iyer and Miller (2008), Pearce and Robbins (1993), Schwartz (1984), Trahms et al. (2013),
and Grinyer et al. (1990).
7See Trahms et al. (2013) for a review of management and organizational research on turnaround
strategies and diversifying acquisitions.
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distressed firms upon an exogenous reduction in bankruptcy risk. In 2012, the IRS
substantially changed the tax treatment for creditors during debt restructuring. This
debt restructuring change (hereafter DRC) reduces restructuring costs for syndicated
loans and increases creditors’ willingness to renegotiate. Campello et al. (2016) find
that the DRC reduces distressed firms’ bankruptcy probability of distressed firms
with a high pre-existing syndicated-loan ratio by 13% and improves access to syndi-
cated loan credit for all distressed firms.8 Since the change in tax treatment applies
only to creditors and does not impact firms’ growth opportunity sets, it serves as a
clean shock to borrowers’ bankruptcy risk. I use this natural experiment to identify
the causal link between financial risk and corporate investment—and in particular,
acquisitions. The diversification hypothesis suggests that firms decrease acquisition
activities upon an exogenous reduction in bankruptcy probability due to the drop in
the value of diversification. Although the shock does not affect firms’ growth oppor-
tunity sets, it does improve their access to credit and financial health. The growth
opportunity hypothesis implies that distressed firms remain the same, or may even
increase acquisition activities due to improved access to credit and debt capacity.
In this paper, I first explore acquisition intensities for bankrupt firms in the years
prior to their Chapter 11 filings. Surprisingly, firms do not exhibit a monotonically
decreasing pattern in acquisition activities as they approach bankruptcy. On average,
the value of acquisitions made by distressed firms is about 5% of their total assets.
This ratio stays relatively constant from the sixth year to the third year before
filing for bankruptcy—even increasing two years before bankruptcy. The value of
diversifying acquisitions exhibits an increasing pattern, growing from 2.5% to 3.5%
of total assets, as distressed firms move closer to bankruptcy. The evidence does
not support the traditional view that financial distress inhibits firms from engaging
in acquisitions; rather, it confirms the observation based on anecdotal evidence that
distressed firms frequently engage in takeover activities.
Next, I investigate whether bankruptcy risk drives acquisitions in distress. The
primary challenge to examine the motivation for distressed firms’ acquisitions is the
8See Section 2.2 of this paper and Campello et al. (2016).
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10 Chapter 2. Why Do Distressed Firms Acquire?
possibility of limited growth opportunities within such firms, as well as demands
to diversify bankruptcy risk. I employ a triple-difference (difference-in-difference-in-
difference) approach using the DRC as an exogenous 13% reduction in the probability
of bankruptcy for distressed firms with a high syndicated-loan ratio in the balanced
sheets. A reduction of bankruptcy risk results in a drop of 41%, or two percentage
points relative to total assets, in cash expenditure on acquisitions for distressed firms
upon the shock. I consistently observe a similar drop in actual acquisitions announced
around the shock by 40% (2.4 percentage points), of which the major part is due
to the significant drop in diversifying acquisitions by 63% (2 percentage points).
Focusing on the 12-month periods around the DRC, I show that the reduction in
diversifying acquisitions is even larger, 2.6 percentage points of total assets, or 81% to
the pre-DRC average. Also, distressed firms borrow significantly less for acquisitions
because of the reduction in bankruptcy risk. Newly obtained credit for acquisition-
related purposes for distressed firms with a high syndicated-loan ratio decreases by
two percentage points of total assets, similar to the changes in cash expenditure on
acquisitions and announced acquisition value.
Finally, I explore the effects of acquisitions on distressed firms’ financial health.
Monthly estimations of asset volatility and estimated default probability of distressed
acquirers around acquisition announcements suggest that diversifying acquisitions
indeed attenuate firm risk and provide financial benefits compared with horizontal
acquisitions. Asset volatility tends to drop after distressed firms announce a diversi-
fying acquisition. Consequently, such diversification benefits slow the deterioration
of distressed firms’ financial health. Moreover, I find that, together with the reduc-
tion in acquisition activities, the treatment group increases future firm risk, proxied
by option-implied volatility. These additional results are again in line with the di-
versification hypothesis, rather than the risk-shifting hypothesis, which posits that
distressed firms acquire unrelated targets as a gambling investment strategy to take
excessive risk at the cost of debt holders.
This study makes several contributions. First, it adds to the general literature of
M&As by documenting the acquisition patterns of distressed firms and investigating
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motivations for such acquisitions. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that firms
in distress are unlikely to acquire,9 I find an increasing pattern of diversifying acqui-
sitions made by firms prior to bankruptcy. The evidence implies that diversification
benefits may have a positive effect on acquisition decisions for distressed firms. This
finding extends the literature of diversifying acquisitions, which has mainly focused
on the conglomerate waves between the 1960s and 1990s. The causal evidence that
bankruptcy risk drives diversifying acquisitions adds to the evidence of financial syn-
ergy or the co-insurance effect of acquisitions. In particular, Gormley and Matsa
(2011) show that firms, especially financially vulnerable firms, react to an increase
in firms’ business risk by diversifying acquisitions. However, they do not distinguish
risk associated with operating performance versus financial distress.10 In addition to
Gormley and Matsa (2011), I establish that diversification of financial risk dominates
the motivation to seek external growth opportunities. My finding also highlights a
diversification motivation in investment decisions for distressed acquirers, which ex-
tends the studies on acquisitions of distressed targets (Hubbard and Palia, 2002,
Billett et al., 2004).
Second, the current paper contributes to the existing literature on how financial
distress affects investment policies. Previous research documents the effects of fi-
nancial distress costs on investment decisions in the presence of market frictions (see
Myers, 2003). For example, financial distress could positively relate to investment
risk (risk shifting; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or negatively relate to investment
levels (debt overhang; Myers, 1977). Benefits of leverage are also present, includ-
ing preventing empire-building activities (free cash flow problems; Jensen, 1986) and
derailing inefficient investment (discipline effect; Chava and Roberts, 2008). The
current study highlights another important effect of financial distress on corporate
investment: the pressure to meet debt obligations incentivizes distressed firms to seek
diversifying investments, in particular, through acquisitions. It also implies that fi-
9For example, Kaplan (1989) finds that dramatic increases in leverage are associated with sharply
reduced investment; increasing debt is considered to be an effective way to curtail empire-building
acquisitions (Jensen, 1986).
10Gormley and Matsa (2011) identify the shock to business risk using the discovery of a chemical’
s carcinogenicity for firms in the relevant industry. Such a shock affects both economic and financial
distress of firms.
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nancial distress can drive corporate investments from internal organic growth toward
outward expansion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the data sources
and empirical design. Section 2.3 describes the acquisition intensities and character-
istics undertaken by distressed firms. Section 2.4 presents empirical analyses on
why distressed firms make acquisitions. Section 2.5 discusses alternative hypotheses.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Data and Empirical Methodology
This section provides a description of the empirical design. After a description of
my sample selection and data sources, I then introduce the exogenous shock for the
causal tests of motivations for distressed firms’ acquisitions and explain the identifi-
cation strategy. Finally, I describe the sample used in the main analyses.
2.2.1 Data
This study uses data from several sources. The firm sample starts with all large
firms that overlap in Compustat and CRSP from 2010 to 2015, excluding financial
and utility firms.11 I consider a firm “large” if it has start-of-period total assets
worth more than $100 million.12 Firm fundamental information is from Compustat
and stock price data from CRSP.
I collect all completed mergers and acquisitions from SDC Platinum between
2010 and 2014 with positive deal value, shares sought or shares acquired larger than
50%, and transaction types recorded as M&As or tender offers. I match the six-digit
CUSIPs of acquirers, their immediate parent firms, and their ultimate parent firms,
to the first six digits in CUSIPs of securities in CRSP. I drop deals that are worth
less than 1% of firms’ total assets.
In the analyses utilizing the natural experiment, I focus on the sample of large
firms between 2010 and 2014 that overlap in Compustat and CRSP. I match firm-
11I exclude financial industry (SIC header 6) and regulated industry companies (SIC headers 48
and 49).
12I adjust the dollar value of total assets to 2012 dollars by the Consumer Price Index and require
that the adjusted value of total assets for an individual firm is always above $100 million.
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year sample to LPC-Dealscan using the linking table provided by Chava and Roberts
(2008).13 Loans with missing facility amounts or missing maturities are excluded. I
further drop loans that are canceled, rumored, or suspended. Since the exogenous
shock (DRC) in later analyses applies to the U.S. market, I only retain completed
syndicated loans that originate in the U.S., with facility amounts above $100 million
to evaluate the usage of syndicated loans prior to the DRC.
I obtain bankruptcy data from the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database.
The database includes all Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings by Compustat firms over
$100 million at the time of bankruptcy. I drop Chapter 7 filings and bankrupt firms
emerging from previous bankruptcy cases.
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy
2.2.2.1 A natural experiment in corporate bankruptcy risk
The challenge in showing the causal relationships between the diversification or
growth opportunity motivation and acquisition activities of distressed firms is that
financially distressed firms tend to not only bear a high bankruptcy risk, but also lack
internal growth opportunities. Moreover, corporate financial health is endogenous
to investment activities, resulting in a reverse causality bias. An ideal setting to
disentangle the two potential motivations is to have a clean exogenous shock that
only affects one of the possible motivations and then to evaluate the consequent
change in acquisition activities. In this study, I rely on a tax change that only affects
the bankruptcy risk of certain distressed firms to test whether such firms adjust
acquisition activities as a result of the shock.
On September 12, 2012, the U.S. Treasury announced the new rules, IRS Regula-
tion T.D. 9599, that have significantly changed the income tax treatment of creditors
during debt restructuring (“DRC”).14 During corporate restructuring, the IRS treats
13I thank Chava and Roberts (2008) for making the linking table available online. Since the linking
table is current until August 2012, many unmatched loans may exist for firms that start utilizing
loan syndication in recent years. Thus, I also do robustness checks with only firms that can be
matched with the linking table during my sample period in order not to underestimate syndicated
loan usage systematically after the exogenous shock in September 2012.
14See Campello et al. (2016) for a more detailed description of the tax treatments. I benefit from
their excellent analysis of the event.
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significant modification on old debt issues as taxable exchanges for new debt issues
if the restructuring process occurs outside of Chapter 11 court.15 Debt holders must
report to the IRS for any capital income incurred. The tax base is the excess of
the value of the new debt over the “issue price” of the old debt. The specific tax
treatment depends on the classification of the debt as publicly traded debt or pri-
vately traded debt. In particular, these two types of debt are treated differently in
determining the value of the new debt after the restructuring process. Even though
an over-$1 trillion, actively traded, syndicated loan market had existed, the IRS did
not consider syndicated loans as publicly traded debt until the DRC in 2012.
Before the DRC, syndicated loans were classified as private debt. In such a case,
if a creditor of a syndicated loan is not the original lender, the creditor, upon out-of-
court debt restructuring, has to pay tax for the difference between the par value of the
new debt and the initial purchase price. The par value is usually the principal amount
while the corresponding purchase price for the distressed debt is always far below the
principal amount. Since the restructuring process frequently involves modification
of the maturity dates and yields but rarely the principal amount, the creditor who
has purchased the loan from a secondary market owes tax on a phantom gain—that
is, the difference between the principal amount and the market purchase price of the
distressed debt. It hinders the creditor from restructuring the debt since such costs
can be avoided if the creditor pushes the borrower to bankruptcy court.
After the shock on September 12, 2012, IRS treats debt over $100 million with
“indicative quotes” as publicly traded debt. In this case, the aforementioned creditor
is to pay tax for the excess of the fair market value and the market price at which
the creditor has purchased the loan. The adjusted tax treatment ensures that the
creditor owes capital income tax only on the capital gain from restructuring the debt.
The DRC reclassified syndicated loans from private debt into publicly traded
debt. Figure 2.2 presents an illustration of tax treatment. In a simple case in which
a syndicated loan with a principal amount of $1000 becomes distressed, its value drops
15The taxable income, which is called cancellation of debt income, can be fully exempted if the
debt is discharged under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Mandarino, 2010, Scarborough
and Caracristi, 2012).
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to $400 in distress, and the lender can opt for restructuring the distressed borrower
out of court. Before the DRC, the original lender does not incur any tax since the
principal amount stays unchanged regardless of whether she agrees to renegotiate
or liquidate it under bankruptcy proceedings. The lender can claim a tax credit
for her capital loss if she sells it to other investors who are willing to restructure
the borrower out of bankruptcy court. Suppose that the distressed loan is sold to
a new creditor at the market value of $400 and the creditor successfully enhances
the value of the distressed loan to $600 by renegotiating with the borrower. The
actual capital gain is, therefore, the added proportion in the value of the distressed
loan, ($600− $400 = $200). However, under the former tax treatment, the creditor’s
taxable income upon restructuring is based on the principal amount of the “new” loan,
$1000, and as such, she is liable for a high tax due to the phantom gain ($1000 −
$400 = $600). With a marginal tax rate of 35%, the tax ($200) is even higher
than the actual capital gain. On the other hand, the creditor does not have to pay
any tax if she pushes the borrower to Chapter 11 and restructures the loan after
the borrower files for bankruptcy. The tax change, DRC, fixes the phantom gain
problem by treating syndicated loans as publicly traded debt in debt restructuring.
After the DRC, the creditor only needs to pay a reasonable tax of $70; therefore,
the most direct consequence of the DRC is a potential tax reduction for debt holders
regarding renegotiating syndicated loans out of court. Syndicated-loan holders are
more incentivized to renegotiate the debt rather than go directly to bankruptcy
court after the DRC. Campello et al. (2016) show that, with the passage of the
DRC, markets anticipate more out-of-court renegotiations instead of bankruptcies.
Specifically, credit-default-swap (CDS) spreads dropped by 53 basis points, or 19%,
in the week the DRC was changed in cases of distressed firms with high syndicated-
loan ratio. The authors also estimate that bankruptcy probability decreases by 13%
and that over $100 billion is saved in potential tax for debt holders. Since the DRC
is a direct shock on the debt holders, it is a clean exogenous shock on the bankruptcy
risk for distressed firms to the extent of their syndicated-loan usage. In addition to
the effect of reducing bankruptcy probabilities for distressed firms with high usage of
syndicated loans, Campello et al. (2016) point out an indirect effect of the DRC: it
16 Chapter 2. Why Do Distressed Firms Acquire?
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also enhances access to credit for distressed firms. In particular, distressed firms are
8% more likely to obtain a new syndicated loan and receive a 28-basis-point drop in
loan markups after the DRC.
2.2.2.2 Tests of the diversification hypothesis versus the growth oppor-
tunity hypothesis
The main research question of this study is whether diversification benefits drives
distressed firms to engage in external investment, such as acquisitions. In particular,
I want to capture causal changes in investment activities when a change occurs in a
firm’s bankruptcy risk. When the bankruptcy probability drops, the need for a dis-
tressed firm to diversify should decrease. The DRC event serves as an instrument for
such change. In particular, the DRC quasi-experiment is an exogenous reduction in
corporate bankruptcy risk for a treatment group within distressed firms. The diversi-
fication hypothesis—i.e., diversification of bankruptcy risk is a driver for acquisition
in distress—predicts a reduction in acquisition activities when the risk of bankruptcy
decreases. Consequently, such a change in acquisition strategies should result in an
increase in firm risks due to these refocusing actions. Since the DRC does not affect
firm fundamentals directly and positively influences access to the syndicated-loan
market for distressed firms, the growth opportunity hypothesis predicts that dis-
tressed firms utilize the improved access to credit and increase acquisition activities
as a result of the DRC.
Such a predication provides motivation to compare various measurements of in-
vestment, especially acquisitions, for distressed firms with a high usage of syndicated
loans at the time of the DRC to distressed firms with low usage. Here I use the
ratio of syndicated loans relative to book value of assets (syndicated-loan ratio) as
the measure of syndicated-loan usage. The parallel-trends assumption is key when
determining the consistency of the DRC as an instrument. Economically, I need to
ensure that, in the absence of treatment with the DRC, the average change in the
investment variables would have been the same for both the treatment and control
groups. However, there is a concern that firms with a higher syndicated-loan ratio
have better relationships with banks and are therefore more likely to be able to make
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acquisitions. To address such potential inconsistency, I include non-distressed firms
and compare firms across the same levels of syndicated-loan ratio. Thus, the setup
of the treatment group involves a two-way division of the firm sample. I split the
sample by the syndicated-loan ratio and the degree of financial distress. The treat-
ment group is the sample of highly distressed firms with high a syndicated-loan ratio.
Therefore, I implement the comparison of acquisition intensities for the treatment
group versus the control groups via a triple-difference model for firm i in time t:
Acquisitionit =α+ β1HighSyndi + β2Distressedi + β3HighSyndi ×Distressedi
+ β4PostDRCt + β5HighSyndi × PostDRCt
+ β6Distressedi × PostDRCt
+ β7HighSyndi ×Distressedi × PostDRCt
+ γXit−1 + ηi + νt + εit.
(2.1)
In the above model, Distressedi is an indicator that equals one if firm i has a
high degree of financial distress at the time of the DRC, and 0 otherwise. The main
analyses use distance-to-default, based on Merton (1974). I calculate distance-to-
default following and Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008).
Distressedi equals one when distance-to-default for firm i is in the upper tercile at
the end of the month prior to the DRC. Results are robust to using Altman’s Z-score
as the distress measure, where Distressedi equals one if firm i has a Z-score below
1.9 prior to the DRC.
HighSyndi is an indicator that equals one if firm i is in the top half of syndicated-
loan usage at the time of the DRC. I measure the usage of syndicated loans by
syndicated-loan ratio. The ratio is calculated by dividing the total facility amount of
syndicated loans for firm i outstanding at the time of the DRC by the total assets
of firm i prior to the DRC. A qualifying syndicated loan has a start date before the
DRC month, an end date after the DRC month, and a facility amount over $100
million. PostDRCt is an indicator that equals one if time t is after the DRC. Time
t can be a fiscal year or a window of 12 months depending on the frequency of each
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dependent variable. Xit−1 is a vector of usual control variables. Appendix A.1 lists
detailed definitions for all variables. ηi is an industry fixed effect based on the four-
digit SIC. νt, a time fixed effect, takes away any fluctuations in aggregated merger
waves and absorbs the term, PostDRC. εit is a random error term that is potentially
correlated within firm observations and heteroskedastic (Petersen, 2008). I calculate
the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and cluster standard errors at the
firm level.
To improve the precision of the treatment effect estimation, I replace industry
fixed effects with firm fixed effects, ϕi. Equation (2.1) turns into a general triple-
difference model:
Acquisitionit =α+ β4PostDRCt + β5HighSyndi × PostDRCt
+ β6Distressedi × PostDRCt
+ β7HighSyndi ×Distressedi × PostDRCt
+ γXit−1 + ϕi + νt + εit.
(2.2)
The coefficient of interests in both Equation (2.1) and (2.2) is β7. A significantly
negative β7 indicates that investment activities decrease sharply following a reduc-
tion in bankruptcy probabilities for highly distressed firms with high syndicated-loan
usage. In a regression with a dependent variable measuring acquisitions, such a neg-
ative β7 would support the diversification motivation that bankruptcy risk is a driver
for distressed firms to make acquisitions.
2.2.2.3 Acquisition intensities
To measure corporate investment activities—primarily acquisitions—I construct
measures of intensities for acquisitions and internal investment from three different
sources:
I first examine the use of funds on various types of investment, including ac-
quisition expenditures, capital expenditures (CapEx) and research and development
spending (R&D). I extract information from Compustat and calculate annual acqui-
sition expenditures, CapEx, and R&D, standardized by start-of-period total assets.
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Acquisition expenditures are the cash spending in acquisitions net of cash acquired in
the targets, which normally expands the scope of operations (Graham et al., 2002).
Corporate CapEx is usually funds spent on physical assets such as property, plants,
and equipment. It normally maintains the scope of firm operations.
In addition to total annual spending on investment activities, I investigate actual
acquisition activities announced around the shock. Information on specific deals al-
lows me to identify and focus on diversifying acquisitions. Since small deals could
be trivial, only economically important deals larger than %1 of total assets are con-
sidered. I calculate the total value of diversifying acquisitions standardized by start-
of-period total assets (diversifying-acquisition value) and the number of diversifying
acquisitions announced (#diversifying acquisition) to evaluate the magnitude of di-
versifying acquisition activities.
After measuring investment activities based on the cash expenditure on invest-
ment activities, as well as the value of different types of takeover deals, I look into
what firms claim to do with newly obtained credit. I collect the primary purposes of
syndicated loans, provided by LPC-Dealscan, and categorize them into acquisitions,
CapEx, debt repayment, equity payout, operating liquidity, and so forth. Specif-
ically, I classify loans for “acquisition line,” “LBO,” “mergers,” or “takeovers” for
acquisition-related purposes, and loans for “capital expenditures,” “corporate pur-
poses,” or “project finance” for CapEx-related purposes. Similar to those of acquisi-
tion activities, I calculate total loan sizes (loan ratio) and newly obtained loan sizes
(new-loan ratio), standardized by start-of-period total assets, as well as the indicators
of borrowing new loans (new-loan dummy), for different purposes.
To reflect the effect of the DRC on firms’ future riskiness, I calculate a measure of
asset risk based on option-implied volatilities. I include all near-the-money stock op-
tions with positive open interests, positive best bid price, and non-missing expiration
dates. I further delete options with bid-ask spreads of more than 50% of the average
of the bid and ask prices. I calculate option-implied volatilities either utilizing the
last observation for each option in a period or weighting daily option observations
by volumes, following Bali and Hovakimian (2009) and Xing et al. (2010).
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2.2.2.4 Control variables
M&As are the most economically significant firm investments. Thus, the control
variables are common factors that affect investment decisions, including firm size,
leverage, liquidity, return on assets (ROA), cash flow, tangibility, market-to-book
ratio, and credit-rating fixed effects. I also include term premium, the difference
between the interest rates on ten-year Treasury bonds and two-year Treasury notes
to control for interest rate uncertainties. Interest rate uncertainties are shown to have
a sizable effect on the timing of investment (Chen, 1991, Ingersoll and Ross, 1992).
All control variables are lagged one year, except for cash flow and term premium,
which are contemporaneous with investment. See Appendix A.1 for details of variable
definitions.
2.2.3 Validity of the Natural Experiment
To obtain a consistent treatment-effect estimator, I need to ensure that any trends
in acquisitions for the treatment group, the distressed firms with high syndicated-loan
ratios (HighSynd), and control groups prior to the DRC are the same (see Roberts
and Whited, 2013). In Figure 2.3, I plot the average acquisition expenditures for
the treatment and control groups. Note that firms with a low distance-to-default
prior to the DRC were not necessarily distressed in the years before the DRC shock;
likewise, firms with a high syndicated-loan ratio prior to the DRC were not necessarily
with a high usage of syndicated loans before. Nevertheless, the average acquisition
expenditure of the treatment group (distressed and HighSynd) generally co-moves
with the three control groups until 2011, especially in non-distressed and HighSynd
firms, except for an outlier in 2007. There is a sharp drop in acquisition expenditures
for treatment group in 2012, which persist into 2013. No pre-shock trends exist that
could explain the sudden drop in 2012.
I further check whether the two dimensions along which I split my samples are
independent. One might speculate that excessive usage of syndicated loans drive
firms to become distressed, a negative correlation between syndicated-loan ratio and
distance-to-default. However, this speculation is not empirically supported: the cor-
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Figure 2.3. Parallel trends
This figure calculates the average acquisition expenditures between 2000 and 2014 for the four
groups of firms in the main sample. The black solid vertical line indicating the year of the DRC.
The gray shade indicate the post-DRC period. All variables are winsorized at the 1-99% levels.
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relation between syndicated-loan ratio and distance-to-default is 0.006 and statisti-
cally insignificant in the full sample of big firms prior to the DRC. Figure 2.4 depicts
the average distance-to-default across quintiles of syndicated-loan ratio in August
2012. The graph on the left depicts the full sample of non-financial and non-utility
firms over $100 million. Since many firms do not have syndicated loans outstanding,
the lowest two quintiles consist of firms with zero syndicated-loan ratios and collapse
into one group. The graph on the right excludes firms that do not have any syndi-
cated loans outstanding between 2010 and 2014. Both graphs fail to show a mono-
tonic relationship between syndicated-loan ratio and distance-to-default. Therefore,
the checks on the parallel trend assumption suggest that the triple-difference test is
appropriate.
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Figure 2.4. The relationship between Distance-to-Default and Syndicated-Loan
Ratio
This figure presents average distance-to-default across quintiles of syndicated-loan ratios.
distance-to-default is adjusted to firm size. The syndicated-loan ratio is the total amount of
syndicated loans outstanding at the end of August 2012 over total assets. Syndicated loans with
the amount less than $100 million, syndicated outside of the U.S., or with status as “canceled”,
“suspended”, or “rumored” are excluded. In the graph on the left, the sample include all
non-financial and non-utility firm between 2010 and 2014, with total assets at the beginning of the
year over $100 million (in 2012 dollars). Due to the large number of zero syndicated-loan ratios
observations, the second lowest quintile of syndicated-loan ratios collapse with the lowest quintile.
In the graph on the right, the sample excludes firms that have no active syndicated loan
outstanding during the sample period (2010-2014). All variables are winsorized at the 1-99% levels.
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2.3 Acquisitions by Distressed Firms
This section describes patterns and characteristics of acquisitions made by dis-
tressed firms. First, I summarize the acquisition activities for bankrupt firms in
the years prior to their Chapter 11 filings. I then compare acquisition characteris-
tics by distressed acquirers to those by non-distressed acquirers. Finally, I compare
acquisition activities of treatment firms and control firms prior to the DRC.
2.3.1 Acquisitions before Bankruptcy
I first look into the time-series pattern of distressed firms’ acquisitions. Since
financial health and investment activities are highly endogenous and correlated, I
utilize a very different sample in which the financial distress changes monotonically
over time—that is, firms that actually go into Chapter 11 bankruptcy later. This ad
hoc distressed firm sample that is based on the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research
Database consists of large non-financial/utility firms with total assets over $100 mil-
lion at the last year before Chapter 11 filings between 1990 and 2014, excluding
those firms emerging from a previous Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In total, there are 418
unique firms. The number of firms drops sharply to less than 200 in the period more
than six years before bankruptcy (year ≤ −6). Figure 2.1 shows financial distress
and acquisition activities during the ten-year period prior to Chapter 11 filings (year
0). The estimations tend to be more volatile for years earlier than six years prior to
bankruptcy due to the drop in the number of observations. The first graph checks
the financial distress measures. The estimated default probability, the cumulative
normal distribution probability of (−distance-to-default), increases exponentially as
bankruptcy approaches. Compared to the measure of distressed dummy later in the
analysis, these firms are on average distressed from year −4. Consistently, the classi-
cal financial distress measure, Altman’s Z-score, drops monotonically from year −6
and reaches about 0.5 in the last year before bankruptcy. This graph confirms that
firms’ financial health deteriorates rapidly as bankruptcy approaches.
The second graph and third graph measures acquisition activities during the years
before Chapter 11 bankruptcy. I only consider completed deals announced in the
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fiscal year, with shares acquired over 50% and deal value over 1% of start-of-period
total assets. Around 15% of firms engage in at least one acquisition until year −3,
and at least 12% make acquisitions during the last two years before bankruptcy. The
acquisition value—the aggregated acquisition value announced in a year, scaled by
start-of-period total assets—is also quite stable, except for a sharp drop in the last
year prior to bankruptcy. The third graph for diversifying acquisitions only considers
diversifying acquisitions in which the acquirer and the target have different three-
digit SIC codes, and shows an increasing trend of diversifying acquisitions when firms
become more distressed and closer to bankruptcy. Over 10% of firms make at least
one large diversifying acquisition starting from the fourth year prior to bankruptcy.
With the exception of the drop in the last year, the diversifying-acquisition value also
demonstrates an increasing pattern: rising from about 2.5% relative to total assets
in year −6 to about 3.5% in year −2.
To sum up, the figure on acquisitions by large firms that become subsequently
bankrupt shows that firms do not decrease acquisition activities, or even make more
diversifying acquisitions, while approaching closer to bankruptcy, which is consistent
with both the diversification hypothesis and the growth opportunities hypothesis.
This descriptive analysis suffers from endogenous biases. For instance, it could be
the increasing diversifying growth that eventually drives these firms into bankruptcy.
Therefore, I use the triple-difference tests around the SRC in Section 2.4 to distinguish
the two hypotheses and address to the reverse-causality bias.
2.3.2 Acquisition Expenditures and Value
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for firm-year observations in the sample
for the main results in Section 2.4. The sample contains all Compustat/CRSP firms
with start-of-period total assets over $100 million in 2012 dollars, but excludes finan-
cial and utility firms. Sample firms further require a non-missing distance-to-default
estimation in August 2012. The sample eventually consists of 5505 firm-year obser-
vations.
On average, firms spend more on CapEx than on acquisition expenditures. In
regard to cash expenditures, firms spend 3.4% relative to total assets on acquisitions,
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although over half of the sample firms do not have a positive acquisition expenditure.
CapEx is higher than acquisition expenditure, with a mean of 6.1% and median
3.7%. R&D expenditures are similar to acquisition expenditures, with a mean of
2.8%. The aggregate acquisition deal value, acquisition value, is 2.8% relative to
total assets, similar to acquisition expenditures. Over half of the acquisition value
is from diversifying acquisitions in which the acquirer and the target have different
three-digit SIC codes. Relative to total assets, the diversifying-acquisition value
amounts to 1.6%.
Sample firms on average hold 31.4% syndicated loans. Loans for acquisition-
related purposes amounts to 5.2% relative to total assets, or 16.6% of total loan size
outstanding (5.2%/31.4%). Newly borrowed loans for acquisitions (new-acquisition-
loan ratio) amounts to 1.7% relative to total assets, about a third of the average
acquisition-loan ratio. Loans for CapEx-related purposes amounts to more than
three times of that for acquisition-related purposes, for both the CapEx-loan ratio
and the new-CapEx-loan ratio. Only 3.6% of sample firms borrow new syndicated
loans for acquisitions, while 24.3% of firms borrow for CapEx.
I further split the sample into four subsamples, following the triple-difference
setting. Table 2.2 describes the cross-sectional acquisition intensities in subsamples
prior to the DRC, as well as t-test results for comparison. I sort unique firms along
distance-to-default and syndicated-loan ratio prior to the DRC.
The treatment group, distressed firms with high syndicated-loan ratio have, on
average, acquisition expenditures of 5.9%. Diversifying-acquisition value is 3.2%,
almost doubling the main sample average (1.6%). These numbers are slightly higher
than those of non-distressed firms also with high syndicated-loan ratios. When firms
ex ante have a high syndicated-loan ratio, distressed firms do not acquire less than
non-distressed firms. However, conditional on low syndicated-loan ratio, distressed
firms acquire significantly less in both acquisition expenditures and acquisition value.
All the acquisitions intensity measures for distressed firms are only up to half of those
of non-distressed firms with the condition that firms have conditional on that firms
have a low syndicated-loan ratio. Comparison across firms’ financial health suggests
Chapter 2. Why Do Distressed Firms Acquire? 27
Table 2.1. Summary statistics: main sample
The table describes the sample firms’ characteristics in the main analyses. The panel data consists
of Compustat/CRSP firms with start-of-period total assets over $100 million (adjusted according
to the CPI to 2012 dollars) between 2010 and 2014. Financial firms and utility firms are excluded.
Firm size, leverage, liquidity, market-to-book, ROA, tangibility, distance-to-default, estimated
default probability, and Altman’s Z-score are measured at the beginning of the year, while others
are measured at the end of year. See Appendix A.1 for details of variable definitions. All variables
are winsorized at the 1-99% levels.
N Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75
Acquisition expenditures 5172 0.034 (0.091) 0.000 0.000 0.019
CapEx 5493 0.061 (0.072) 0.020 0.037 0.071
R&D 5502 0.028 (0.055) 0.000 0.000 0.028
Acquisition dummy 5502 0.178 (0.383) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Acquisition value 5502 0.029 (0.100) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Diversifying-acquisition value 5502 0.016 (0.066) 0.000 0.000 0.000
#Diversifying acquisition 5502 0.142 (0.406) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Syndicated-loan ratio 5502 0.240 (0.420) 0.000 0.050 0.330
Syndicated-loan ratio (all loans) 5502 0.314 (0.620) 0.000 0.148 0.413
Acquisition-loan ratio 5502 0.052 (0.187) 0.000 0.000 0.000
CapEx-loan ratio 5502 0.182 (0.379) 0.000 0.042 0.240
New-acquisition-loan ratio 5502 0.017 (0.127) 0.000 0.000 0.000
New-CapEx-loan ratio 5502 0.060 (0.205) 0.000 0.000 0.000
New-acquisition-loan dummy 5502 0.036 (0.187) 0.000 0.000 0.000
New-CapEx-loan dummy 5502 0.243 (0.429) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm size 5502 7.569 (1.728) 6.180 7.427 8.676
Leverage 5482 0.260 (0.206) 0.096 0.226 0.381
Liquidity 5502 0.149 (0.149) 0.044 0.103 0.204
Market-to-book 5499 1.786 (1.086) 1.095 1.460 2.086
ROA 5331 0.045 (0.102) 0.020 0.059 0.094
Cash flow 5500 0.071 (0.111) 0.042 0.085 0.125
Tangibility 5502 0.313 (0.253) 0.107 0.223 0.480
Term premium 5502 1.992 (0.492) 1.570 1.720 2.560
Distance-to-default 5030 6.935 (5.950) 2.318 5.648 10.404
Estimated default probability 5030 0.081 (0.213) 0.000 0.000 0.010
Altman’s Z-Score 5105 3.355 (3.142) 1.547 2.816 4.411
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that when firms have a high usage of syndicated loans, financial distress does not
restrict firms acquisition intensities.
Given a certain level of financial distress, firms with a high syndicated-loan ratio
tend to acquire more than those with low syndicated-loan ratios. For distressed
firms, this gap is up to 4.5% for general acquisition activities. Distressed firms with
low syndicated-loan ratios only spend around 1.6% (0.7%) relative to total assets on
(diversifying) acquisitions, which is 4.3% (2.5%) significantly less than then treatment
group. For non-distressed firms, the difference persists but it is of less economic and
statistical significance.
The previous observations on the cross-sectional comparison is consistent with
financial theories that access to credit restricts investment expenditures for finan-
cially unhealthy firms (see, for instance, Whited, 1992). It also suggests that when
distressed firms have good access to the credit market, their acquisition intensities
could be as much as non-distressed firms’.
2.3.3 Acquisition Characteristics
What types of acquisitions do distressed acquirers make? I directly compare the
characteristics of acquisitions by distressed firms to those by non-distressed firms.
I sort full sample firms between 2010 and 2014 by their start-of-period distance-to-
default. Distressed acquirers have distance-to-default in the bottom tercile, while
non-distressed acquirers in the upper tercile. Table 2.6 describes the average acqui-
sition characteristics of deals by the two groups of firms, as well as t-test results
comparing the two. Distressed firms on average announce less acquisitions than non-
distressed firms—the number of deals by distressed acquirers is only 42.0% (368/877)
of that by non-distressed acquirers. An average deal announced by distressed firms is
of $527 million, 30% significantly less than that announced by non-distressed firms.
Distressed firms also pay significantly less in cash—54.2% compared to 64.6% of
non-distressed acquirers.
The percentages of diversifying acquisitions are similar for distressed firms and
non-distressed firms, 47.3% and 49.7%, respectively. To better capture the degree of
diversification for the acquisitions, I evaluate the closeness between industries of the
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acquirer and the target and distinguish the diversification benefits associated with
cash flow risk and with investment opportunities (market-to-book and Tobin’s q), re-
spectively. I calculate the correlations of industry average cash flow, market-to-book,
and Tobin’s q over the previous 10 years between three-digit primary SIC industries of
the acquirer and the target, following Duchin (2010).16 As the correlation lowers, the
more the acquisitions diversify. The average industry market-to-book and Tobin’s q
correlations of acquisitions by distressed firms are significantly lower than those by
non-distressed firms. Such a cross-sectional comparison on acquisition characteristics
indicates that distressed acquirers engage in deals with more diversification benefits.
Specifically, distressed firms are significantly more likely to make acquisitions that
diversify investment opportunities than non-distressed firms.
The announcement return (2 percentage points) of distressed acquirers is signifi-
cantly higher than that of non-distressed acquirers, which does not necessarily mean
that the stock markets recognize the benefits of diversification and positively react
to deal announcements by distressed acquirers. Another explanation may be that
private targets are usually associated with higher acquirer returns. The majority
(90.8%) of targets by distressed acquirers is private. The acquirer returns that are
conditional on public targets are not significantly different between distressed and
non-distressed acquirers, which is in line with the latter explanation.
2.4 Motivations for Acquisitions
2.4.1 Acquisition Expenditures and Corporate Investment: Main Results
Figure 2.1 reveals that distressed firms actively make acquisitions. The increasing
pattern in diversifying acquisitions suggests that diversification could drive distressed
firms to acquire. However, it is also possible that distressed firms make acquisitions in
other industries because of the scarcity of growth opportunities within their original
industries (McCardle and Viswanathan, 1994). Moreover, the descriptive evidence
does not rule out reverse causality bias that distress or bankruptcy is caused by exces-
16I exclude multi-segment firms, small firms with total assets less than $10 million, irregular
observations with sales growth, or asset growth larger than 150%, as well as industries with fewer
than 3 years of valid data.
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sive acquisitions. To understand why distressed firms engage in acquisitions, I con-
duct causal tests based on an exogenous reduction in bankruptcy probabilities. The
exogenous shock—i.e., the announcement of the DRC—reduces bankruptcy proba-
bilities because it enhances creditors’ willingness to renegotiate default debt instead
of pushing it to Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Therefore, it neither affects the growth op-
portunities within and outside firms nor directly alters any operating activities. The
DRC cleanly separates the diversification motivation from the growth opportunities
motivation. The diversification hypothesis implies that distressed firms have less in-
centive to diversify when their bankruptcy risk decreases. Conversely, the growth
opportunities hypothesis suggests no change or positive increase in acquisitions, as
a reduction in bankruptcy risk does not affect the growth opportunity set, but does
increase the debt capacity of treated firms to allow for more acquisitions. The DRC
serves as a positive shock in bankruptcy risk for distressed firms. The degree of such
firms’ exposure to the shock depends on the proportion of affected syndicated loans
in their balance sheets at the time of the DRC. Thus, the diversification hypothesis
predicts that a distressed firm spends less on acquisitions after the DRC if it receives
a larger reduction in bankruptcy probability from the DRC.
I focus on the period of 2010-2014 in my sample to study the effects of the DRC
(in 2012) on acquisition activities. All sample firms have start-of-period total assets
over $100 million during the period from 2010 to 2014. I evaluate the changes in
acquisition expenditure in a triple-difference setting in Table 2.4, following Equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2). The treated group is the intersection of distressed firms and
firms with high syndicated-loan ratios—distressed and HighSynd firms. The data is
a panel data, and therefore, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are included.
PostDRC equals one if the firm-year observation is in or after 2012. All variables
are winsorized at the 1-99% level. In column 1, I estimate the level changes for the
treatment group of acquisition expenditures, without any control variables. The co-
efficient of the triple interaction term HighSynd×Distressed×PostDRC is negative
and significant. It shows that acquisition expenditure for the treatment group, highly
distressed firms with high syndicated-loan ratio, drops significantly by 1.9 percentage
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points. The estimated triple-difference effect is consistently around two percentage
points and negatively significant, when more controls and fixed effects are included.
Column 3 shows the results of the regression with the full set of controls. Column
4, as in equation (2.2), presents the estimation of the reduction in acquisition ex-
penditures due to the exogenous reduction in bankruptcy risk up to 2.4 percentage
points. The magnitude of such a drop is substantial, which is 40.7% of the average
acquisition expenditure for the treated group (0.059).
In order to check whether the decline in acquisitions is due to the decrease in the
demand to diversify or simply a general pattern in all investment activities, I con-
duct the same regressions using CapEx and R&D costs as the dependent variables
in columns 5 and 6. In contrast to the effects on acquisition expenditures, treated
distressed firms tend to insignificantly increase capital expenditures or R&D spend-
ing. The finding shows that the DRC only negatively affects acquisition expenditure
rather than all types of investment. Since acquisitions are more likely to substan-
tially expand the scope of the firm than internal investment, the results suggest that
treated firms become more focused on internal investment by reducing diversifying
investment.
All in all, the triple-difference analyses of acquisition expenditure confirm the
trend of acquisitions made by distressed firms in recent years and strongly support
the diversification hypothesis.
2.4.2 Acquisition Expenditures and Corporate Investment: Robustness
In this subsection, I show that the main results are robust to using a standard
difference-in-difference setting, keeping syndicated-loan borrowers only, and including
mid-distressed firms, besides using Altman’s Z-score.
Although concern about using triple-difference estimations is that the result is
driven by certain control groups with irregular trends, the parallel assumption check
in Figure 2.3 does not suggest this is the case. Nonetheless, I run standard difference-
in-difference regressions in Panel A of Table 2.5. I compare distressed firms across
levels of syndicated-loan ratio in columns 1, 2, 5, and 7, while HighSynd firms between
distressed and non-distressed in columns 3, 4, 6, and 8. In columns 1 to 4, the depen-
34 Chapter 2. Why Do Distressed Firms Acquire?
Table 2.4. Triple-Difference Regression Analyses of Acquisition Expenditures,
Capital Expenditures, and R&D around the DRC
This table presents triple-difference OLS regression results of acquisition and other investment
expenditures between 2010 and 2014. This panel data include all firms with total assets over $100 million
(in 2012 dollars) at the beginning of fiscal years. Firms in financial and utility industries are excluded.
Distressed dummy takes the value of one if the firm’s distance-to-default in August 2012 is in the bottom
tercile, and zero for non-distressed firms in the top tercile. Firms in the middle tercile are omitted.
HighSynd dummy takes the value of one for firms with pre-existing syndicated-loan ratios in August
2012 above median, and zero for firms below median. Loan facilities over $100 million syndicated in the
U.S. starting before September 2012 and ending after September 2012 are considered when calculating
pre-existing syndicated-loan ratios. PostDRC takes the value of one if the fiscal year is 2012 or later and
is absorbed by year fixed effects. Acquisition expenditures measure the cash spending on acquisitions.
CapEx is capital expenditures. R&D is expenditures on research, development, and advertising. Control
variables include start-of-period firm characteristics (firm size, leverage, liquidity, market-to-book, ROA,
tangibility), firm cash flow in the current year, and term premium at the end of year. Credit-rating fixed
effects control for 23 level of firms’long-term credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s (including a fixed
effect for unrated firms). Industry fixed effects are at the four-digit SIC level. Please see Table A.1 for
further information on variable definitions. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at
the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Acquisition expenditures CapEx R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Distressed -0.003 -0.005 0.014∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.008∗
(-0.61) (-1.02) (2.24) (5.93) (-1.84)
HighSynd 0.017∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.007∗∗
(2.87) (3.96) (4.69) (-1.35) (-1.98)
Distressed×HighSynd 0.009 0.005 0.004 -0.017∗∗ 0.007
(1.01) (0.59) (0.37) (-2.55) (1.40)
Distressed×PostDRC -0.011∗ -0.011∗ -0.006 0.003 -0.008∗ 0.003
(-1.89) (-1.79) (-1.00) (0.41) (-1.79) (1.29)
HighSynd×PostDRC -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.003
(-0.02) (0.14) (-0.28) (-0.26) (1.15) (-1.43)
Distressed×HighSynd×PostDRC -0.019∗ -0.020∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.024∗∗ 0.006 0.003
(-1.76) (-1.85) (-1.96) (-2.19) (1.03) (1.12)
Firm size -0.003∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001
(-1.71) (-6.49) (0.13) (-1.01)
Leverage -0.029∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(-3.19) (-5.92) (-5.58) (-3.30)
Liquidity 0.006∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.002
(3.19) (5.00) (2.05) (1.63)
Market-to-book 0.003 0.009∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(1.31) (2.23) (6.31) (9.56)
ROA 0.082∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.019 -0.067∗∗∗
(4.92) (2.54) (1.50) (-6.41)
Cash flow -0.035∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(-2.80) (-3.80) (4.78) (-6.90)
Tangibility -0.047∗∗∗ 0.035 0.129∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗
(-3.65) (0.89) (9.83) (-2.65)
Term premium -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(-0.35) (-0.08) (0.95) (1.47)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Credit-rating fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Observations 5172 5172 4991 4991 5307 5314
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.071 0.092 0.105 0.471 0.631
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Figure 2.5. Drop in acquisition expenditures upon the reduction in bankruptcy risk
due to the DRC in 2012.
This figure presents the average acquisition spending by non-financial and non-utility firms
between 2010 and 2014, sorted into four groups by their exposure to the DRC’s impact on
bankruptcy risk. Sample firms have total assets over $100 million in 2012 dollars at the beginning
of the year. The value on y-axis is acquisition expenditures, adjusted to firm size. Distressed firms
are in the bottom tercile of distance-to-default measured in August 2012, and non-distressed firms
are in the upper tercile. HighSynd firms have above-median pre-DRC syndicated-loan ratios, while
LowSynd indicates the lower half. Syndicated-loan ratio is the ratio of the total amount of all
qualifying loan outstanding in August 2012 and total assets in the most recent fiscal year end prior
to September 2012. Syndicated loans with the amount less than $100 million, syndicated outside
of the U.S., or with status as “canceled”, “suspended”, or “rumored” are excluded. All variables
are winsorized at the 1-99% levels.
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dent variables are acquisition expenditures. The different-in-difference estimations
are consistently around -2.3 percentage points, almost identical to the triple-difference
estimations. Column 1 implies that distressed firms with high syndicated-loan ra-
tios spend 2.7 percentage points more than those with low syndicated-loan ratios;
however, the gap diminishes after the DRC when the treated distressed firms reduce
acquisitions expenditures by a comparable 2.4 percentage points. Column 2 suggests
that within HighSynd firms, distressed firms acquire as much as non-distressed firms,
but cut acquisitions expenditures by 2.4 percentage points upon the DRC. CapEx
and R&D do not decrease even under the difference-in-difference setting. In the
HighSynd subsample, distressed firms increase R&D significantly due to the DRC.
The standard difference-in-difference regression results show that the main results
are robust to compare along either dimension, the pre-existing syndicated-loan ratio
or distant-to-default.
Since almost half of the sample includes firms with zero syndicated-loan ratios
(mostly due to no matches within the LPC Dealscan dataset), I run the regressions in
the subsample of those matched to Dealscan to address to the matching inaccuracy
concerns. In columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.5, Panel B, I only keep firms that have
any syndicated loans outstanding between 2010 and 2014 and run the regression of
acquisitions expenditures on the full set of independent variables and controls. The
estimations of the treatment effect are very close to those in the main sample.
Because firms in the middle tercile (gray zone) of pre-DRC distant-to-default are
dropped in the main analysis, thus, resulting in a loss of a third of the full sample,
a potential concern is that the results are sensitive to this filtering. In columns 3
and 4 in Table 2.5, Panel B, I add back these mid-distressed firms. The drops in
acquisitions expenditures are still estimated around two percentage points, although
slightly less than those without gray-zone firms.
2.4.3 Diversifying Acquisitions
Table 2.6 reports the results when measuring acquisition intensity based on an-
nounced deals. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is aggregated value of all
completed acquisitions announced in the year, scaled by start-of-period total assets
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(acquisition value).17 In column 1, the drop in acquisition value is 1.8 percentage
points, significant only at the 15% level. In column 2, the generalized triple-difference
model provides a more precise estimation of the drop, 2.4 percentage points, which
is again consistent with previous estimations. Even though the majority of the tar-
gets by distressed acquirers are private, I can make use of the industry informa-
tion to identify diversifying acquisitions based on the primary three-digit SIC codes.
Diversifying-acquisition value measures aggregated value of all completed and di-
versifying acquisitions announced in the year, scaled by start-of-period total assets.
Column 4 estimates a drop in diversifying-acquisitions value of two percentage points.
Economically，this is a substantial drop of 62.5%, given that the pre-DRC treatment
group average diversifying-acquisition value is 3.2 percentage points.
In addition to panel regressions using annual data, I also analyze the actual diver-
sifying acquisitions announced in shorter periods around the shock DRC. The SDC
acquisition data provides more timely measurements of major acquisition activities.
I focus on 12-months periods before and after the DRC, and exclude the month of
September in 2012 when the DRC was announced. I summarize the acquisitions
made by firms during the two 12-month windows before and after the DRC, and
construct a two-period panel data following Campello et al. (2016). I only keep two
observations for each firm, while the two observations are based on the two 12-month
windows around the DRC, respectively. The two-period panel data includes fewer
observations than the five-year panel data in Section 2.4.1. I regress the aggregate
diversifying-acquisition value following Equation (2.1). The diversification hypothesis
predicts that treated firms reduce more acquisition activities compared with control
groups, which is supported by the negative coefficients of the triple-difference term
HighSynd×Distressed× PostDRC.
Columns 5 to 7 in Table 2.6 report the results of triple-difference regressions us-
ing two-period diversifying acquisition data. Column 1 reports the standard triple-
difference regression result of diversifying-acquisition value, while column 2 represents
17The differences between acquisition value and acquisition expenditures include: acquisition value
capture the aggregate deal value while acquisition expenditures value the cash expenditure; acqui-
sition value excludes small deals; acquisition value measures acquisition intensity according to the
deal commencement dates while acquisition expenditures based on deal effective and payment dates.
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the generalized triple-difference regression result. Both regressions generate signif-
icantly negative coefficients around -2.6 percentage points for the triple-difference
terms. The economic magnitude is substantial, up to 81.3% of pre-DRC distressed
acquisition value. The decline in diversifying acquisition activities is not only by
the value, but it is also by the number of new deals. The dependent variable of
the Poisson regression in column 7 is the number of new diversifying acquisitions
announced in each 12-month period. The treated distressed firms reduce the number
of diversifying acquisition by 58.8% (e−0.887 = 41.2%), due to the DRC. Therefore,
the results based on the actual acquisitions in 12-month windows around the DRC
confirms the supporting evidence for the diversification hypothesis in Section 2.4.1.
To sum up, the results based on SDC deal information are in line with the diver-
sification hypothesis that distressed firms refocus by reducing acquisition activities
upon a reduction in bankruptcy risk.
2.4.4 Use of Proceeds
In addition to studying the actual acquisitions around the DRC, I look into the
use of newly obtained funds. In particular, I look into the use of loans proceeds
around the DRC as another dimension to verify the drop in acquisition activities. I
categorize syndicated loans into different types of investment activities, according to
their primary purposes provided by Dealscan. Acquisition-related investment pur-
poses include acquisition line, mergers, takeovers, and so forth, while CapEx-related
investment purposes are capital expenditure, corporate purposes, and project finance.
In contrast to acquisition-related investment, CapEx-related investments are spent
internally and more likely to refocus firm operations rather than diversifying firm
scope. Non-investment purposes are debt repayment, equity payout, operating liq-
uidity, and so forth. I aggregate the loans obtained in each of the 12-month periods
and conduct triple-difference regressions.
Results of the use of proceeds are shown in Table 2.7. Splitting the investment
activities into acquisition-related and CapEx-related activities, I observe a shift in
borrowing patterns. Columns 1 to 3 report the effect of the DRC on the new-
loan ratios obtained in each period scaled by start-of-period total assets. The net
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effect of an exogenous reduction in bankruptcy probabilities is that the treatment
group borrows significantly less by two percentage points for acquisition activities.
In comparison, borrowing for CapEx does not change significantly. Looking at the
value of all outstanding loans relative to firm size (loan ratio) in columns 4 and
5, I observe that total loan outstanding for acquisitions drops by 3.4 percentage
points while borrowing for CapEx increases insignificantly. Columns 6 and 7 further
confirm that the likelihood of borrowing for acquisition-related purposes drops by
3.3 percentage points, while borrowing for CapEx increases insignificantly by 2.8
percentage points.
Therefore, triple-difference regressions on the use of proceeds provide more sup-
port for the diversification hypothesis.
2.5 Discussion on Alternative Hypotheses
2.5.1 Risk Shifting
Financial distress can positively relate to investment risk because of agency costs
(risk shifting; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since an acquisition is a type of corporate
investment, it is possible that a reduction in acquisition resulting from the DRC is
due to a reduction of investment in riskier assets when the DRC has relieved financial
distress by reducing bankruptcy risk. Acquisitions involve dealing with incorporating
business outside of a firm’s scope. Even though external investment like acquisitions
can diversify the scope of operations, it can also be a gambling strategy shifting firm
operations to an unfamiliar business environment. The alternative hypothesis based
on a risk-shifting argument may explain the causal results from the triple-difference
analyses on acquisitions.
I directly check the assumption that the acquisitions that distressed firms make
add to firm risk. I use monthly estimations of asset volatility and estimated default
probability generated with the distance-to-default variable. Figure 2.6 plots the
monthly estimation of asset volatility and estimated default probability around deal
announcement months. I split deals into diversifying acquisitions and horizontal
acquisitions based on three-digit SICs and firms according to their distance-to-default
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in the month prior to announcement. Asset volatility increases when distressed firms
make acquisitions, but drop in the long term. Since distressed firms tend to make
diversifying acquisitions, the evidence that such diversifying acquisitions reduce asset
volatility is not in line with the risk shifting hypothesis.
Moreover, I also check whether firm risk changes due to changes in acquisitions
upon the DRC. Since risk variables such as asset volatility and distance-to-default
based on Merton’s Model, measure current firm risk, the DRC directly impacts these
measures and do not fully capture the changes in firm risk due to changes in ac-
quisitions. A more appropriate measure is to capture firm future risk. Christensen
and Prabhala (1998) argue that volatility implied by options forecast future volatil-
ity. Thus, I proxy for firm future risk by option-implied volatility, following Bali
and Hovakimian (2009) and Xing et al. (2010). I average the implied volatilities of
all call options for each firm-year observation by either focusing on their last obser-
vations or weighting by trading volumes.18 I also calculate the implied volatilities
based on put options, as well as on the arithmetic average of call- and put-option-
implied volatilities. Table 2.8 reports the results of triple-difference regressions with
the option-implied volatility as the dependent variable using the five-year panel data
as in Table 2.4. I control for firm characteristics and industry and year fixed effects.
In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variables are based on the last observations of each
eligible option. Firm risk proxied by option-implied volatility based on call options
increases significantly by around 0.02, or 5.6%. Increases of the same magnitude
are not significant if I use average or put-option based option-implied volatility as
dependent variables. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar if I use
trading volumes as weights to calculate the option-implied volatility in columns 4 to
6. However, the risk-shifting argument should predict a reduction in firm risk to-
gether with a reduction in acquisitions if the acquisitions made by distressed firms are
indeed riskier. I observe a marginally significant increase in firm risk for the treated
firms after the DRC, which is inconsistent with the alternative hypothesis. Hence,
the results on the riskiness of firms are also more in line with the diversification
hypothesis—that is, distressed firms become riskier by reducing diversifying acqui-
18See Appendix A.1 for more details.
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sitions upon a reduction of bankruptcy risk and by refocusing firm scope through
internal investment.
2.5.2 Access to Credit
The results of triple-different regressions capture the change of acquisition activi-
ties for distressed firms upon the introduction of the DRC. Although the most direct
and immediate effect of the DRC on the treated distressed firms is the reduction in
bankruptcy probability, Campello et al. (2016) also find that the DRC enhances the
access to syndicated-loan credit for all distressed firms. Treated distressed firms are
likely to benefit less from the enhancement of access to credit by the DRC since they
have already made high usage of the syndicated loan market and may have maxed
out their debt capacity on syndicated loans. Thus, another possible explanation may
exist for the results in Section 2.4—all distressed firms increase investment including
acquisition activities because of increased financial flexibility, but distressed firms
with a lower pre-existing usage of syndicated loans increase investment significantly
more than the treated group.
The access-to-credit hypothesis is in line with the significant and negative coef-
ficients for the triple-interaction term HighSynd × distressed × PostDRC when the
dependent variable measures acquisition activities. However, the access-to-credit hy-
pothesis should also predict a qualitatively similar coefficient of the triple-difference
term when the dependent variable measures internal investment. The overall CapEx
or R&D spending does not change significantly upon the DRC for the treatment
group in Table 2.4. Moreover, in Table 2.7, the newly obtained credit for internal
investment does not change significantly. These results do not support the access-
to-credit hypothesis.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper explores acquisition activities made by financially distressed firms and
investigates motivations for such acquisitions. Distressed firms tend to be active in
acquisition activities, especially diversifying acquisitions. The diversifying acquisi-
tions tend to decrease financial risk for distressed firms. To identify the motivation
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Table 2.8. Option-Implied Volatilities around the (DRC Announcement
This table presents triple-difference OLS regression results of the option-implied volatility around
the DRC. The panel data include all non-financial and non-utility firms with total assets over $100
million (in 2012 dollars) at the beginning of fiscal years between 2010 and 2014. Distressed
dummy takes the value of one if the firm’s distance-to-default in August 2012 is in the bottom
tercile, and zero for non-distressed firms in the top tercile. Firms in the middle tercile are omitted.
HighSynd dummy takes the value of one for firms with pre-existing syndicated-loan ratios in
August 2012 above median, and zero for firms below median. Loan facilities over $100 million
syndicated in the U.S. starting before September 2012 and ending after September 2012 are
considered when calculating pre-existing syndicated-loan ratios. PostDRC takes the value of one if
the year is 2012 or later and is absorbed by year fixed effects. Dependent variables are option
implied volatility calculated as the average volatility implied by all near-the-money options of each
firm at the end of fiscal years. Implied volatility of each option is based on the last observations in
columns 1 to 3, or based on all observations weighted by trading volumes in columns 4 to 6. Please
see Table A.1 for further information on variable definitions. Control variables include
start-of-period firm characteristics (firm size, leverage, market-to-book, ROA, tangibility), firm
cash flow in the current year, and term premium at the end of year. Industry fixed effects are
based on Fama-French 12-industry classification. Variables are defined in Table A.1. t-statistics
are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
Last observations Volume-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Call Put Average Call Put
Distressed 0.018∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(1.99) (2.03) (2.11) (2.12) (2.16) (2.17)
HighSynd -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.49) (-0.42) (-0.52) (-0.39) (-0.29) (-0.46)
Distressed×HighSynd 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.004
(0.25) (0.02) (0.29) (0.15) (0.00) (0.22)
Distressed×PostDRC -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005
(-0.85) (-1.00) (-0.77) (-1.05) (-1.16) (-0.90)
HighSynd×PostDRC -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.010∗ -0.006
(-1.43) (-1.54) (-1.18) (-1.55) (-1.85) (-1.07)
Distressed×HighSynd×PostDRC 0.019 0.024∗ 0.016 0.021 0.027∗ 0.016
(1.44) (1.82) (1.17) (1.49) (1.84) (1.10)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,784 4,766 4,737 4,784 4,766 4,737
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.45
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behind such activities, I test the diversification hypothesis versus the growth op-
portunity hypothesis utilizing a triple-difference framework based on a 2012 debt
restructuring change (DRC) for syndicated loan creditors. This DRC exogenously
reduces firms’ bankruptcy probabilities to the extent of their usage of syndicated
loans. I observe a net decrease of around 41% in acquisition activities for treated
distressed firms from three different sources: total annual cash outflows from acqui-
sitions, major acquisitions announced around the DRC shock, and the claimed use of
proceeds when firms obtain new credit. However, upon the shock, I do not observe
any significant change in internal investments such as capital expenditures or R&D
spending. The results support the diversification hypothesis that a reduction in the
need to diversify financial risk results in a decrease in acquisitions and refocusing
the business scope, rather than the growth opportunity hypothesis that predicts an
increase in external investment under enhanced financial health.
To summarize, distressed firms are actively engaged in acquisition activities, and
they acquire in order to diversify bankruptcy risk. The results strongly support the
diversification hypothesis and suggest that financial distress may distort corporate
investment style toward external expansion.
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Chapter 3
Winning Connections? Lobbying and the Resolution
of Failed Banks*
3.1 Introduction
Discretion is valuable to ensure regulatory objectives. Regulatory discretion leads
to better response to a given circumstance by allowing regulators to act on the basis
of more precise, private information. Yet discretion may also bring about decisions
that reflect regulators’ personal objectives rather than the general public interest
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The latter consideration is particularly salient following
periods of turmoil—when time-consistency problems make deviation from rules more
likely—and, thus, underlies the debate on the optimal design of regulatory agencies
and mechanisms.
The role of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) during the wave
of bank failures that occurred in the Great Recession is an important case in point.1
The FDIC as receiver is empowered to act independently, without the interference
from other agencies or courts, and to exercise its own discretion in ensuring expe-
*This chapter is based on Igan, Lambert, Wagner, and Zhang (2017) “Winning Connections?
Resolution of Failed Banks and Lobbying” (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980742). We
thank Nicola Babarcich, Santanu Kundu, and Huy Nguyen for excellent research assistance. Com-
ments and suggestions from Eric de Bodt, Jean-Edouard Colliard, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Louis
Nguyen, Marcelo Pinheiro, and participants at seminars at the Banque de France-ACPR, Erasmus
University, IESEG School of Management, University of Bonn, University of Lille 2, University
Paris-Dauphine, and participants at the 2017 Banking and Financial Intermediation Workshop in
Bristol, and the 2017 Public Authority and Finance Conference in Paris are gratefully acknowledged.
All errors are our own. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent those of the IMF, its Management and Executive Board, or IMF policy.
1From 2007 to 2014 (the sample period for the analysis conducted in this paper), the FDIC has
been involved in more than 500 distressed bank cases. About 90 percent of these cases were handled
using a purchase and assumption transaction. The resolution of failed banks imposed significant
costs for the FDIC insurance fund, for which the balance came down from $52 billion in 2007 to
a low of negative $20.9 billion in the third quarter of 2009 (see “Condition of the FDIC Deposit
Insurance Fund: FDIC Rapidly Recapitalizing” by American Bankers Association, March 2016,
available at https://www.aba.com/Tools/Economic/Documents/DepositInsuranceFund.pdf.
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ditious and orderly resolution of failed banks (FDIC, 2014, chap. 3, 5). Discretion
allows the FDIC to achieve its main objectives; that is, maintaining confidence and
stability in the banking system. However, discretion also raises concerns about the
transparency, including fairness, of the sale of failed banks, and can thus be seen
as a lacuna, hindering the resolution process (see Morrison (2010) for an extensive
discussion about this view; and see Section 3.2.1 for details on information disclosure
requirements during the FDIC resolution process).
In this paper we study whether discretion may compromise, or enhance, the effi-
ciency of the resolution process, using the perspective of lobbying. Lobbying reflects
the two sides of discretion. On the one hand, banks can lobby to provide the FDIC
with useful private information, thus making the resolution process more efficient.
On the other hand, it may also distort regulatory decisions through capture. We
collect detailed information on failed-bank auctions conducted by the FDIC over the
period between 2007 and 2014. Our analysis provides clear evidence that bidders
engaged in lobbying activities are in a better position to win an auction. According
to our preferred estimates, bidders lobbying banking regulators and, in particular,
the FDIC at the time of the failure increase their probability of winning an auction
by 26.4 percentage points. In addition, we find that the amount spent on lobby-
ing banking regulators has a positive impact on the probability of winning: a one-
standard-deviation increase in lobbying expenditures targeted on regulators leads to
an increase in the probability that a bidder wins an auction by 6.6 percentage points.
These results hold after controlling for bidders’ characteristics, such as size, asset
composition, capitalization, geographical distance, and quarter and failed-bank fixed
effects.
We also use an instrumental variable approach to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
The instrument is the general lobbying activities of the bidder; that is, those that
are not specifically directed toward relevant banking regulators. Given that a bank’s
decision to lobby entails high upfront costs, once the bank pays them, the marginal
cost of additional lobbying activity declines (Kerr et al., 2014, Drutman, 2015). In
other words, the intuition—which has been shown to have support in the data—is
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that a bank already engaged in the lobbying process is better positioned to punctually
lobby on a specific issue area. Lobbying to regulators and political bodies that are
unrelated to bankruptcy and banking are in turn unlikely to interfere with decisions
undertaken by banking regulators and, in particular, the FDIC. Our instrument thus
satisfies the exclusion restriction by construction. Moreover, we study how the effec-
tiveness of lobbying depends on the type of lobbying employed. While all our proxies
for lobbying affect the probability of winning, it is the usage of revolving-door lobby-
ists and of lobbying contact with the FDIC that have the largest effects on auction
outcomes. Although we control for failed-bank fixed effects, a concern is that the
competitive structure of the auction market affects lobbying. To accommodate this
possibility, we run our regressions in various subsamples split based on the number
of bidders involved, and do not find any evidence that changes our conclusion.
The fact that the allocation of failed banks to bidding banks is influenced by
lobbying does not necessarily imply that lobbying has any economic consequences. In
a next step, we study whether lobbying affects the costs associated with bank failure
as well as post-acquisition performance. First, to assess the economic magnitude of
the cost (or gain) accrued to the seller (i.e., FDIC) associated with bidder lobbying on
failed-bank auctions, we compare the actual resolution costs to what the FDIC would
have incurred if another bid had been chosen, and gauge whether lobbying affects
this differential. We show that this differential is significantly reduced, and is also
more likely to be negative, when acquirers lobby, meaning that lobbying acquirers
seem to pay less than other bidders. Economically, the cost imposed on the Deposit
Insurance Fund (DIF)—and, hence, to society—due to lobbying is substantial: the
average effect estimated is equal to 16.4 percent of the total resolution losses. In level
terms, this means that the transfer from the DIF to lobbying bidders amounts to $7.4
billion. Second, we study the acquirer’s efficiency following the investment in a failed
institution. To do so, we examine how efficiency metrics vary around acquisitions and
if this relates to the lobbying activities of the eventual acquirer. In a difference-in-
differences setting, we show evidence consistent with the expectation that acquisition
of a failed bank improves efficiency as measured by return on assets and cost-to-asset
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ratio. However, we find that lobbying acquirers deliver inferior efficiency outcomes
relative to their non-lobbying counterparts. The effect documented is economically
meaningful. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in lobbying expenditures
is associated with a roughly 30-percent decline in return on assets, relative to the
sample mean.
Our analysis speaks to the channel through which lobbying affects regulatory out-
comes. Two channels can be distinguished: lobbying is conducted to obtain favorable
treatment (rent-seeking channel) or to reveal information to regulators (informational
channel). Distinguishing between these channels has proven difficult, as discussed by
Facchini et al. (2011) and Igan and Mishra (2014), among others. Nonetheless, our
results do suggest that auction winners have to pay a lower price in order to win.
This, first, increases the cost to the DIF. It may also prevent the bidder with the
highest private valuation to win the auction, resulting in a mis-allocation of failed
banks. This is in line with the rent-seeking explanation, albeit by itself is not suf-
ficient to rule out the information-based lobbying. This is because regulators may
allocate banks at lower prices to bidders who have conveyed private information that
convince the regulators that these bidders are in a more favorable position to acquire
the failed bank. However, the fact that lobbying banks under-perform other acquir-
ers ex-post appears inconsistent with the efficiency-improving role of bank lobbying.
Instead, this is consistent with agency-type inefficiencies in the allocation of failed
banks predicted by rent-seeking theories á la Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Overall,
our empirical analysis suggests that, in the context of bank resolution, regulatory
discretion may lead to undesirable effects by opening the door for outside influences
through lobbying.
The political-economic considerations of our study may have important policy
implications, especially regarding perceptions on the credibility of the resolution
framework in place and the associated financial stability implications. If market
participants believe that the political environment, legal framework, and operational
complexities interfere with whether a regulator will take the best decisions—that is,
based purely on economic considerations—for a bank in distress, they may adjust
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their beliefs on the regulator’s commitment or ability to comply by a pre-determined
resolution framework. Temptation to interfere with the resolution process may arise
due to the inherent time-consistency problem in dealing with too-big-to-fail insti-
tutions or when faced with the too-many-to-fail question, or it may simply reflect
information that become available to the resolution authority in real time. No matter
the source, doubts on commitment or ability to comply may lead to distortions by,
for instance, giving lobbying banks a funding advantage and altering the competi-
tive landscape. It may then be tempting to instead tie the hands of the resolution
authority and minimize room for discretion, which may have its own implications for
efficiency and informed decision making under time pressure.2
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is part of the
literature on the resolution of failed banks, which mostly focused on the savings and
loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s. James and Wier (1987) study how FDIC auction
procedure and competition affect the sale price of failed bank assets, and report
evidence of wealth transfers to winning bidders. Our findings are also in line with
the presence of wealth transfers and goes further to suggest that the magnitude of
these transfers is partly determined by bidders’ lobbying activities. In related work,
Giliberto and Varaiya (2012) find that winning bids tend to increase with the number
of competitors, consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis. James (1991) adds to
these findings by showing that losses—measured as the difference between the book
value of assets and the recovery value net of direct expenses related to the failure—
are substantial, averaging 30 percent of the failed bank assets. We observe losses in
similar magnitude in our sample.
Another set of studies followed the 2008‒09 financial crisis. Granja (2013) finds
that regulators incur lower resolution costs when disclosure requirements with which
the failed bank complies by are more comprehensive, implying that such requirements
help mitigate information asymmetries inherent to the auction process. Cole and
2This issue is part of an ongoing debate on bank resolution frameworks (Philippon and Salord,
2017, see). Under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, significant changes have been made to broaden
the resolution powers granted to the FDIC when faced with the failure of a systemically important
financial institution. The Act, at the same time, eliminated the option of open bank transactions—
which was used by the FDIC in 2008 in the cases of Citigroup and Bank of America—and made the
FDIC’s ability to provide debt guarantees subject to a congressional resolution of support.
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White (2017) look into the timing of FDIC receivership and empirically estimate the
costs of forbearance to be almost 40 percent of the FDIC’s estimated costs of closure.3
Closer to our line of inquiry, the work by Granja et al. (2017) document that the
wedge between potential acquirers’ willingness to pay—as captured by their proximity
with the failed bank in terms of location and lines of business—and ability to pay—as
proxied by their capitalization—distorts the allocation of failed banks. The authors
conclude that frictions in failed bank sales are non-negligible. To our knowledge,
ours is the first paper to document that political influence and, in particular, bidder
lobbying activities represent an important source of mis-allocation of failed banks in
the Great Recession and its aftermath.4
Our work also contributes to the literature on the political economy of the fi-
nancial crisis.5 Mian et al. (2013) show that both special and constituent interests
influenced public policy supporting subprime mortgage lending in the years prior to
the crisis—a theme extensively discussed by McCarty et al. (2013). Igan and Mishra
(2014) show that politically-targeted activities of the financial industry swayed leg-
islators’ position toward deregulation during the pre-crisis period between 1999 and
2006. Mian et al. (2010) find that special interest campaign contributions from the
financial services industry is positively associated to votes in favor of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, a bill which transfers wealth from taxpayers to
the financial services industry (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010). A few studies focus,
like we do, on bank lobbying activities. These studies provide evidence that lobbying
banks were more likely to be bailed out (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012) and that they
were less likely to be imposed enforcement actions by regulators (Lambert, 2017),
3Kroszner and Strahan (1996) investigate the role of politics and the incentives of regulators to
intervene in failing banks’ operations, and provide compelling evidence that regulators deferred the
realization of costs in failing S&L associations (Kane, 1989, see also). Also in the United States,
Liu and Ngo (2014) show that political concerns play a significant role in the timing of bank failures
over the period 1976-2010. Brown and Dinc (2005) find consistent evidence from a sample of large
banks in 21 emerging countries, while Imai (2009) examines the case of Japan in 1999-2002. Our
paper adopts a different perspective and provides evidence of political economy factors being at play
in the resolution of failed banks.
4Therefore, our work is also related to the corporate finance literature on bankruptcy auctions. A
partial list in this literature includes: Strömberg (2002), Thorburn (2000), and Eckbo and Thorburn
(2008).
5Lambert and Volpin (2017) survey the recent literature on the political economy of finance,
including a discussion on the financial crisis.
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even though they took on more excessive risks in the run-up to the financial crisis
(Igan et al., 2012).6 The results presented here show that lobbying might have had a
bearing on the faith of not only saved banks but also those that failed. In that sense,
our analyses also relates to the literature on the optimal resolution of bank failures
(Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008, 2007, Walther and White, 2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives information on the
institutional background and the data used in the analysis. Section 3.3 presents the
results of the empirical analysis on bidder lobbying and the probability of winning an
FDIC-run auction. Section 3.4 discusses empirically to what extent the allocation of
failed banks during the Great Recession can be interpreted as a sign of mis-allocation.
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background and Data
3.2.1 An Overview of the FDIC Resolution and Receivership Process
The FDIC, together with the other federal agencies—the Federal Reserve (Fed)
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)—and state regulators, su-
pervises banks, but has also the authority to resolve failing or failed institutions.7
When a bank is about to fail, the FDIC initiates its resolution process, which formally
begins when it receives a notification (the failing bank letter) from the institution’s
primary regulator. The main reasons for a failure are critical under-capitalization,
insolvency, deposit run, implication in a severe case of fraud. Upon receiving the
notification, the FDIC contacts the management of the failing institution and ar-
ranges for specialists to go to the bank to compile information in preparation for
the closing. During this on-site visit, the specialists prepare an information package
for potential bidders, perform an asset valuation review8 (subsequently used to set a
6This evidence is consistent with other studies that show that banks paying higher fees are subject
to more lenient regulation and, in the long run, have more loans defaulting (Kisin and Manela, 2014)
and that banks are less likely to fail in the year leading up to a gubernatorial election (Liu and Ngo,
2014).
7Note that the regulatory overhaul following the 2008-09 financial crisis, enshrined in the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, eliminated one of the regulators at the federal level, namely, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS). We have banks supervised by the OTS in our sample, given that the data set
covers failures between 2007 and 2014.
8The FDIC may hire contractors to complete this work.
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reservation value on the sale), estimate the amount of uninsured deposits, determine
the resolution method, and plan for the closing and receivership (FDIC, 2014, chap.
3).
Using the information collected on site, the FDIC chooses the most appropriate
resolution method to be offered. During the recent crisis, and for most of the FDIC’s
history, the purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction has been the preferred
resolution method—i.e., in more than 90 percent of cases in our sample period. In a
P&A transaction, a healthy financial institution agrees to purchase some or all of the
assets of the failing depository institution and assumes some or all of the liabilities,
including all insured deposits. This is performed through a process that resembles a
first-price sealed bid auction. Other methods, including deposit payoffs and purchase
and assumption of the insured deposits only (PIs), are usually considered by the FDIC
when the auction does not attract any interested bidder or when bids revealed to be
below its reservation value.
After gathering the necessary information and determining the resolution method,
the FDIC starts to confidentially market the failing institution to a group of approved
potential bidders.9 This initial contact does not contain any identifiable information
regarding the distressed institution. Then, a virtual data room—access to which
is conditional on signing a confidentiality agreement—is set up to provide potential
bidders with details of the failing institution (loan review, schedules representing the
value of the items on the balance sheet, operational information, legal documents,
bidding procedure). If feasible, prospective bidders are also given the opportunity
to review these information as part of their on-site due diligence. The FDIC is not
required to reveal whom it invites for the bidding.
After having completed due diligence, bidders submit their bids to the FDIC,
generally one to two weeks before the scheduled closing. The bidders can place one
or more sealed bids for the failed bank. A bid consists of, at least, two pricing terms:
9The eligibility criteria include: (1) be a financial institution or in the process of applying for a
bank charter; (2) be well-capitalized; (3) possess a CAMELS rating of 1 or 2; (4) have a satisfactory
anti-money-laundering record; (5) have a satisfactory Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating;
(6) be sufficiently large (i.e., twice the size of the failed institution if located in the same state, even
larger otherwise). See also Section B.1.
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the first is the franchise value for the deposits (the premium) and the second is the
amount for the assets. An additional element that may compose a bid is the terms
of a potential loss-sharing agreement between the FDIC and the bidder over the
subsequent losses on the assets transferred in the resolution process.10 The FDIC
uses its proprietary least-cost test model to evaluate submitted bids and then selects
the one, given the reservation value set by the FDIC, that is the least-costly for
the DIF, as mandated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991 (FDICIA). The FDIC is, however, not required to disclose the specifics
of these tests and, primarily based on systemic considerations, has recourse to legal
exemptions through which it may choose a bid without the least-cost test, thus taking
into account unobserved, complex considerations (IMF, 2015).11
Once the FDIC board of directors approves the resolution transaction, the final
step is the closing of the bank, and the appointing of the FDIC as receiver. Imme-
diately after closure, the FDIC informs the public of the institution’s closing, and
announces the winning bidder together with an estimate of the cost of resolving
the failed institution. The FDIC as receiver is responsible for settling the affairs
of the failed institution, which comprises transferring to the acquirer the assets pur-
chased and deposits assumed, and to the extent possible, satisfying the creditor claims
against the receivership. An insured depository institution is generally placed in re-
ceivership within 90 days, not including the settlement time frames which can take
much longer (Hynes and Walt, 2010). Despite the expedient and orderly resolution
of the vast majority of failed banks, the FDIC took a loss on most failures since the
beginning of the crisis; the cumulated loss so far adds up to $75 billion.
To fulfill this mission as receiver, Congress has entrusted the FDIC with complete
responsibility and has also conferred protections and plenary power over the process.
The FDIC is not subject to the direction or supervision of any other executive agency,
10Under a loss-sharing agreement, the FDIC agrees to absorb a portion of the loss on a specified
pool of assets (i.e., commercial assets and residential mortgages), which maximizes asset recoveries
and minimizes losses by preventing the FDIC of having to keep or take back large amounts of assets
that it would then attempt to sell piecemeal under unfavorable market conditions (for details, see
FDIC (1998, chap. 7) and FDIC (2014, chap. 4)).
11Title XI of the Dodd-Frank Act curtailed the systemic risk exception authority of the FDIC.
This authority can now only be used for insured depository institutions placed into receivership and
wound down and not used for open bank assistance.
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state, or court in the operation of the receivership, which allows the FDIC to use
its discretion in determining the most effective resolution of failed institutions. The
most significant of these powers fall into the following categories (FDIC, 2014, chap.
5): (1) determining whether to allow or disallow claims; (2) repudiating contracts
that are deemed to be burdensome; (3) placing litigation on hold; (4) avoiding fraud-
ulent conveyances; and (5) using special defenses. The latter point (5), for instance,
protects the FDIC by prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions or similar equitable
relief to restrain the receiver from completing its resolution or liquidation activities.
3.2.2 Bank Lobbying Activities in the United States
Lobbying is pervasive in the American democratic process (Drutman, 2015) and,
in particular, constitutes the bulk of politically-targeted spending aimed at influenc-
ing policies and regulatory decisions (Kerr et al., 2014). Lobbyists attempt to sway
the influence of regulators and politicians on specific issues, using a combination of
contacts, expertise, persuasion and public relations skills. Banking interests are par-
ticularly well represented by lobbyists, whether external or in-house. In 2009, at the
height of the crisis, commercial banks alone spent approximately $50 million in hiring
lobbyists, which is five times the money they spent on campaign contributions over
the same year. In 2009, again, lobbyists specifically targeted the FDIC 120 times,
and about 800 times between 2007 and 2014.12
Legally, a lobbying contact is defined as “any oral or written communication (in-
cluding an electronic communication) to a covered executive branch official or a
covered legislative branch official that is made on behalf of a client with regard to (i)
the formulation, modification, or adoption of Federal legislation (including legislative
proposals); (ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal rule, regula-
tion, Executive order, or any other program, policy, or position of the United States
Government; (iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or policy (in-
cluding the negotiation, award, or administration of a Federal contract, grant, loan,
permit, or license); or (iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for a position
subject to confirmation by the Senate (LDA [2 U.S.C. 1602])”. In our analyses, the
12Sourced from www.opensecrets.org (last accessed: May 2017).
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definition under (iii) is the type of activity we are interested in.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), by bringing a certain level of ac-
countability to federal lobbying practices, imposes lobbyists to register and report
periodically information on their activities to the Senate Office of Public Records
(SOPR). The information that external and in-house lobbyists have to disclose in-
cludes the amount of money they receive by their clients as well as the issues and the
officials (at the agency level) targeted. Another feature of the disclosed information
is that the identity of lobbyists hired by a particular firm to lobby a particular agency
on a particular issue is known. Hence, it is possible to categorize different lobbyists
based on their previous work experience. In the literature, a commonly used concept
has been that of the“revolving door”whereby former members of Congress, staffers,
and public-sector employees leave their posts to become lobbyists.13
The information disclosed under the LDA includes the amount spent on lobbying
as well as the issues and the officials (at the agency level) targeted. This helps
determine the economic motivation behind the lobbying effort and the branch of the
government targeted. In other words, one can observe which bank hired lobbyists to
contact which agency, allowing analysis of a bank auction in relation to lobbying to
the federal bank supervisors by the involved banks.
3.2.3 Sample Composition, Data Sources and Key Variables
Our empirical analysis combines data on each government-assisted deal from SNL
Financial and publicly available information released by the FDIC on these deals.14
We obtain from these sources information on the identities of failed banks and acquir-
ers, bidding information, P&A terms, estimated costs of resolution, and, if available,
the identities of other bidders.15 The shaded area of Figure 3.1 shows the time dis-
13Bertrand et al. (2014) document the importance of the connections built through the revolving
door in determining what issues a lobbyist is hired to work on. Blanes i Vidal et al. (2012) show
that lobbyists who worked for legislators in the past generate more revenue.
14FDIC data are retrieved from http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html (last
accessed: April 2016).
15The FDIC discloses on its website the identities and bidding information of all bidders. Note,
however, that we can only obtain the identities of acquirers (winning bidders) and cover bidders
(second place). For the remaining bidders, the FDIC provides a list of bidder names without linking
to specific bidding information. Nonetheless, we compile the sample of actual bidders including all
the bidders disclosed by the FDIC. We match the names of bidder banks with the FDIC institution
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tribution of all failed banks in our sample, while Table 3.1 presents the construction
of the auction sample. From 2007 to 2014, our period of interest, the FDIC acted as
the receiver for 522 commercial and savings banks and chose the P&A transaction as
the resolution method in 470 of cases. We drop from our analysis 39 cases without
auction disclosures occurring prior to May 2009 as well as the P&A transaction of
Home National Bank, which involved two acquirers.16 We exclude assistance trans-
actions (13 cases), direct payoffs (26), and PIs (13), because there are no auction
data available.17 We end up with a sample composed of 430 P&A transactions, ac-
counting for $278.3 billion of aggregate total assets. Table 3.1 also reports that 65.8
percent of the FDIC-run auctions attract bids from at least two eligible institutions,
out of which 43.1 percent records four or more bidders.
We obtain financial characteristics of both failed and bidding banks from the
Quarterly Report on Condition and Income (or Call Report) filings. These Call
Reports provide detailed information on the size, capital structure, and asset com-
position for each commercial and savings bank, while SNL Financial further pro-
vides demographic characteristics and an estimation of banks’ CAMELS rating.18
Moreover, we compute various measures of bidders’ proximity to failed banks using
information from the Summary of Deposits database provided by the FDIC.
We use lobbying disclosure filings to identify banks that are engaged in lobbying.
The LDA requires lobbyists to register and report information on their activities to
the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR). The version of the data used comes
directory to identify each bidder with a FDIC certification number. For each bidder, we identify
several potential matches in the institution directory using fuzzy matching algorithms based on
spelling and phonetic distances. Then we go over each matched pair based on bank names, cities,
and states to confirm the automated match. For bidder names without a match, we use manual
searches to identify a match.
16Before that date little was known about other bidders and their bidding prices. From November
2009, the FDIC, in compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), began to disclose all
the bids in auctions subsequent to May 2009. The information disclosed by the FDIC increased due
to the change in the FDIC’s internal policy under public pressure. Before the change, one needed
to file a FOIA request to obtain such information.
17There is also an economic reason to exclude these transactions because the FDIC tends to choose
these as a resolution option because there is no potential acquirers.
18CAMELS—officially, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS)—is an abbrevia-
tion for the supervisory rating system U.S. regulators have developed to assess a bank’s condition,
based on its Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity
to market risk. Ratings are not released to the public but general information on the system is
available (https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-900.html).
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Figure 3.1. Number of bank failures
This figure plots the time series of all bank failures between 1995 and 2014. Data is obtained from
the FDIC website: www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. The solid line presents the
number of bank failures in each year, excluding assistance transactions. The shaded area presents
the sample used in the main analysis.
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from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).19 We merge CRP data with the SNL
Financial database using a name-matching procedure (i.e., an algorithm that finds
common words) enabling us to generate a list of potential matches between the names
in CRP and SNL Financial. We then manually check whether the pairs of name
strings are actual matches with current and historical bank names via eyeballing,
web searches, and additional information provided in disclosure filings. We also
assign the lobbying activities from the parent institution, if any, to an individual
bank because individual banks may benefit from the lobbying done by their parent
without necessarily lobbying on their own. The main lobbying variables used in
the analysis (see Appendix B.1 for definitions) are constructed with the following
information: the name of the registrant (i.e. the lobbying firm) and the name of the
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Table 3.1. Auction sample construction
This table presents the construction of the auction sample used in the analysis. The main sample
starts with all failed banks in the U.S. between 2007 and 2014, excluding assistance transactions
and the outlier Washington Mutual Bank. Assistance transactions via either open bank assistance
or providing assistance to the acquirer are rarely used after 1992. Such methods were only used in
5 failed banks belonging to Citigroup on November 23, 2008, and 8 failed banks belonging to Bank
of America on January 16, 2009. Payoffs are failed bank resolutions where there is no acquirer and
the FDIC pays off all insured deposits. PIs are the acquisitions of only insured deposits of failed
banks. The disclosure of failed-bank auctions started from May 2009. In July 9, 2010, RCB Bank
and Enterprise Bank & Trust together purchased Home National Bank. Enterprise Bank & Trust
took over a collection of loans while RCB Bank assumed the rest of assets, including all deposits.
The aggregate value of total deposits and total assets (in $ million) are from the last Call Reports
of the failed institutions. Aggregated Resolution Cost (in $ million) is the amount disbursed from
the Deposit Insurance Fund to cover obligations to insured depositors and the amount estimated
(by the FDIC) to be ultimately recovered from the failed bank resolutions.
Aggregated Aggregated Aggregated
Sample #obs. Deposits Assets Resolution Cost
All failed banks, excluding assistance
transactions (2007-2014) 509 315,774 384,831 75,045
− Payoffs (no acquirer) −26 13,888 15,901 4,467
− PIs (acquiring insured deposits only) −13 27,673 40,341 15,284
− No auction disclosures −39 37,517 49,682 10,226
− Two acquirers −1 514 585 67
P&As with auction disclosures 430 236,167 278,306 44,992
1 bidder 147 59,017 66,082 15,939
2 bidders 81 59,076 73,229 10,805
3 bidders 79 40,514 47,809 8,294
4 bidders 58 37,688 45,206 5,457
>4 bidders 65 39,872 45,979 4,497
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client (in case of in-house lobbying the bank is the registrant and client); the annual
amount the client pays, which is calculated by the CRP by summing the information
in quarterly reports; and the name of agencies lobbied. First, we construct a variable
that captures the bidder lobbying status during the current year of the bank failure
date. More specifically, this is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
bank lobbies the Treasury or any of the following relevant banking regulators: FDIC,
Fed, OCC, and OTS. Second, we construct a variable that reflects the intensity with
which a bank lobbies. This variable is the log-dollar amount of lobbying expenditures
directed specifically toward the Treasury and the aforementioned banking regulators.
Third, we create several other lobbying variables using additional information from
the lobbying disclosure filings that are presented and discussed in Section 3.3.3.
3.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3.2 we present descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our
analysis for failed banks (Panel A) and their bidders (Panel B). The vast majority
of failed banks in our sample are state chartered (73 percent).20 At the time of the
failure, the median failed bank’s total assets are $203.5 million, with a high standard
deviation of $1.4 billion. Bank failures impose substantial costs on the FDIC: the
median cost of a sold failed bank in our sample is 23.5 percent of total assets of
the failed bank, with a significant dispersion (standard deviation of 12.5 percent).
Similar insights apply for the net discount, as defined by the difference between the
asset discount and the deposit premium of the winning bid (standardized by total
assets of the failed bank). In levels, the average cost of resolution amounts to $92.9
million, with a median of $41.2 million and a standard deviation of $153.1 million.
The resolution of bank failures in our sample led to DIF costs of approximately $45
billion.
Comparing the characteristics of failed banks with bidding banks reveals inter-
19See the CRP website (http://www.opensecrets.org.) for more details.
20From the 430 P&A transactions in Table 3.1, 265 (untabulated) concerns state-chartered banks
supervised by the Fed. State non-member banks and savings institutions (chartered and supervised
by the FDIC) account for 63 of the transactions. Federally chartered banks (supervised by the
OCC) are observed in 63 cases, while thrifts make up the remainder with 39 P&A transactions at
the time the OTS still existed.
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esting patterns. Bidding banks are, as expected, much larger than sold failed banks.
The average bidding bank’s assets are $8.8 billion with a standard deviation of $3.3
billion, while the average failed bank’s assets amount to $605.3 million (standard
deviation of $1.4 billion). Bidding banks are also well capitalized (average Tier 1
capital ratio of 15.8) and have no significant regulatory concerns (an average esti-
mated CAMELS rating of 1.6). Bidding banks are located relatively close to failed
banks with an average distance of 225 kilometers away from each other. Failed banks
show on average a higher proportion of residential real estate loans (approximately
55 percent of their asset portfolio), though the bulk of lending from all banks in our
sample tilts to real estate.
Many bidders are engaged in lobbying in 2007-2014 (18 percent of all bidders) as
well as at the time of a target bank failure (12 percent). The proportion of lobbying
banks in our sample is thus quite high given the high entry barriers to beginning to
lobby (Kerr et al., 2014, Bertrand et al., 2014). The average lobbying expenditures
(on any issues) in our sample are $86,720, with a significant dispersion (standard
deviation of $338,800). Focusing on lobbying bidders only, they spent on average
approximately $710,000 (i.e., 42.56 ÷ 0.06 in Panel B) on lobbying expenditures tar-
geted at regulators during the year of the failure, again with a significant dispersion.
In Table 3.3 we compare characteristics of auction winners (i.e., acquirers) with
auction losers. We note that acquirers tend to be located closer to failed banks
relative to other bidders, consistent with Granja et al. (2017). However, winners
and losers do not appear to differ on many other characteristics but their lobbying
activities. Acquiring banks tend to lobby significantly more than other bidders. The
winner lobbying status is on average 5 percentage points higher than the one of losers.
Acquirer’s average lobbying expenditures targeted at banking regulators are almost
doubling that of a loser (e0.66 = 1.93). Interestingly, winners also tend on average to
satisfy less the FDIC eligibility criteria (see the five proxies we used in Appendix B.1)
than losers. Figure 3.2 shows the lobbying activities by all bidding banks surrounding
the bank failure date: auction winners (solid line) are consistently engaged in more
lobbying activities than losers (dashed line). In Figure 3.3, we present the histogram
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Table 3.2. Summary statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of the main samples used in the analysis. Panel A
describes the sample of failed banks. Panel B describes the bidding banks participating in the
auctions of failed banks. The variable Resolution Cost in Panel A is expressed as both the dollar
amount (in $ million) and percentage of Total Assets of the failed bank at the time of the failure.
Lobbying expenditures are in three forms: (1) indicators that take the value 1 if lobbying
expenditures is positive in the year of failures; (2) dollar amount (in $ thousands) of lobbying
expenditures in the year of failures; and (3) log-transformation of the dollar amount in (2). All the
other variables are in the quarter prior to the failure dates. See Appendix B.1 for more details
about variable definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th levels.
Panel A. Failed Banks
Variable # obs. Mean St.dev. 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Resolution Cost
Resolution Cost ($ million) 430 92.86 153.06 19.58 41.15 90.98
Resolution Cost (%) 430 24.17 12.54 14.83 23.5 33.05
Net Discount (%) 430 11.72 9.08 5.78 10.54 16.39
Net Discount Differential (%) 287 -1.68 8.13 -4.65 -1.7 0.01
Acquirer Net Discount >Cover Bids 287 0.26 0.44 0 0 1
Financial Characteristics
Total Assets ($million) 430 605.26 1421.05 98.64 203.48 453.35
Liquidity Ratio 374 22.24 8.77 15.21 21.22 27.03
CRE Loans (%) 411 10.62 8.58 4.6 8.35 14.35
C&I Loans (%) 411 25.59 17.5 12.76 23.3 32.28
Residential Loans (%) 411 54.66 24.25 42.88 60.02 70.88
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (%) 399 1.15 3.47 0.14 1.48 2.63
NPL Ratio (%) 374 25.74 11.5 17.66 24.13 32.42
OREO Ratio (%) 411 5.34 4.85 1.81 4.12 7.35
Core Deposit (%) 374 80.57 19.27 68.87 87.39 95.97
State Bank 411 0.73 0.44 0 1 1
Estimated CAMELS Rating 411 4.97 0.16 5 5 5
Acquirer Lobbying Expenditures
Lobbying Regulators >0 430 0.1 0.3 0 0 0
Lobbying Regulators ($000) 430 52.01 219.23 0 0 0
Lobbying Regulators (log) 430 1.23 3.77 0 0 0
Active Lobbying 430 0.2 0.4 0 0 0
Lobbying >0 430 0.16 0.36 0 0 0
Lobbying ($000) 430 123.05 368.12 0 0 0
Lobbying (log) 430 2 4.71 0 0 0
continued on next page
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Table 3.2. Summary statistics (continued)
Panel B. Bidding Banks
Variable # obs. Mean St.dev. 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Financial Characteristics
Total Assets ($million) 1135 8840.63 33379.3 520.68 1466.58 3788.68
Liquidity Ratio 1051 25.12 11.32 17.06 23.1 31.73
CRE Loans (%) 1135 14.23 9.1 7.47 12.26 18.88
C&I Loans (%) 1135 24.99 15.54 14.68 22.51 30.99
Residential Loans (%) 1135 45.67 21.57 32.68 47.88 62.14
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 1088 15.78 6.96 11.83 13.88 17.09
NPL Ratio 1051 6.18 5.3 2.51 4.87 8.11
OREO Ratio 1135 1.04 1.13 0.21 0.65 1.43
Core Deposits (%) 1051 86.3 10.76 81.94 89.4 94.19
State Bank 1135 0.73 0.45 0 1 1
Estimated CAMELS Rating 1118 1.6 0.62 1 1.5 1.5
Proximity to Failed Banks
Eligible Bidder 1051 0.61 0.49 0 1 1
Distance 1134 5.42 1.34 4.4 5.48 6.52
Distance CRE Loans (%) 1083 23.16 19.23 8.39 17.72 33.45
Distance C&I Loans (%) 1083 8.9 8.14 2.83 6.54 12.43
Distance Residential Loans (%) 1083 14.87 13.63 5.18 11.54 19.75
Lobbying Expenditures
Lobbying Regulators >0 1156 0.06 0.25 0 0 0
Lobbying Regulators ($000) 1156 42.56 220.01 0 0 0
Lobbying Regulators (log) 1156 0.83 3.17 0 0 0
Active Lobbying 1156 0.18 0.39 0 0 0
Lobbying >0 1156 0.12 0.32 0 0 0
Lobbying ($000) 1156 86.72 338.77 0 0 0
Lobbying (log) 1156 1.46 4.05 0 0 0
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of failed banks’ total assets and further highlight the frequencies with which failed
banks are acquired by banks engaged in lobbying. Moreover, we can observe that
the distribution is skewed to the right (darker shaded bars), indicating that lobbying
banks tend to acquire the largest failed banks. The solid line in Figure 3.3 shows this
even more clearly by displaying the proportion of failed banks eventually acquired by
a lobbying institution in a corresponding size range. In summary, these differences
in means reported in Table 3.3 and the graphical illustrations in Figure 3.2 suggest
that failed banks are likely to be sold to banks engaged in lobbying activities. We
formalize these insights with the regression analyses to follow.
3.3 Empirical Results on the Allocation of Failed Banks and
Bidder Lobbying
3.3.1 Baseline Results
To evaluate the effect of lobbying on the probability that a bidder wins a FDIC-
run auction, we use Φ(·) denoting a probit and estimate the specification
Pr(winijt = 1) = Φ(α+ βljt + ΓjXjt + ΓijXijt + µi + µt + εijt), (3.1)
in which winijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bidder j acquired failed bank
i at time t, and 0 if not. α is a constant term. ljt is a measure of bidder j’s
lobbying activities, usually either taking the value of 1 when the bidder directs its
lobbying toward a banking regulator or calculated as the log of 1 plus the lobbying
expenditures on banking regulators, measured in thousand dollars. Xjt is a vector of
control variables that always includes the following financial characteristics of bidder
j in the quarter prior to the failure date t: Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital
Ratio, NPL Ratio, OREO Ratio, CRE Loans, C&I Loans, and Residential Loans.
Xijt is another vector of variables of proximity between a failed bank i and a bidder
j, which always includes the variable Distance, calculated as the log value of average
distance of the branch network of the bidding bank j from the branch network of the
failed bank i, and Change in HHI, calculated as the average increase in local deposit
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Table 3.3. Winning and losing bidders
This table presents the results of t-test with unequal variances of the mean difference between
auction winners and losers. All variables on financial characteristics are in the quarter prior to the
failure dates. See Appendix B.1 for more details about variable definitions. All variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th levels. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels.
Winner Loser Winner − Loser
#obs. Mean #obs. Mean Difference t-stat.
Financial Characteristics
Size 418 14.28 715 14.27 0.01 -0.09
Liquidity Ratio 389 25.64 661 24.82 0.81 -1.13
CRE Loans (%) 418 14.98 715 13.79 1.19∗∗ -2.19
C&I Loans (%) 418 24.62 715 25.19 -0.57 (-0.61)
Residential Loans (%) 418 45.83 715 45.69 0.14 -0.11
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 406 15.96 680 15.68 0.28 -0.61
NPL Ratio 389 6.14 661 6.22 -0.09 (-0.24)
OREO Ratio 418 0.97 715 1.07 -0.1 (-1.39)
Core Deposits (%) 389 84.52 661 87.38 -2.85∗∗∗ (-3.98)
State Bank 418 0.7 715 0.75 -0.04 (-1.61)
Estimated CAMELS Rating 411 1.61 705 1.59 0.02 -0.56
Proximity to Failed Banks
Eligible Bidder 397 0.55 653 0.65 -0.10∗∗∗ (-3.20)
Distance 414 5.25 719 5.51 -0.27∗∗∗ (-3.24)
Distance CRE Loans (%) 400 24.01 681 22.53 1.34 -1.09
Distance C&I Loans (%) 400 8.89 681 8.84 -0.02 (-0.03)
Distance Residential Loans (%) 400 15.29 681 14.52 0.65 -0.75
Change in HHI 430 2.1 722 1.56 0.55 -0.91
Lobbying Expenditures
Lobbying Regulators >0 430 0.1 726 0.04 0.05∗∗∗ -3.3
Lobbying Regulators (log) 430 1.23 726 0.57 0.66∗∗∗ -3.18
Active Lobbying 430 0.2 726 0.15 0.05∗∗ -2.1
Lobbying >0 430 0.16 726 0.09 0.06∗∗∗ -3.09
Lobby (log) 430 2 726 1.11 0.89∗∗∗ -3.4
market concentration across failed bank branch locations.21 µi and µt represent a
full set of failed bank and quarter fixed effects. The failed bank fixed effects µi ensure
that our results are not driven by the characteristics of the bank being sold and its
auction process, while quarter fixed effects µt control for any macro movements. The
coefficient of interest is β, which measures the effect of lobbying on the probability
that a bidder wins a FDIC-run auction. εijt is the error term.22 Throughout the
main text, we report standard errors clustered at the level of the state where the
failed bank’s headquarters is located. In unreported results, we have bootstrapped
standard errors obtained using 1,000 draws with replacement, and confirm that our
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Figure 3.2. Bidding bank lobbying activities around bank failures
The figures show the time series of lobbying activities targeted at banking regulators by all bidding
banks in the main analysis during the years around failure dates. Year 0 in the x-axis identifies the
calendar year of each bank failure. The figure at the top shows the percentage of bidding banks
engage in lobbying targeted at banking regulators, while the figure at the bottom shows the
average lobbying expenditures (in $ thousand) on banking regulators. Winner (solid lines) in the
auction of a failed bank is the bidding bank that wins the auction and becomes the acquirer of the
failed bank. Loser (dashed lines) in the auction is the bidding bank that does not win.
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Figure 3.3. Histogram of failed bank assets
The figure shows the histogram of total assets of failed banks. The light shaded bars present the
frequencies of bank failures in a corresponding size range (in log-transformation of $ million). The
darker shaded bars show the frequencies of bank failures taken over by a lobbying acquirer in a
corresponding size range. The solid line depicts the proportion of bank failures with a lobbying
acquirer in a corresponding size range.
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results are robust.
Table 3.4 shows our basic regressions, estimates of Equation 3.1. The results
across columns 1-4 confirm the intuition from Figure 3.2 that lobbying is positively
associated with the probability of acquiring a failed bank. Column 1 is the most
parsimonious specification regressing the probability of winning an auction on our
lobbying dummy variable and both quarter and state fixed effects, meaning that all
auctions (even with only one bidder) are considered. The probit estimate of β yields a
marginal effect of 0.1858 (s.e.= 0.0648), statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
In column 2, we estimate the same specification as in column 1 but we replace state
fixed effects by failed bank fixed effects µi, which allow for within auction differences
in lobbying status of bidders to the failed bank.23 The inclusion of µi implies that
auctions with only one bidder are dropped. The average marginal effect estimate on
lobbying status is 0.3425 (s.e.=0.0648), statistically significant at the 1-percent level.
Column 3 is our standard specification, which adds controls for financial char-
acteristics of bidders, their distance to the failed bank, and change in market con-
centration. The result on lobbying is statistically and economically meaningful. The
estimate, 0.2640 (s.e.=0.0680), implies that targeted lobbying on regulators increases
the probability of winning the auction by 26.4 percentage points. Column 4 mirrors
the specification in column 3 but turns to estimating the effect of lobbying expen-
ditures. The coefficient estimation on lobbying expenditures is 0.0208 (s.e.=0.0051),
again statistically significant at the 1-percent level. In economic terms, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in targeted lobbying expenditures on regulators (3.17) leads
to an increase in the probability that a bidder wins the auction by 6.6 percentage
points.24
21All our results presented in the next sections are robust to the inclusion of other variables in
Xjt (Core Deposits, State Bank, Estimated CAMELS Rating) and Xijt (Eligible Bidder, Distance
X Loans), respectively. We do not report them in the paper for brevity reasons.
22As a robustness check, we also run conditional fixed-effect logit regressions Φ(· · · |µi) in which
bidder-failed bank pairs are grouped by the failed bank i and the likelihood is calculated relative to
each group (µi denotes the fixed effect for failed bank i). The results obtained are very similar and,
thus, not reported for brevity reasons.
23Quarter fixed effects are absorbed when we insert failed bank fixed effects.
24It is worthwhile emphasizing that we address self-selection bias in Table A.2 in the appendix by
performing a Heckman-probit analysis. Bidders may indeed self-select to bid upon the invitation
from the FDIC to join an auction, raising concerns that our results do not apply to a representative
eligible bidder. Based on the eligibility criteria reported in Appendix B.2, we extend the bidder
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The evidence from control variables in columns 3 and 4 shows that winning bid-
ders are relatively larger and less liquidity-constrained than losers. By contrast, the
coefficient on capitalization (as measured by Tier 1 Capital Ratio) is not statistically
distinguishable from zero, suggesting that actual bidders do not differ much in their
ability to pay for the failed bank (Granja et al., 2017, see). The coefficient estimate
on geographical distance indicates that bidders that are located farther from a failed
bank have a lower probability of acquiring it.
Overall, these results suggest that the odds for a bidder of winning an FDIC-run
auction are positively associated with the bidder’s lobbying status and expenditures.
Next we address potential endogeneity concerns by devising an instrumental variable
(IV) strategy.
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable Results
One potential concern with the results above is that the variable of interest ljt is
correlated with the error term εijt, leading to inconsistent and biased estimates of β.
Bidder-specific omitted factors might drive both lobbying activities and the auction
process, affecting both ljt and Pr(winijt = 1). For example, lobbying activities of
bidders could simply proxy for their ability and expertise in acquiring and integrating
other institutions, increasing their probability of winning. Arguably, lobbying might
also be the result of the bidder’s expectation and willingness to win the auction,
rather than its driver. These challenges are not unique to our data, but are likely
concerns with any data where lobbying and auction outcomes are simultaneously
observed.
We address these concerns in Table 3.5 by exploiting variation in bidder lobbying
activities that is exogenous to the auction process of the failed bank. Kerr et al. (2014)
demonstrate that firms’ lobbying decision engenders high upfront costs, which creates
sample to all eligible bidders for each failed-bank auction. We then employ the Heckman-probit
method, for which both the dependent variable (winijt) and participation variable (bidijt) are
binary. The specifications mirror the ones of Table 4, while the specifications on bidding probability
further add bidder fixed effects. From the regression output in Appendix B.1, it can be seen that
the estimations of lobbying on the probability of winning are qualitative similar than in Table 3.4.
At the same time, we do not find that lobbying significantly affects banks’ propensity to participate
into an auction. The Wald tests also fail to reject the null, suggesting that our probit estimations
reported in Table 3.4 are appropriate.
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Table 3.4. Auction winning likelihood and bidder lobbying: baseline results
This table reports the results of probit regressions. Estimations are the average marginal effects on
the likelihood of winning an auction. Control variables include financial characteristics of bidders
in the quarter prior to failure dates —Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, NPL Ratio,
OREO Ratio, CRE Loans (%), C&I Loans (%), and Residential Loans (%)—and proximity
measures—Distance and Change in HHI. See Appendix B.1 for more details about variable
definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th levels. Robust standard errors of
marginal effects are presented in the parentheses and clustered at the level of the failed bank’s
state headquarters. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(Win)
Lobbying Regulators >0 0.1858∗∗∗ 0.3425∗∗∗ 0.2640∗∗∗
(0.0648) (0.0648) (0.0680)
Lobbying Regulators 0.0208∗∗∗
(0.0051)
Size 0.0529∗∗ 0.0524∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0218)
Liquidity Ratio 0.0042∗∗ 0.0041∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.0057 0.0058
(0.0051) (0.0052)
NPL Ratio -0.0080 -0.0079
(0.0090) (0.0090)
OREO Ratio -0.0030 -0.0034
(0.0470) (0.0470)
CRE Loans (%) 0.0030 0.0031
(0.0034) (0.0034)
C&I Loans (%) -0.0017 -0.0018
(0.0027) (0.0027)
Residential Loans (%) -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Distance -0.0725∗∗∗ -0.0718∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0156)
Change in HHI -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Failed Bank State Fixed Effects Yes No No No
Failed Bank Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.075 0.103 0.103
Auctions 422 283 234 234
Observations 1148 1009 803 803
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an option value associated with continuing to lobby over time.25 Once firms get into
the lobbying process, they tend to stay in because they would prefer not to incur
these upfront (sunk) costs to set up a lobbying operation again in the near future.
The propensity of a bank j to lobby in general (i.e., on any issue area and regulatory
bodies) highly conditions the lobbying done on failed bank acquisitions in a specific
point in time. We exploit bidder lobbying activities (i.e., status or expenditures) not
directed toward relevant banking regulators in the context of FDIC-run auctions to
instrument for targeted lobbying activities at the relevant regulators. This instrument
likely thus satisfies the exclusion restriction by construction. Furthermore, there
are few reasons to believe that lobbying on regulators and political bodies that are
unrelated to bankruptcy and finance would directly interfere with the decisions of
banking regulators and, in particular, the FDIC.
We construct an instrument, derived from the above intuition, measuring lobbying
on any political or regulatory bodies other than the Treasury, FDIC, Fed, OCC, OTS,
for each bidder in our sample. The instrument is—depending on the instrumented
variable used—either equal to 1 if the bidder j lobbies on any non-banking regulators
at time t and 0 otherwise, or is the log of 1 plus the lobbying expenditures directed
toward any non-banking regulators at time t, measured in thousand dollars. We also
include the same set of control variables (Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio,
NPL Ratio, OREO Ratio, CRE Loans, C&I Loans, Residential Loans, Distance,
Change in HHI) and fixed effects (µi and µt) in the first stage and again cluster
the standard errors at the level of the state of the failed bank’s headquarters. Non-
regulator lobbying is, as expected, positively associated with lobbying on banking
regulators in both models of Table 3.5. The first-stage estimates are statistically
significant at the 1-percent level.
The second-stage results show that our inferences from Table 3.4 remain the
same. In Model (1) we estimate Equation 3.1 while instrumenting our dummy vari-
able of banking regulator lobbying with a dummy variable of non-banking regulator
25These upfront costs include, for instance, searching for and hiring the right lobbyists and, once
hired, educating them about the firm’s interests and agenda, learning about the complexity of the
political process and exploring how best to attempt to affect it, etc.
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lobbying and the same control variables and fixed effects as before. The IV-probit
estimate of the marginal effect of our lobbying dummy variable is in line with the
probit estimate of Table 3.4, though it results in a slight fall in the coefficient to
0.2183 (s.e.=0.0949).26 Economically, this implies that targeted lobbying on regu-
lators increases the probability of winning by 21.8 percentage points. In Model (2)
we instrument instead lobbying expenditures on banking regulators using the corre-
sponding instrument in log-dollar value. Again, the IV-probit estimate mirrors the
baseline estimate from Table 3.4, and gives a smaller estimate of 0.0175 (s.e.=0.0078).
Comparing this estimate with the corresponding probit estimate in Table 3.4 column
4 shows that it is about 15 percent smaller. The small sample size may also affect
the validity of our inferences here. We accordingly adopt a bootstrap procedure (un-
reported), which is particularly useful in our case since our auction sample, though
rather small, represents very closely the (distribution of the) population. Inferences
drawn using bootstrapped standard errors show that IV coefficients on both lobbying
variables are statistically stronger.
We also report at the bottom of Table 3.5 the Wald statistic and p-value for the
test of the null hypothesis of no endogeneity; that is, testing whether the correlation
parameter ρ is equal to zero. We fail to reject the null in both models (test statistics
are insignificant), suggesting that probit regressions from Table 3.4 are appropriate.
3.3.3 Alternative Lobbying Measures
In Table 3.6 we examine various alternative channels through which lobbying
may generate an advantage to win an auction conducted by the FDIC in 2007-2014.
Throughout the table we use our standard specification of column 3 in Table 3.4,
and sequentially add different lobbying measures.
First, lobbyists differ in terms of network that they can deploy to reach out regu-
lators. An important characteristic in this respect is the lobbyist’s past employment
experience at any of the relevant banking regulators or membership at financial sub-
committees of the Congress. In column 1 we investigate the relevance of this char-
acteristic, best known as the “revolving-door” status of lobbyists. The coefficient
26The estimation result is qualitatively similar if a bivariate probit model is used.
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Table 3.5. Auction winning likelihood and bidder lobbying: instrumental variable
results
This table reports the results of IV-probit regressions. 1st Stage columns show OLS estimations
and 2nd Stage columns report the average marginal effects on the likelihood of winning an auction.
Instrumental variables are an indicator (Lobbying Non-Regulators > 0) and the
log-transformation (Lobbying Non-Regulator) of lobbying expenditures targeted at non-banking
regulators in the year of the failure. Control variables include financial characteristics of bidders in
the quarter prior to failure dates—Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, NPL Ratio, OREO
Ratio, CRE Loans (%), CRE Loans (%), and Residential Loans (%)—and proximity
measures—Distance and Change in HHI. See Appendix B.1 for more details about variable
definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th levels. Robust standard errors of
marginal effects are presented in the parentheses and clustered at the level of the failed bank’s
state headquarters. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2)
2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage
Lobbying Lobbying
Pr(Win) Regulators >0 Pr(Win) Regulators
Lobbying Regulators >0 0.2183∗∗
(0.0949)
Lobbying Non-Regulators >0 0.5459∗∗∗
(0.1032)
Lobbying Regulators 0.0175∗∗
(0.0078)
Lobbying Non-Regulators 0.6460∗∗∗
(0.1108)
Size 0.0504∗∗ 0.0086 0.0502∗∗ 0.0541
(0.0218) (0.0089) (0.0213) (0.0891)
Liquidity Ratio 0.0042∗∗ 0.0003 0.0041∗∗ 0.0105
(0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0114)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.0057 0.0010 0.0058 0.0157
(0.0052) (0.0018) (0.0053) (0.0248)
NPL Ratio -0.0080 0.0012 -0.0079 -0.0036
(0.0090) (0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0460)
OREO Ratio -0.0027 0.0023 -0.0029 0.0648
(0.0472) (0.0098) (0.0472) (0.1245)
CRE Loans (%) 0.0031 0.0007 0.0031 0.0091
(0.0034) (0.0010) (0.0034) (0.0119)
C&I Loans (%) -0.0017 0.0006 -0.0018 0.0093
(0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0027) (0.0110)
Residential Loans (%) 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0103
(0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0023) (0.0077)
Distance -0.0727∗∗∗ -0.0164∗ -0.0722∗∗∗ -0.2452∗∗
(0.0157) (0.0097) (0.0155) (0.1184)
Change in HHI -0.0015 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0075
(0.0021) (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0112)
Failed Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald χ2 0.4161 0.2319
Wald p-value 0.5189 0.6301
Auctions 234 234
Observations 803 803
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estimate is 0.5850 (s.e.=0.0767), statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The
economic effect is considerable: Revolving-door lobbyists increase the probability of
winning by more than 50 percentage points. In column 2 we include instead a dummy
variable equal to 1 if (0 if not) the bidder directs its lobbying toward banking reg-
ulators in combination with the help of a revolving-door lobbyists. Unsurprisingly,
the effect is economically stronger (β=0.7047; s.e.=0.1432) than in regression model
estimated in column 1, suggesting that lobbyists influence more easily the decisions
of regulators for which they used to work with.
Second, thus far we have investigated bidders’ lobbying at the time of the failure
without considering their past lobbying activities. In columns 3 and 4, we evaluate
the impact of lobbying performed during the eight quarters prior to the failure date
employing, similarly as before, a 0–1 indicator and a dollar-value variable, respec-
tively. The coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1-percent level,
and of slightly larger magnitude than their counterparts in Table 3.4.
Third, since the FDIC has complete control over the receivership process, one
could argue that the FDIC is the regulatory authority that really matters when it
comes to influencing the auction outcome. In columns 5 and 6, we respectively use a
0–1 indicator and a dollar-value variable capturing the lobbying directed specifically
toward the FDIC. The results reveal to be consistent in terms of order of magni-
tude and statistical significance. For instance, the estimate in column 5, 0.2477
(s.e.=0.0618), means that lobbying targeted at the FDIC increases the probability
of winning a failed-bank auction by 24.8 percentage points. This indicates that most
of the effect of lobbying shows up when the bidder establishes a lobbying contact
directly with FDIC agents.
3.3.4 Auction Competition
A simple look at Table 3.1 reveals that competition between bidders varies across
auctions, with auctions gathering as little as one bidder to auctions involving a
dozen of bidders. Although our standard specification includes failed bank fixed ef-
fects which control for auction-specific factors such as competition, we conclude the
analysis of this section by further examining whether the competitive process of an
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auction drives the probability of winning of lobbying bidders. Table 3.7 presents the
results, and shows that the effect of lobbying continues to hold regardless auction
competition.
Specifically, in column 1 we split the sample between auctions according to the
number of bidders involved; that is, two bidders and more than two bidders. Our
independent variables of interest are the interaction terms between our lobbying
dummy variable and a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the number of bidders
participating in the auction is two (or strictly above two). Both interactions terms en-
ter positively and statistically significantly in the regression model (i.e. our standard
specification).27 The coefficient estimate is larger for the interaction considering only
two bidders: 0.6799 versus 0.1786. In column 2 we split the sample differently. We
analyze auctions including two bidders, three bidders, and four bidders, and strictly
more than four bidders, respectively. Again, the results are consistent. Note, how-
ever, that the interaction term with the dummy variable of more than four bidders
turns out to be statistically insignificant at conventional levels, possibly due to the
resulting lack of statistical power. In columns 3 and 4, we replicate this strategy by
interacting instead our log-$-value lobbying variable. The result obtained provides
similar insights than in columns 1 and 2. All in all, our results here indicate that the
effect of lobbying persists whatever the competition between bidders, with a more
pronounced effect (though unsurprisingly) the lower the competition is.
3.4 Assessing the (Mis)allocation of Failed Banks due to Lob-
bying
3.4.1 Acquirers’ Bids and Resolution Costs
As we documented previously, selling failed banks leads to important costs for
the FIDC that may greatly vary across bank resolutions. In this section, we explore
whether selling failed banks to lobbying acquirers affects FDIC losses. A simple cut in
the data reported in Figure 3.4 suggests that this is the case. It shows the distribution
27We follow Ai and Norton (2003) estimating the average marginal effects and standard errors.
Because their recommended Stata command does not deal with multiple interactions, we use the
more flexible “margins” command (Berger and Bouwman, 2013, see also).
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of resolution costs contrasted with the size of sold failed banks in our sample that
we split according to the lobbying status of the acquirer. The median resolution
cost of failed banks sold to acquirers engaged in lobbying amounts to $96.4 million
(approximately 21 percent of the median failed-bank size), which is much higher than
for failed banks sold to non-lobbying acquirers (median of $36.4 million, about 20
percent of the median failed-bank size).
Next we compare the resolution cost resulting from an actual transaction to what
the FDIC would have incurred if another bid would have been chosen, and gauge
whether lobbying affects this differential. The submitted bids to the FDIC have two
parts: (1) the discount the bidder requires for acquiring the failed bank’s assets;
and (2) the premium the bidder is prepared to pay for assuming the deposits. The
difference between the two parts represents the net discount offered by the bidder
on the failed bank’s assets and liabilities. A higher (positive) net discount means a
higher net payment from the FDIC to the acquirer.28 Here we study the relationship
between bidder lobbying and the difference in net discount between the acquirer and
the bidder whom the FDIC viewed as the second best (i.e. the cover bidder). We
perform OLS regressions of the following specification:
costits = α+ βlit + ΓXits + µt + µs + εits, (3.2)
in which i denotes a sold failed bank, t a quarter and s a state. The dependent
variable, costits, is the difference in net discount between the acquirer and the cover
bidder, standardized by total assets of the failed bank. The net discount differential
gives an indication of the incremental loss (gain) for the DIF that should have been
realized if the FDIC Board had selected the cover bid. In addition, using the net
discount differential further mitigates concerns about unobserved failed bank charac-
teristics potentially correlate with the resolution process. lit is a measure capturing
the lobbying (i.e. status and expenditures) of both the acquirer and the cover bidder.
Xits controls for failed bank’s characteristics including the variables Size, Liquidity
28As an example, suppose that the acquirer views the failed bank’s assets with a book value of
$100 as being worth $75, but assumes responsibility for $100 in deposits for which he is prepared
to pay $10, then the payment from the FDIC to the acquirer will be of $15 (i.e. the net discount).
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Table 3.7. Auction winning likelihood and bidder lobbying: robustness to auction
competition
This table reports the results of probit regressions. Estimations are the average marginal effects of
Lobbying Regulators (dummy or log-dollar value) on the likelihood of winning an auction in
different subsamples. Independent variables are the interaction terms of the indicator (Lobbying
Regulators > 0) in columns 1 and 2, or Lobbying Regulators in columns 4 and 5, with another
dummy variable indicating whether the observation is within a certain subsample. In columns 1
and 3, the sample is split in two parts, whether the auction involves two bidders or strictly more
than two bidders. In column 2 and 4, the sample is split in four parts, whether the auction
involves two bidders, three bidders, four bidders, or strictly more than four bidders. We correct
estimation and standard errors of marginal effects following Ai and Norton (2003). Control
variables (unreported) include financial characteristics of bidders in the quarter prior to failure
dates—Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, NPL Ratio, OREO Ratio, CRE Loans (%),
C&I Loans (%), and Residential Loans (%)—and proximity measures—Distance and Change in
HHI. See Appendix B.1 for more details about variable definitions. All variables are winsorized at
the 1st and 99th levels. Robust standard errors of marginal effects are presented in the parentheses
and clustered at the level of the failed bank’s state headquarters. ***, **, and * represent
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lobbying Regulators >0 Lobbying Regulators
Pr(Win)
Number of Bidders = 2 0.6799** 0.0544**
(0.2919) (0.0222)
Number of Bidders >2 0.1786** 0.0142***
(0.0714) (0.0051)
Number of Bidders = 2 0.6819** 0.0546**
(0.2916) (0.0222)
Number of Bidders = 3 0.2748** 0.0205**
(0.1363) (0.0102)
Number of Bidders = 4 0.2968** 0.0269***
(0.1341) (0.0083)
Number of Bidders >4 0.0941 0.0075
(0.1295) (0.0097)
Failed Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bidder Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.108 0.109 0.110
Auctions 234 234 234 234
Observations 803 803 803 803
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Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, NPL Ratio, OREO Ratio, CRE Loans, C&I Loans, and
Residential Loans. Moreover, Xits contains bid characteristics of both acquirer and
cover bidder, namely a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if (0 if not) the deal is
for all loans and deposits of the failed bank, other dummy variables taking the value
of 1 if (0 if not) the transaction includes a loss-sharing agreement between the FDIC
and the acquirer. Xits also controls for the number of bids in each P&A transaction.
µt captures the quarter when the failed bank was sold, ensuring that the estimate is
not driven by aggregate trends. We also include state fixed effects, µs, to account for
any differences between states (e.g. economic conditions, regulatory forbearance).
We cluster standard errors at the level of the failed bank’s state headquarters.
Columns 1 to 4 of Table 3.8 present the results of estimating Equation 3.2. Across
columns the coefficients on our lobbying variables suggest that acquirer lobbying
increases the losses incurred by the FDIC. The magnitudes are large. In column
1, the independent variable of interest is the difference between the lobbying status
(i.e. a 0-1 indicator) of the acquirer and the cover bidder. The coefficient estimate
is 2.4037 (s.e.=1.0872) and statistically significant at the 5-percent level, indicating
that when the acquirer has an advantage in terms of lobbying over the cover bidder
it amplifies the loss for the DIF. In column 2, we estimate the effect of both acquirer
and cover bidder lobbying separately, in lieu of their net effect. The coefficient
estimate on acquirer lobbying status, 2.6498 (s.e.=1.2721), implies that the transfer
to lobbying acquirers is estimated at $7.4 billion for the DIF, or 16.4 percent of the
total resolution losses of $44.99 billion.29 Importantly, the coefficient estimate on
cover bidder lobbying status is negative and insignificant. Columns 3 and 4 display
consistent results when we consider the log-$-value variables of lobbying. In terms of
money spent on lobbying toward regulators (using coefficient estimates of column 4),
a one standard deviation increase in lobbying expenditures (3.17) leads to an increase
in the transfer from the DIF to lobbying acquirers of $1.7 billion, which is equal to
3.8 percent of the total resolution losses.
Next, we analyze cases where the net discount submitted by the cover bidder
29Using estimate of β from column 2, 2.6498 percentage points of $278,306 million of aggregated
assets yield approximately $7,374.6 million (= 16.4% of the aggregated resolution cost in Table 3.1).
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on the failed bank’s assets and liabilities is lower than the one eventually offered
by the winning bidder. In such cases the FDIC accepts higher resolution costs by
allocating the bank to the winner. We construct a dummy variable that takes the
value of 1 if the acquisition price is lower than the cover price in terms of net discount,
and 0 otherwise. We again control for bid characteristics such as the cover of some
assets by loss-sharing agreements. The results presented in columns 5 to 8 show
that the coefficient estimates on acquirer lobbying variables are always positive and
statistically significant at the 1-percent level. Lobbying thus increases the likelihood
that the FDIC selects a winning bid with a higher net discount.
To sum up, the results in this section are as follows: (1) lobbying increases the
net discount differential, suggesting that lobbying acquirers pay on average relatively
less than other-auction bidders; and (2) lobbying significantly increases the likelihood
of winning with a greater net discount than the cover bidder, suggesting that lob-
bying acquirers tend to pay less than the cover bidder. Lobbying thus results in
a significant drain for the FDIC insurance fund. Importantly, these findings also
show that the FDIC makes more use of its discretion when bidders lobby. We now
move on to studying outcomes following the investment in a failed bank to further
establish whether the documented effect of lobbying can be interpreted as a sign of
mis-allocation.
3.4.2 Post-Acquisition Efficiency
In this section, we formally examine whether the acquisition of failed banks by
lobbying institutions leads to observable efficiency improvements. For that purpose,
we construct a panel data set at the joint-bank (acquirer and failed bank combined)
and quarter levels spanning the 2003-2015 interval and perform fixed-effects regres-
sions of the specification
efficiencyj′t = α+β1post acquisitionj′t+β2(lj′×post acquisitionj′t)+ΓXj′t+µj′+µt+εj′t.
(3.3)
Here efficiencyj′t is a measure of efficiency of the joint-bank j′ at time t. Specif-
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Figure 3.4. Kernel density of failed bank assets and resolution costs
The figure shows the kernel density functions of total assets of failed banks, split by active
lobbying acquirer. Solid lines represent the distributions of failed bank total assets in log value,
and dashed lines for resolution costs to the FDIC. Vertical lines indicate the median values in $
million. The figure at the top depicts the failed banks acquired by banks that have positive
lobbying expenditures during the sample period (2007-2014), while the figure at the bottom for
failed banks acquired by banks that do not lobby during the sample period.
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ically, we employ return on assets (ROA) and the cost-to-asset ratio (ATC) as two
complementary measures of efficiency that have been used in prior works (e.g. Cor-
nett and Tehranian, 1992; and Granja et al., 2015, in a context similar than ours).
The dummy variable post acquisitionj′t takes the value of 1 on the quarter after the
failure and the subsequent quarters, and 0 otherwise.30 The interaction between lj′
and afterj′t captures how bidder lobbying (i.e. status and expenditures) modifies the
average effect of a failed bank’s acquisition on the outcome variable efficiencyj′t. To
isolate the effect of β2, the coefficient of interest, we control for a host of joint-bank
characteristics (Xj′t) including Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, NPL Ra-
tio, OREO Ratio, CRE Loans, C&I Loans, and Residential Loans. We further add
joint-bank and quarter fixed effects, µj′ and µt, to remove the effect of fixed joint-
bank characteristics potentially correlated with lobbying or the acquisition itself on
efficiency outcomes and to eliminate any common trends in both lobbying and ac-
quisition potentially correlated with efficiency outcomes. The inclusion of µj′ in our
specification thus absorbs the lobbying variable itself and only the interaction effect
between the acquisition dummy and lobbying variable is identified. Standard errors
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the joint-bank level. Since acquirers
take different time span to finalize the integration of failed bank acquisitions, we
drop observations during the four quarters starting from the failure date.
Table 3.9 reports the results of assessing whether efficiency changes around the
acquisition vary according to the lobbying activities of the eventual acquirer of failed
banks. We measure the combined efficiency of an acquirer and the failed bank before
the acquisition by weighting their individual efficiency measures, and then compare
them after the transaction. Columns 1-4 first show that there are in general efficiency
improvements after failed bank acquisitions: the post-acquisition dummy variable
enters positively and significantly in regression models of columns 1 and 2, which
suggests that acquiring failed banks enhances operating performance as measured
by ROA. Similarly, in columns 3 and 4 total expenses relative to total assets (ATC)
decrease on average after the acquisition of a failed bank. The coefficient on the
30Because the time needed to finalize the integration of the failed bank may vary from one acquirer
to the other, we drop observations during the four quarters starting from the failure date.
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post-acquisition dummy variable, though insignificant, is negative.
When acquisitions involve a lobbying bank, they are associated with a relatively
lower ROA and a higher ATC, suggesting efficiency deterioration compared to an
average acquirer. First, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term in column 1
is -0.1771 (s.e.=0.0272), statistically significant at the 1-percent level. This means
that ROA at lobbying banks decreases by about 18 basis points relative to a sample
mean of 0.15 percent. The results are also economically meaningfully when we study
the lobbying expenditures (column 2): A one standard deviation change in lobbying
expenditures is associated with a drop in ROA by around 30 percent relative to the
mean. Second, we focus on our cost measure (ATC) and find results in line with the
ones on ROA. As can be observed from the remaining two columns of Table 3.9, we
find that the takeovers of a failed institution by lobbying banks lead to significant
increases in ATC, which corroborates the fact that post-takeover efficiency appears
to deteriorate at lobbying banks.
3.4.3 Are Lobbying Bidders Engaged in Rent Seeking? A Discussion
Our empirical analyses reveal that lobbying by bidders affects the outcomes of
FDIC-run actions along two dimensions: lobbying bidders are more likely to win
auctions and they have to pay relatively less in order to win. The implied negative
relationship between price paid and likelihood of winning seems puzzling as it is
at odds with standard economic theory. We have also shown that the operating
performance of lobbying banks post-acquisition falls relative to the total sample of
acquiring banks. This is also surprising to the extent that lobbying banks may hence
ultimately not benefit from their ability to acquire more easily. In this section, we
discuss what may plausibly explain our findings.
One channel through which lobbying may affect acquisitions is rent-seeking à la
Shleifer and Vishny (1994):31 Lobbying allows bidders receiving a more favorable
treatment by the FDIC. This view can account for our finding that lobbying in-
creases the likelihood of winning while simultaneously reducing the acquisition price
31See Khwaja and Mian (2011) who discuss and review recent advances in the study of rent seeking
in the financial sector.
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for bidders. Rent-seeking has the likely consequence that it distorts the efficient allo-
cation of failed banks, as the regulatory agency is no longer solely guided by economic
principles in its decisions. For example, while a failed bank should be allocated to
the bidder that is best able to acquire and integrate the failing bank (and hence can
offer the highest valuation), lobbying may lead to other banks being favored in the
auction process. Our results on the post-acquisition efficiency are consistent with
this: lobbying banks do not seem to be matched with failing banks in situations
where they are able to improve the performance.
An alternative channel depicts the lobbying process as one of information trans-
mission (Grossman and Helpman, 2001, see). The informational view posits that
lobbying resolves the information asymmetry inherent to the resolution process. The
bidder’s ability to acquire and integrate a failed institution might be private to the
bidder, but lobbyists have the ability to convey it to the regulator. By gaining access
to new information, the FDIC can in principle make superior decisions, selecting
better matches for failing banks. This channel can also explain our main finding
that lobbying banks have a higher likelihood of winning the auction: everything else
being equal, the FDIC should prefer bidders for which informational asymmetries
are less pronounced. The information-based explanation is also consistent with the
fact that lobbying bidders are able to pay less, as the resolution of informational
problems should increase the FDIC’s willingness to allocate failed banks to lobbying
banks. However, our last empirical finding, the lower operating performance of lob-
bying acquirers, does not fit with the case of better information dissemination since
we would expect lobbying banks to only be allocated failed banks when they are good
acquirers.
Our analysis further informs us about the reason for why banks may lobby. Two
explanations can be brought forward. One is that lobbying is an efficient investment
in regulatory capital. Banks make these investments in order to benefit from favorable
treatment, allowing them to improve their overall return to shareholders (Acemoglu
et al., 2016, Borisov et al., 2016). Our auction results can be explained by this, as
lobbying acquirers benefit from a lower price they have to pay. The results on the
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Table 3.9. Post-acquisition efficiency and bidder lobbying
This table presents the results from fixed-effects panel regression models. The dimension of the
constructed panel is at the joint-bank and quarter levels. Both dependent and independent
variables are the weighted average of the acquirer and the failed bank by total assets in the
quarters prior to failure dates and then those of acquirers in the quarters after failure dates. All
quarters between 2003 and 2015 are included, except for the four quarters starting from the failure
quarters. Post-Acquisition is an indicator that takes the value of 1 for the quarters after the failure
date. Lobbying Regulators > 0 and Lobbying Regulators are measured in the year of the failure,
are absorbed by Joint Bank Fixed Effects, except for the interaction terms. Joint-bank controls
include Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, NPL Ratio, OREO Ratio, CRE Loans (%),
C&I Loans (%), and Residential Loans (%). See Appendix B.1 for more details about variable
definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th levels. Robust standard errors are
presented in the parentheses and clustered at the joint-bank level. ***, **, and * represent
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROA ATC
(Lobbying Regulators >0) × Post-Acquisition -0.1771∗∗∗ 0.0473∗
(0.0272) (0.0266)
Lobbying Regulators × Post-Acquisition -0.0142∗∗∗ 0.0038∗
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Post-Acquisition 0.0760∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗∗ -0.0107 -0.0108
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0197) (0.0197)
Size 0.1677∗∗∗ 0.1680∗∗∗ -0.0990∗∗∗ -0.0991∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0171) (0.0171)
Liquidity Ratio -0.0058∗∗∗ -0.0058∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗ -0.0017∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ -0.0016 -0.0016
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0015)
NPL Ratio -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0017)
OREO Ratio -0.0163∗ -0.0164∗ 0.0071 0.0072
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0065) (0.0065)
CRE Loans (%) -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0017∗ 0.0017∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
C&I Loans (%) -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0022∗ 0.0022∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Residential Loans (%) -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Joint-Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.343 0.615 0.615
Auctions 400 400 400 400
Observations 12935 12935 12935 12935
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lower efficiency of acquiring firms, however, seem to be at odds with this explanation
as acquiring firms will not benefit from a higher likelihood of winning auctions if this
leads to inferior performance going forward.
The second explanation is that lobbying is the result of agency problems within
the firm. Aggarwal et al. (2012) highlight the common agency issues prevalent in
rent-seeking situations characterizing corporate political contributions in the United
States. The authors find that firms with high political contributions experience
lower long-term stock returns, and have operating characteristics consistent with
the existence of a free cash flow problem. In particular, firms that make political
contributions tend to engage in more and worse acquisitions than firms that do
not. In the context of the financial crisis, like ours, Duchin and Sosyura (2012)
show that politically connected institutions are more likely to access to government
investment funds. They also find that these investments in politically connected
institutions under-perform those in unconnected institutions, consistent with Shleifer-
Vishny predictions on agency-type inefficiencies from political connections.
In our specific context, agency problems may take the form of empire-building
managers, who realize that lobbying allows them expand more easily through acqui-
sitions. This is consistent with our finding that lobbying simultaneously raises the
likelihood of being able to acquire another bank while at the same time lowering the
performance of acquisitions. In this view, lobbying has a double cost: it distorts the
efficient allocation of failed banks (a social cost) and amplifies agency problems at
acquiring banks (a firm-level cost).
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, focus has been on the political economy of the allocation of failed
banks in the Great Recession and its aftermath. Studying the universe of P&A
transactions between 2007 and 2014, we find strong evidence that bidders engaged
in lobbying activities are in better position to win a FDIC-run auction. Further
empirical evidence suggests that rent seeking for favorable treatment accounts for
this finding. In particular, we show that eventual acquirers with lobbying activities
deliver inferior outcomes in terms of post-acquisition efficiency, consistent with rent-
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seeking theories (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). We also assess the economic magnitude
of the cost associated with the lobbying on failed-bank auctions and find that the
cost imposed to the DIF, thus to society, is meaningful; that is, the average effect
estimated is equal to 16.4 percent of the total resolution losses. Of course, having
shown that lobbying creates distortions at the bank level does not imply any welfare
consequences, as there may also be benefits for financial stability and employment.
Understanding and quantifying further the welfare consequences of lobbying remains
a fruitful area of future research.
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Chapter 4
Lobbying in Mergers and Acquisitions*
4.1 Introduction
Regulatory uncertainty when completing mergers and acquisitions captures the
attention of both practitioners and academics. In 2011, AT&T proposed to acquire
T-Mobile USA in a $39 billion deal.1 The proposed merged company would take a
43% share in the wireless market, which raised concerns with the Antitrust Division
in the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ eventually blocked the deal and AT&T
stock price dropped by 4% on the DOJ announcement. In addition, AT&T had to
pay a reverse breakup fee of around $4.2 billion (almost 10% of its market value)
to the target. This case illustrates the substantial regulatory risks (the deal failed)
and direct costs (such as the termination fee, but also filing costs, costs of lawyers,
etc.) in large M&A transactions.2 Merging firms in successful deals avoid paying
termination fees but may need to offer asset divestitures or restrictive agreements to
address the antitrust concerns of the government. These negotiated concessions are
also costly because they reduce projected deal synergies. Still, regulatory frictions
also imply indirect costs associated with increased interim uncertainty (Bhagwat
et al., 2016).3 The regulatory costs and risks associated with the antitrust review
*This chapter is based on Fidrmuc, Roosenboom, and Zhang (2017) “Lobbying in mergers and ac-
quisitions” (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2484669) and has been submitted to a journal.
We are grateful to Dion Bongaerts, Espen Eckbo, Jarrad Harford, Buihui Qiu, Frederik Schlinge-
mann, Karin Thorburn, Marieke van der Poel, Mathijs van Dijk, David Yermack, seminar partic-
ipants in Erasmus University and Australian National University, and participants in 2017 FMA
European Conference (Lisbon) for valuable suggestions and comments. All errors are ours.
1http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/01/technology/att_tmobile_lawsuit/
2According to the 2011 Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Annual Report reported by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice (http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/06/2011hsrreport.pdf) as
much as 40% of all large merger deals with deal value larger than $1 billion in 2011 were reviewed
in detail and over 15% received a Second Request.
3“Companies in a number of recent mergers have been waiting upward of a year or longer for
a final verdict, and some deals have fallen apart because of government concerns. . . . As time
passes, merging firms can become increasingly worried about completing a deal. They have to ensure
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process may motivate merger firms to directly influence regulatory decision makers
through lobbying or other political activities.
In this paper, we investigate whether firms actively engage in lobbying around
merger announcements to mitigate regulatory frictions of antitrust merger reviews.
To start with, we document in detail the US antitrust review process and the di-
verse set of possible antitrust review outcomes. Our empirical analysis has four
parts. First, we test whether regulatory uncertainty is an important source of deal-
completion risks and costs. We do this by conducting an event study around the
revelation of antitrust review outcomes and testing whether less favorable antitrust
review outcomes increase the probability of withdrawals and time needed to com-
plete. Second, we investigate whether firms actively mitigate regulatory uncertainty
through adjusting lobbying before and after their merger announcements. Lobby-
ing is the main channel through which firms influence regulators and legislators.
Corporate lobbying also has the advantage of being regularly reported on a quar-
terly basis and of being the largest part of corporate political activities (Kerr et al.,
2014). Therefore, we explore the relationship between lobbying expenditures and
the probability of the different antitrust review outcomes. Third, we analyze value
consequences of lobbying associated with M&A announcements. Finally, to test for
possible conflicts between lobbying and regulatory antitrust goals, we explore the
effect of lobbying on the change in market power from before to after the merger.
We collect detailed information about the antitrust regulatory process for all
merger transactions above $100 million during the period from 2008 to 2014.4 We
end up with a set of 370 large merger deals. Typically, both the acquirer and the
target submit their HSR premerger filings shortly after the deal public announcement
and wait the statutory 30 days for the review outcome.5 Favorable antitrust review
outcomes of Early Termination and Natural Expiration cover 138 and 139 deals
financing remains in place, and that can cost money. They can begin to lose employees nervous
about the future, as well as customers.” See “’U.S. Antitrust Reviews of Mergers Get Longer,” WSJ,
June 7, 2015.
4Merging firms need to clear antitrust review if their deal value is above a certain threshold that
is determined yearly based on GNP growth rate. We opt for a cut-off value of $100 million so that
it is low enough and still all transactions in our dataset are subject to the regulatory process.
5HSR premerger filing refers to the Premerger Notification and Report form, pursuant to the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.
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in our sample, respectively. For both outcomes, 6% of deals are later withdrawn
and abandoned. The issuance of a Second Request, in contrast, means that a full-
scale investigation into the antitrust nature of the deal is initiated and the relevant
antitrust agency requests extensive additional information. Second Requests are
issued for 62 deals in our sample and the fraction of withdrawn deals for this outcome
is 19%. Within the group of 62 deals with Second Requests, 24 deals are Challenged
and a complaint is filed against the merging parties, while 38 deals manage to stay
Unchallenged and get clearance to complete without a filed complaint. Still, these
Unchallenged Second Requests spend significant resources and time to comply with
the extra information request. In contrast to Ferris et al. (2016), we show that these
unchallenged deals are associated with a high failure rate.
Sometimes, firms choose to strategically withdraw the HSR premerger filing and
refile it again to start another waiting period. This way merger firms provide addi-
tional time for the antitrust agency to review their case without immediately trigger-
ing an adverse Second Request. To capture this strategic behavior of merging firms,
we create a special outcome category of “Pull and Refile” for deals that employ the
strategy of pulling their HSR filing and eventually receive favorable Early Termina-
tion or Natural Expiration. The special category of Pull and Refile includes 31 deals
and 6% of them are withdrawn.
The antitrust review process is associated with substantial costs and risks even
for deals receiving Early Termination or Natural Expiration but the costs and risks
get substantially more severe for Second Requests. In a Challenged outcome the
regulatory agencies question the source of the potential benefits from the merger –
this category of mergers is considered as anticompetitive. Nevertheless, Unchallenged
Second Requests also face high regulatory costs. Second Requests take on average 237
days from announcement to completion, while it takes only 98 days to complete the
favorable outcomes of Early Termination and Natural Expiration. Second Requests
are also more likely to withdraw. The antitrust review process is also closely followed
by the stock market. Receiving a Second Request is associated with –2.8% and
–2.6% abnormal return for the acquirer and the target, respectively, while Early
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Terminations and Natural Expirations exhibit insignificant announcement abnormal
returns. This is an economically sizable market adjustment that reflects increased
costs and risks of complying with Second Requests. Previous studies documents
a negative effect of regulatory enforcements on the probability of future mergers
in the same industry (Clougherty and Seldeslachts, 2012, Seldeslachts et al., 2009).
Our evidence evaluates the regulatory costs directly through the effect of receiving a
Second Request.
As a next step, we explore acquirer lobbying activities before and after merger
announcements and their association with the antitrust review outcomes. Our data
suggest that firms lobby in order to actively manage antitrust review risks and costs.
Firms increase their lobbying intensity four quarters before the merger public an-
nouncement. An increase in pre-announcement lobbying expenditures is associated
with more favorable antitrust review outcomes. A one-standard-deviation increase in
the pre-announcement acquirer lobbying ratio decreases the probability of receiving
a Second Request by 7.6%, which is economically large given that the unconditional
probability of a Second Request equals 16.8%. However, higher post-announcement
lobbying is then associated with increased probability of adverse review outcomes, es-
pecially for firms with lower pre-announcement lobbying. This suggests that Second
Requests do require more intensive lobbying either to influence the antitrust agencies
in getting the deal approved or to supply the antitrust agencies with with additional
information such that they can arrive at a more informed decision. Pull & Refile is a
special category with a favorable outcome but intensive post-announcement lobby-
ing. Indeed, a positive correlation between post-announcement lobbying and the Pull
& Refile category confirms that pulling the HSR filing is coordinated with lobbying
and, therefore, a deliberate action with the objective of avoiding a Second Request.
The next part of our analysis explores the value implications of lobbying. We show
that the market recognizes the value of lobbying: acquirer and combined-firm deal-
announcement abnormal returns are significantly higher for firms with higher pre-
announcement lobbying. A one-standard-deviation increase in lobbying expenditures
reported over one year before the deal public announcement increases the acquirer and
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combined-firm abnormal return by 1.1% and 2.3%, respectively. However, lobbying
positively impacts acquirer returns only when it is likely to be used for the benefit of
shareholders (in firms with strong corporate governance) and not to pursue empire
building behavior (in firms with weak corporate governance).
Finally, we relate the pre- and post-announcement lobbying to realized changes
in acquirer market power from before to after the merger to explore the merger an-
titrust effects. We do not find any support for a link between acquirer lobbying and
increased market power. The evidence does not show that antitrust agencies abuse
their powers and bend to lobbying advances by opportunistic acquiring firms. We
believe our result tilts support to the information-sharing rather than regulatory-
capture hypothesis. According to the information-sharing hypothesis, lobbying mit-
igates information asymmetry between regulators and firms. Lobbying firms obtain
extra information about potential regulatory risks and adjust their deals in line with
compliance. Lobbying firms also supply information to the agencies to help them to
make more efficient decisions. The regulatory-capture hypothesis suggests that firms
achieve more favorable review outcomes directly influencing the antitrust agencies.
Through lobbying and political connections, merging firms influence the antitrust
agencies towards a more favorable outcome that may be associated with higher prof-
its for the merging firms but decreased competition in the wider market.
We address potential endogeneity bias using the instrumental-variable approach.
Our biggest concern is that lobbying is driven by omitted (unobservable) variables.
Our results are robust to using past lobbying expenditures as an instrument. To
ensure no direct influence of the instrument on the review outcomes, we only consider
lobbying expenditures three years prior to deal announcement. We also check that
our results are robust to using alternative lobbying measures.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it contributes to the
literature on the impact of regulatory uncertainty, inherent to regulatory processes,
on individual firms and their M&A activities. Regulatory uncertainty is documented,
for example, in Aktas et al. (2009) who show negative value consequences of European
regulator interventions in announced business combinations. In the US, antitrust
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agencies are subject to the influence of the Congress or interested parties.6. Also,
Croci et al. (2017) show that that firms contributing to political action committees
or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their takeover process
is lengthier. They also argue that correlations between politicians’ future careers,
campaign finance and takeover activities of firms linked to the politicians imply that
future career concerns may motivate politicians to interfere in M&A activities.7
We add to this line of literature by showing that the antitrust review process is
a major source of the deal-failure probability and also causes deal delays. Based on
hand-collected data concerning the antitrust review process compiled from various
sources, we document granular levels of antitrust review outcomes and show in detail
the real effects of regulatory frictions. In particular, we show that the antitrust
review delays all deals with potential antitrust concerns (adverse outcomes) even if
they are not officially challenged. Also, even though all adverse-outcome deals are
less likely to complete than deals with favorable review outcomes, the deal-failure
probability is higher for unchallenged deals that are under full investigation by the
antitrust agencies than for challenged deals. We also measure the direct impact on
shareholder wealth around the revelation of antitrust review outcomes and find that
the value loss for adverse outcomes is up to a half of synergy gains. Given our results
that regulatory uncertainty in M&As exhibits substantial economic consequences, we
also contribute to the recent research on interim uncertainty (for instance, Bhagwat
et al., 2016).
Second, we contribute to the growing literature concerning the impact of political
economy on corporate finance that generally shows a positive link between corporate
political connections and firm value.8 Recently, Akey (2015) shows a positive causal
relationship between firm political donations to winning candidates and firm value,
6For instance, see Coate and Higgins (1990), Weingast and Moran (1983), Falaschetti (2008)
7We mainly focus on the impact of the regulatory process on individual deals and firms. Research
on general consequences for merger waves and economic surplus include Eckbo (1992), Eckbo and
Wier (1985), Seldeslachts et al. (2009).
8See, for example, Goldman et al. (2008), Cooper et al. (2010), Amore and Bennedsen (2013),
Akey (2015), Borisov et al. (2016). See also similar evidence based on one-time events (Acemoglu
et al., 2016, Jayachandran, 2006, Alexander et al., 2009) and based on countries with weaker insti-
tutions (Claessens et al., 2008, Fisman, 2001, Johnson and Mitton, 2003, Khwaja and Mian, 2005,
Faccio, 2006)
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which suggests that corporate political donations are effective in influencing policy
decisions and represent an investment in valuable political capital. A stream of papers
attempts to identify channels through which political connections may enhance firm
value. For example, politically connected firms manage to secure more government
contracts, and their financial gains from the contracts are economically large (Tahoun,
2014, Goldman et al., 2013). Also, politically connected firms are more likely to
receive government assistance or funding in the period of distress (Faccio et al.,
2007, Duchin and Sosyura, 2012, Adelino and Dinc, 2014) or have better access to
bank credit in countries with weaker institutions (Dinc, 2005, Khwaja and Mian,
2005, Claessens et al., 2008).9 Complementing this line of research, we explore the
effect of lobbying on firm value through corporate investment activities. Focusing
on mergers and acquisitions, which are the largest and most value-consequential
corporate investments with high regulatory risks and costs, we are able to show that
firms strategically adjust their lobbying around these large corporate investments to
mitigate regulatory uncertainty and, as a result, increase firm value.
Ferris et al. (2016) is the closest paper to our analysis as they document higher
merger-announcement abnormal returns for politically connected firms. Our analy-
sis focuses on the antitrust review process in detail and explores lobbying activity
around merger events, which may be complementary to political connections through
board seats. Also, we measure the direct impact on shareholder wealth of regulatory
review outcomes and relate lobbying to subsequent market power changes to evaluate
society-wide effects of lobbying in M&As.
This stream of literature also points to the potential costs of political connections
to firm value. For example, firms actively engaging in political activities tend to
suffer weaker corporate governance (Aggarwal et al., 2012). Political connections
may also allow firms to engage in unethical practices and misconduct (Ramanna,
2008, Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010, Yu and Yu, 2011, Correia, 2014, Borisov
et al., 2016). Links to government may alter firm strategy towards government
9Moreover,Alexander et al. (2009) show lobbying firms receive sizable tax benefits in the tax
holiday created by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 and Gao and Huang (2016) find that
lobbying hedge funds benefit from trading on political insider information.
102 Chapter 4. Lobbying in mergers and acquisitions
objectives and destroy shareholder wealth (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). We add
to this literature by showing that lobbying increases acquirer returns only for firms
with stronger corporate governance.
Finally, the current paper contributes to the literature on political risk in invest-
ment activities. Related to our paper, Seldeslachts et al. (2009) show that regulatory
risks discourage future merger activities. Karolyi and Taboada (2015) find that banks
direct their merger activities to countries with lower regulatory frictions.10 Adding
to the previous evidence, we show that acquiring firms use lobbying in a strategic
way to lower regulatory costs and risks associated with the antitrust review process
in takeovers. Given that mergers are large and easily-identifiable investments, we
show that firms actively manage political risk in investment activities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly introduces the institutional
background of the antitrust merger review process. Section 4.3 describes our data
and provides basic summary statistics concerning the antitrust-process outcomes and
lobbying activities around merger announcements. Section 4.4 shows our results.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Regulatory Background
The antitrust agencies (DOJ and FTC) make a predictive analysis of the con-
sequences of ongoing mergers. According to US laws, the agencies’ objective is to
“identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary
interference with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral” (the US
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010, p.1). The antitrust
review is designed to protect consumers and ensure that mergers do not result in
higher prices, fewer choices or reduced rates of innovation. Except for the cases of
clear-cut anticompetitive mergers, such as monopoly or near-monopoly, the agencies
trade-off adverse effects of increased market power against efficiency enhancements
in merged firms. Nevertheless, methodologies and processes that the agencies employ
may be very detailed. A change in market concentration of a regional market may
10In similar vein, firms avoid paying tax by holding cash offshore, relocate headquarters to low-tax
countries through invert mergers, or flow investment to states or countries with lower disclosures
requirement(Zucman, 2014, Karolyi and Taboada, 2015, Lin et al., 2012).
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lead to the agencies detaining a national-wide merger.
In addition to antitrust clearance, merging firms sometimes need to get approval
from industry specific agencies. For example, mergers involving a telecommunications
company often require the permission of transferring communication licenses from
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Sometimes, firms also need to get
approvals from foreign antitrust agencies if the parties do business in other countries.
Nevertheless, the US antitrust review is the most widespread and applies to almost
all the economically significant deals involving US targets.
Merging firms need to clear antitrust review if their deal value is above a certain
threshold. The size threshold is adjusted yearly based on the GNP growth rate and
ranges between $50 million and $100 million. In 2014, for example, the threshold
was $75.9 million. Both the bidder and the target are required to submit an HSR
premerger filing.11 The submission of the HSR premerger filings is usually done after
the public merger announcement and starts a statutory waiting period of 30 days.12
The merging firms cannot consummate their deal before the expiration of this waiting
period. The information in the HSR premerger filing is not public, but merger firms
often voluntarily disclose the status and timings of their filings, especially when the
target has a public listing. After receiving HSR filings from both merging parties,
the antitrust agencies (FTC or DOJ) may request additional information from the
merging companies (such as lists of customers and suppliers).13 The agencies may
also reach out to third parties, such as rivals, customers, and suppliers, for their
opinions on the transaction.
The first stage of the antitrust review process results in one of the following
three outcomes: (i) the waiting period is terminated before the 30-day waiting pe-
riod (Early Termination); (ii) the 30-day waiting period expires naturally (Natural
11The Premerger Notification and Report form, pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976, requires information including the identity of the involved parties, financial
statements, valuation, filings submitted to SEC, and information of operation and production. The
required information submission is only minimum and does not contain any advanced analysis on
product markets or competitions.
12The waiting period is 15 days for cash tender offers or bankruptcy sales.
13In most cases, the antitrust agencies involved are the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). The requests for additional information
occurs during the waiting period either in a ”voluntary access letter” or in phone calls and emails.
Firms can also invite the agency to presentations to address the antitrust concerns.
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Expiration); and (iii) a full-scale investigation is initiated and the antitrust agency
issues a request to the merging firms for additional information (Second Request).
Early Termination and Natural Expiration imply that merger firms have cleared the
antitrust review and are free to complete the deal. The issuance of a Second Re-
quest resets the waiting period. Once the firms certify substantial compliance with
the Second Request, the agency starts a new 30-day waiting period to review the
newly-submitted information (10 days for cash tender offers or bankruptcy sales).14
A positive outcome of the review after Second Request is confirmed in an antitrust
clearance and the deal is then allowed to complete. However, if the agency finds
an M&A transaction to be anti-competitive, the transaction is “Challenged.” The
DOJ files a complaint against the merging parties in a federal court to block the
transaction. The FTC proceeds with an administrative complaint in front of an
Administrative Law Judge while seeking a preliminary injunction from a federal
court to stop the deal from consummation.
Remedy negotiation for Challenged deals is a lengthy, often multi-month process
that requires extensive discussions, provision of information and negotiation concern-
ing the remedy agreement.15 If it works out, firms sign a “consent order” (issued by
the FTC) or a “consent decree” (with DOJ, issued by a federal court). If a settle-
ment has been reached, a proposed consent decree can be filed simultaneously with
the antitrust complaint. Alternatively, firms may decide to abandon the transac-
tion or choose to litigate against the agency’s decision in federal court or before an
administrative law judge.
14The actual time between the issuance of a Second Request and the expiration date of the new
waiting period is usually much longer than 30 days since it takes significant time and effort to fulfill
the information requirements.
15To address the agency’s antitrust concerns, the merger parties may consider to offer asset or
business divestitures or to execute restriction agreements. Note that negotiations with agencies can
take place at any stage, even before receiving Second Request. For example, in the Ahold/Delhaize
merger, the merging parties proposed to sell 80+ supermarkets in the US. Our sample contains five
mergers with a consent agreement without triggering Second Requests. We do not consider them
as being officially Challenged.
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4.3 Data
To explore the effect of lobbying in M&A transactions, we investigate a sample
of economically significant US mergers. Our merger sample comes from the SDC
M&A database and meets the following requirements: (i) the deal value is at least
$100 million and the percentage of shares sought in the deal is at least 50%; (ii)
the announcement date is between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2014; (iii)
the acquirer and the target are publicly-traded US companies that can be matched
to CRSP stock information at the time of the announcement and to Compustat,
with at least one year accounting information before the merger announcement; (iv)
both the acquirer and the target are not operating in the financial industry;16 (v)
the deal is not a leveraged buyout, spin-off, recapitalization, self-tender, exchange
offer, repurchase, acquisition of remaining interest, or a privatization. We focus on
domestic US M&A deals so that all firms in our sample face the same regulatory
framework. The sample period starts in 2008 due to the availability of quarterly
lobby data. In total, we end up with 432 deals that meet all the above requirements,
but we are not able to find any information concerning the antitrust review process
for 62 deals. Industry and year distributions of the final sample of 370 deals are
reported in Appendix C.3.
To explore the effect of lobbying in M&A transactions, we investigate a sample
of economically significant US mergers. Our merger sample comes from the SDC
M&A database and meets the following requirements: (i) the deal value is at least
$100 million and the percentage of shares sought in the deal is at least 50%; (ii)
the announcement date is between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2014; (iii) the
acquirer and the target are publicly-traded US companies that can be matched to
CRSP stock information at the time of the announcement and to COMPUSTAT,
with at least one year accounting information before the merger announcement; (iv)
both the acquirer and the target are not operating in the financial industry; (v) the
deal is not a leveraged buyout, spinoff, recapitalization, self-tender, exchange offer,
16M&As in financial industry need approvals from financial supervisory agencies, such as the
Federal Reserve.
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repurchase, acquisition of remaining interest, or a privatization. We focus on domestic
US M&A deals so that all firms in our sample face the same regulatory framework.
The sample period starts in 2008 due to the availability of quarterly lobby data.
We exclude financial merger deals because the regulations in the financial industry
are tighter and the antitrust merger reviews for these deals are more complex than
in other industries.17 In total, we end up with 432 deals that meet all the above
requirements, but we are not able to find any information concerning the antitrust
review process for 62 deals. Industry and year distributions of the final sample of
370 deals are reported in Table C.1 in the Internet appendix.
Panel A of Table 4.1 reports summary statistics for usual deal and acquirer char-
acteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix C.1. The average transaction value
is $3 billion, which is significantly larger than an average transaction value of $1.5
billion in Malmendier et al. (2016) representing a recent wide M&A sample, but
comparable to large deals in Barraclough et al. (2013). Relatively, the transaction
value is 28% of the acquirer’s market value. The average takeover premium is 42%
relative to target stock price 8 weeks before the public deal announcement, which
is comparable to the literature. All cash deals represent 57% of our sample, which
is more than for an average deal in Malmendier et al. (2016). Using Hoberg and
Phillips (2016) to define industry peers, 55% of target firms operate in the same
product market as the acquirer. The pairwise similarity reflecting the closeness of
target’s and acquirer’s product markets is 0.045, which is markedly smaller to the
average pairwise similarity of 0.114 reported in Hoberg and Phillips (2010) for a gen-
eral takeover sample. This suggests that large deals that do have to clear antitrust
review are biased towards deals that are less closely related in their product market.
This might be also because the merging firms are larger and more diversified. Deal
hostility and bidding competition after the public announcement are low, but repre-
sentative of general takeover population. Termination fees that the target firm agrees
to pay are not so common in our data set: the mean value is only 1% of the deal
value and median is zero. In contrast, reverse termination fee promised by acquirers
17M&As in financial industry are not only subject to the investigations of the antitrust agencies,
but also need approvals from their own supervisory agencies, such as the Federal Reserve.
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is high (3% of deal value on average), suggesting that target companies are aware of
the high regulatory risks and demand compensation.
Around the public deal announcement, target stock prices adjust by 31%, while
the acquirer market reaction is virtually zero. Combined abnormal announcement
effect is 4%. The expected completion probability is 95%. The acquirer statistics
show that acquirers in our sample are large firms with a relatively small market-to-
book ratio of 1.9. 38% of our acquirers have not announced any large deal within
the previous three years, while 70% have not announced any large deal concerning
a public target. The acquirer deal rank shows that our acquirers announce, on
average, seven large deals (excluding the current one) over the past three years, but
the median is only 1. Public large deals are less common – the average indicates only
one additional deal (excluding the current one) in the previous three years.
4.3.1 The Antitrust Review Process
In order to get a detailed picture of the antitrust review process, we collect in-
formation concerning individual submissions of HSR premerger filings, public an-
nouncements of antitrust review outcomes or announcements certifying substantial
compliance with a Second Request. We search through related SEC filings as well
as press releases on Factiva looking for keywords such as “antitrust”, “second re-
quest”, “early termination”, “challenge” and “HSR”. Most firms disclose information
concerning at least one date related to their antitrust review because it concerns
material information regarding the completion and timing of merger transactions.
Appendix C.2 provides an illustration of our data collection using SEC filings and
press releases concerning the antitrust review process. Out of 432 mergers, we find at
least one date related to antitrust review for 370 mergers. In the 62 mergers without
any specific dates, there are nine mergers where the merging firms explicitly mention
they are not required to submit HSR premerger fillings, and two mergers where the
antitrust approvals have been cleared before deal announcements.18
We identify Challenged deals by manually collecting merger information from the
18The exemptions include the acquisition of raw lands, or foreign assets, of which the sales in the
US are no more than $50 million.
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Hart-Scott-Rodino Annual Congress Report from 2008 to 2015, and the antitrust-case
filings on the DOJ and FTC websites.19 In congress reports, the antitrust agencies
describe every officially challenged deal during the corresponding year. In total, we
are able to identify 24 Challenged deals.
Panel A in Figure 4.1 shows an overview of the antitrust review process with the
median days taken in each step of the process across different outcomes to illustrate
differing complexities. On average, firms file the HSR premerger filing 13 days after
the public announcement date.20 In 46 deals, merging firms strategically pull the
HSR premerger filing just before the expiration of the 30-day waiting period and
refile it again to start a new 30-day waiting period. In most cases, firms explicitly
state (in their SEC filings) that they do this to provide extra time to the antitrust
agencies to review their case. This suggests that merging firms intentionally avoid
Second Requests.
After submitting their HSR premerger filings, most firms clear the antitrust review
without any additional request for information. In the first group, 156 deals receive
an Early Termination in 12 days after they submit their HSR premerger filings and
then 147 deals complete in a further 60-day period. The remaining 9 deals are
withdrawn in 78 days. The second set of 152 deals clears the antitrust review as the
compulsory 30-day waiting period expires. This outcome is referred to as Natural
Expiration. 143 deals are then completed in 31 days, and 9 deals are withdrawn in
49 days.
The third group of 62 deals receives a Second Request. After the expiration of
the 30-day waiting period, these deals are requested to provide additional detailed
information. Out of these 62 deals, only 24 deals are officially Challenged as anticom-
petitive and an official complaint against the merging parties is filed with a relevant
court. Only 3 of the 24 Challenged deals withdraw in 101 days and 21 manage to
complete their deal within 96 days from the Second Request outcome. The com-
pleted Challenged Second Requests usually pledge to divest some assets to address
19We consult http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/index.html and http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings for DOJ and FTC, respectively.
20We have three mergers that file the HSR premerger filing before the public announcement, but
only one deal has the review outcome revealed before the deal announcement.
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles for four groups of
variables concerning the deal and acquirer characteristics (Panel A), antitrust-review outcomes
(Panel B), lobbying expenditures (Panel C) and product-market industry characteristics (Panel D).
All variables are defined in Appendix C.1 and winsorized at the 1th and 99th percentiles.
Variable # obs. Mean St.dev. 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Panel A: deal and acquirer characteristics
Deal value ($million) 370 3,024.500 5,952.113 387.961 1,172.092 3,055.269
Deal value (log) 370 7.079 1.323 5.961 7.067 8.025
Relative size 370 0.281 0.362 0.036 0.157 0.397
Takeover premium 361 0.423 0.383 0.218 0.340 0.518
All cash 370 0.568 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000
Horizontal merger 370 0.568 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000
Pairwise similarity 370 0.046 0.066 0.000 0.015 0.082
Tender offer 370 0.343 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000
Hostile 370 0.043 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bidding contest 370 0.070 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000
Entrenched acquirer 370 0.319 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000
Termination fee 370 0.013 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.023
Reverse termination fee 370 0.028 0.012 0.024 0.031 0.036
Acquirer announcement AR 370 0.005 0.075 -0.027 0.001 0.034
Target announcement AR 370 0.314 0.291 0.133 0.264 0.410
Combined announcement AR 370 0.043 0.075 -0.003 0.027 0.079
Expected completion probability 361 0.949 0.552 0.893 0.968 1.000
Market cap ($million) 370 28,200.121 49,849.600 2,030.557 6,642.716 26,271.348
Acquirer market-to-book 370 1.858 0.813 1.284 1.639 2.247
Acquirer leverage 366 0.205 0.195 0.064 0.139 0.286
Acquirer tangibility 370 0.235 0.216 0.072 0.150 0.351
Acquirer liquidity 370 0.301 0.184 0.166 0.269 0.404
Panel B: antitrust-review outcomes
Early Termination 370 0.373 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000
Natural Expiration 370 0.376 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000
Pull & Refile 370 0.084 0.277 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second Request 370 0.168 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.000
Challenged Second Request 370 0.065 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unchallenged Second Request 370 0.103 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000
Withdrawn 370 0.081 0.273 0.000 0.000 0.000
# days to complete 370 122.562 92.657 56.000 93.000 158.000
Acquirer outcome AR 367 -0.008 0.063 -0.036 -0.005 0.026
Target outcome AR 367 -0.008 0.064 -0.037 -0.008 0.026
Combined outcome AR 367 -0.007 0.054 -0.032 -0.005 0.022
continued on next page
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Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics (continued)
continued from previous page
Variable # obs. Mean St.dev. 25th perc. Median 75th perc.
Panel C: lobbying data
Active lobbier 370 0.795 0.405 1.000 1.000 1.000
No previous lobbying 370 0.341 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000
Lobbying dollars (−4,−1) ($000s) 370 2,923.081 6,107.520 0.000 220.000 2,750.000
Lobbying dollars (0,+3) ($000s) 370 3,027.607 6,029.503 0.000 240.000 3,020.000
Lobbying ratio (−4,−1) (b.p.) 370 1.512 3.793 0.000 0.302 1.213
Lobbying ratio (0,+3) (b.p.) 370 1.637 3.945 0.000 0.289 1.286
Lobbying dummy (−4,−1) 370 0.641 0.480 0.000 1.000 1.000
Lobbying dummy (0,+3) 370 0.665 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000
Disclosed lobbying ratio (b.p.) 370 1.527 3.655 0.000 0.315 1.238
Politicians’ ownership dollars ($000s) 370 19.111 89.919 0.000 0.000 0.000
Politicians’ ownership dummy 370 0.141 0.348 0.000 0.000 0.000
PAC contribution dollars ($000s) 370 6.842 14.093 0.000 0.000 6.000
PAC contribution ratio (b.p.) 370 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.003
PAC contribution dummy 370 0.373 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000
Target lobbying dummy (−4,−1) 370 0.273 0.446 0.000 0.000 1.000
Target lobbying dummy (0,+3) 370 0.241 0.428 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel D: product-market conditions
Acquirer HHI 370 0.247 0.263 0.095 0.142 0.261
Target HHI 370 0.226 0.223 0.095 0.146 0.265
Expected ∆HHI 370 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
∆HHI 338 0.002 0.215 -0.032 0.000 0.031
Acquirer market share 370 0.162 0.284 0.008 0.035 0.160
Target market share 370 0.069 0.208 0.001 0.004 0.026
∆market share 338 0.007 0.204 -0.006 0.000 0.010
Acquirer similarity 343 4.297 4.703 1.561 2.446 4.502
Target similarity 356 5.661 6.936 1.557 2.761 6.037
∆similarity 306 0.235 1.434 -0.283 -0.000 0.395
Acquirer fluidity 337 7.610 3.821 5.199 6.870 9.364
Target fluidity 347 8.289 4.037 5.264 7.468 10.492
∆fluidity 293 -0.551 2.340 -1.910 -0.518 0.862
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their antitrust issues. The remaining 38 Second Requests are Unchallenged: 29 deals
manage to provide all relevant additional information and complete in 150 days, while
9 deals withdraw in 135 days. We see that even though these Unchallenged deals do
not get an official complaint, it takes them roughly three-times as long to complete
(or withdraw) than deals with Natural Expiration or Early Termination. This extra
time is costly.
Panel B in Figure 4.1 focuses on the process of gathering extra information after
a Second Request. This process very often happens behind closed doors and not
much information is released to the public domain. Therefore, we were able to col-
lect some information only on a subset of 19 deals with Second Requests (31% of all
Second Requests) – 10 Challenged and 9 Unchallenged deals. On average, these firms
announce a substantial compliance with their Second Request in 55 days from the
initial outcome day. Subsequently, 14 deals are completed in 149 days (8 Challenged
and 6 Unchallenged), while 5 deals are withdrawn after 65 days. These time statistics
are perhaps not representative of all Second Requests, but suggest that compliance
with a Second Request is costly not only for Challenged deals that are, for example,
analyzed in Ferris et al. (2016), but also for Unchallenged Second Requests. The
collected SEC filings describe the process of compliance as very time-consuming and
involving disclosure of proprietary information.21 Gotts and American Bar Associa-
tion Antitrust Law Section (2006, p. 154) describes that a Second Request “consists
of both document requests and interrogatories… It is the company’s responsibility to
gather the necessary information and to prepare a narrative response. Gathering the
information and documents called for by a Second Request can be time-consuming
and expensive for the parties. Business people often react initially that it would be
impossible to comply.”
In summary, Figure 4.1 shows that most of the large deals in our sample manage
to get a favorable outcome of Early Termination (42%) or Natural Expiration (41%).
Only around 17% of deals receive a Second Request and only 39% of Second Requests
21For example, Avis Budget Group described in its SEC filings for the acquisition of Dollar Thrifty,
that it “submitted over a million pages of documents and vast quantities of data in response to the
FTC’s Second Request.”
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Figure 4.1. Antitrust-review process (continued)
Panel B. Panel B: extra data for Second Request
19 deals announcing certifying 
substantial compliance to 
Second Request
Second Requests
Deal withdrawn
Deal completed
55 days
5 deals
64.5 days
14 deals
149 days
are Challenged. Also, on average 8% of acquirers withdraw their offer; they abandon
and do not complete their announced deal. Withdrawals happen across all three
main review outcomes, but are more common for Second Requests (19%) relatively
to Early Terminations and Natural Expirations (6% each). Later in the analysis, we
refer to this group of three review outcomes – Early Termination, Natural Expiration
and Second Request – as the first-stage review outcomes.
To complete the picture, we note that 18 of Early Terminations and 13 of Natural
Expirations end up with these outcomes because of a strategic Pull & Refile of their
original HSR premerger filings. This means that they choose to get extra 30 days in
the waiting period to get a favorable outcome. Because of the strategic nature of this
move and its potential correlation with lobbying, we treat this group of 31 Pull &
Refile deals as an extra category in our lobbying-spending analysis below.22 We also
keep track of Challenged and Unchallenged Second Requests as it is possible that
their lobbying patterns are different. Altogether, we form a granular set of review
outcomes – Early Termination, Natural Expiration, Pull & Refile, Unchallenged and
Challenged Second Requests – that reflects in-depth features of the US antitrust
22Note that the remaining 15 deals that strategically refile their HSR premerger documents end
up with a Second Request. As they fall equally across Challenged and Unchallenged deals and do
not seem to differ from the rest of Second Requests, we decide to pool them with the other Second
Requests.
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review process.
Panel B of Table 4.1 summarizes the antitrust review outcome frequencies. As
mentioned above, we see that across all antitrust review outcomes, we have 8% of
withdrawn deals. The frequencies for Early Terminations and Natural Expirations
(37% and 38%, respectively) reflect that we report Pull & Refile as a separate outcome
category with a frequency of 8% (31 deals). 17% of deals receive a Second Request,
but only 7% (24 deals) are Challenged. The remaining category of 38 deals (10%
of the sample) represents Unchallenged Second Requests, but only 8% (29 deals)
complete, while 2% (9 deals) withdraw their offer, perhaps because the antitrust
review process is becoming too costly.
On average, it takes 123 calendar days from the public announcement to deal
completion or withdrawal, while Malmendier et al. (2016) report only 109 days for
an average sample without antitrust issues.23 At the bottom of Panel B, we report
the 12-day abnormal returns for the window of (−10,+1) around the review outcome
revelation date. Even though we conjecture that the antitrust review process is
costly, the market does not react significantly to the review outcome revelation for
all outcomes together. None of the abnormal returns for acquirers, targets, and
combined firms are significant.
4.3.2 Lobbying Data
The main aim of our paper is to explore effects of corporate political connections in
the context of M&As that represent large corporate investment decisions. We focus on
corporate lobbying because it constitutes a primary channel for influencing politicians
and regulators and the total lobbying expenditures far exceed corporate contributions
to political action committees (PACs) (Ansolabehere et al., 2003, Kerr et al., 2014,
Chen et al., 2015). Moreover, lobbying expenditures are reported quarterly and allow,
therefore, for a timely analysis.
Our lobbying data come from the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR) and
the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP).24 CRP uses publicly-available lobbying
23We have to adjust their number because it is reported in trading rather than calendar days.
24https://www.opensecrets.org/. We focus on corporate lobbying. For more information on gen-
eral lobbyist level statistics and the lobbying industry, see Bertrand et al. (2014).
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disclosure data filed by lobbyists from the SOPR, but standardizes company names
and identifies ultimate parent firms for individual lobbying clients. The database of
lobbying disclosures contains lobbying-income reports of individual lobbyists from
1999 until the present, but before 2008 the individual reports are only on a semi-
annual basis. Since approval of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act in
2007, the reports are on a quarterly basis. We match the lobbying client names with
firm names.25
As supplementary to lobbying data, we also collect information of PAC contribu-
tions by merging firms and the stock holding in merging firms by politicians serving
in the antitrust subcommittees in congressional Judiciary Committees from CRP.
Unlike lobbying data, PAC contributions are reported on a bi-annual basis (corre-
sponding to election cycles) and politician wealth disclosure on a yearly basis.
In our merger-related analysis, we want to allocate lobbying expenditures around
the deal-announcement date and, therefore, quarterly data reported as of 2008 fit
our analysis better. We manually match the names of lobbying clients to Compustat
company names. Following Adelino and Dinc (2014), we assume that the lobbying
expenditure is zero for firms that do not have a matching lobbying client in the
lobbying data.
Panel C of Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for acquirer quarterly lobbying
expenditures. For a start, we see that 80% of all acquirers have lobbied at least
once over the period from 2007 until 2015.26 Still, 34% of acquirers do not have any
lobbying experience for at least 12 quarters (3 years) before quarter −5 relatively to
the current deal announcement. Note that this does not mean that their lobbying
is zero starting with quarter −4. On average, acquirers spend around $3 million
over the four quarters before and again after the deal announcement. This means
that they spend on average $750 thousand on lobbying per quarter. When we scale
25CRP often identifies the acquirer as the parent of the target even for filings before the acquisition.
We check our matching results with the original filing records, location information of lobbying
clients from SOPR, and historical location and names of firms to make sure that we correctly
match lobbying filings to firms. For lobbying filings filed under the target name one year post deal-
completion dates, we allocate the lobbying expenditures to the acquirer assuming that the target
firm has operated as a subsidiary of the acquirer.
26We combine the semi-annual lobbying data before 2008 together with the quarterly data after
2008 to measure the lobbying growth and lobbying experience.
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the lobbying dollars by the acquirer market capitalization (lobbying ratio), we see
that acquirers do not spend a large fraction of their value on lobbying: on average
1.5 and 1.6 basis points of their market capitalization before and after the deal
announcement, respectively. The lobbying dummy variables indicate that 64% and
67% of acquirers spend a positive amount on lobbying during the year before and
after the deal announcement, respectively.
Lobbying spending in our sample is larger relatively to other studies in the litera-
ture: only 12% of firms in Chen et al. (2015) spend on lobbying in 2005 and Adelino
and Dinc (2014) report average lobbying expenditures of $437 thousand in the first
quarter of 2009 in their full sample. The differences may reflect that our acquirers
are larger firms. We also classify lobbying expenditures that directly targets govern-
ment agencies with possible influence over the merger process: the Senate, House of
Representatives, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission and label it
as related lobbying. Appendix C.4 lists the related and unrelated agencies and shows
their frequency of being a lobbying target. Panel C in Table 4.1 shows that related
lobbying expenditure is larger and more frequent than unrelated lobbying, which is
to a large extent driven by lobbying for the Senate and House of Representatives
that cover a wide range of issues and topics.
Figure 4.2 shows a clear time pattern for the acquirer lobbying ratio eight quar-
ters before and after the deal announcement date. In order to reflect on acquirers’
lobbying activities in a context of lobbying activities of other firms in the market, we
also report the lobbying time-series for peer firms and adjust both the acquirer and
peer lobbying ratios for firm characteristics.27 Panel A shows that acquirers increase
their lobbying expenditures over the eight quarters before the deal announcement
and then keep them high after the announcement, while their peers do not. More-
over, Panel B shows that acquirers’ lobbying is significantly larger relatively to their
peers’ lobbying, especially closely around deal announcements. This development
suggests a strong link between lobbying expenditures and firms’ takeover activities
27We match each acquirer firm with its 3-digit SIC peers and consider only those peers that are
in the lowest quartile of absolute deviations (|Xacq − Xpeer|) by both market capitalization and
market-to-book ratio (X = {MarketCap,MBRatio}). We control for total assets, market-to-book
ratio, leverage, ratio of tangible assets and cash ratio.
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for the year before and after the deal announcement.
In order to provide a full picture of lobbying around merger announcements and
control for possible coordinated actions by firms to build political networks (Akey,
2015), we also report summary statistics for PAC (Political Action Committees)
contributions and ownership by politicians. Both are reported only on a yearly basis.
The average PAC campaign contributions are only $7 thousand and only 37% of
our acquirers do this type of lobbying. Ownership by congressmen on the antitrust
subcommittees is very skewed – only 14% of acquirers do have any politicians as
owners and the value of their stake is only $19 thousand. Similar to Chen et al.
(2015), we see that these extra lobbying activities are less important relatively to
direct lobbying expenditures that can be fine-tuned more specifically around the
antitrust review dates. The last set of statistics in Panel C of Table 4.1 refers to
target lobbying variables. Target firms lobby less and less frequently compared to
the acquiring firms.
4.3.3 Industry Data
Finally, we explore the acquirer and target product-market conditions around
the antitrust review. We opt for the text-based industry classification (Hoberg and
Phillips, 2010, Hoberg et al., 2014, Hoberg and Phillips, 2016) that is flexible and
detailed.28
We use the expected change in sales-based HHI (∆HHI) in the target industry
to capture the expected reduction in horizontal competition (the value is set to
zero for non-horizontal mergers), target HHI measuring the existing product market
concentration, and target market share to capture how much market power that
the acquirer can gain by acquiring the target. Moreover, target similarity measures
product homogeneity of close peers and target fluidity captures potential rather than
existing competition (Boone et al., 2016). Therefore, a horizontal merger with higher
∆HHI, higher target HHI, low target similarity, and low target fluidity is associated
with more anticompetitive concerns for the antitrust agencies.
28SIC-based industries may be poor measures of product-market conditions (Ali et al., 2008) and
Census-based measures only cover manufacturing industries.
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Panel D of Table 4.1 shows average statistics for the competitive-environment
variables. The acquirer and target sales-based HHI indices of 0.247 and 0.226 are
very close to the average HHI of 0.22 reported in Hoberg et al. (2014). The expected
and realized changes in HHI are also very small. Acquirer and target average market
shares are 16% and 7%, respectively, confirming that target firms are, not surpris-
ingly, smaller market players. The median values are, however, much smaller and
the expected change in market share is very small even at the 75th percentile.
The average acquirer and target TNIC3 similarity is 4.3 and 5.7, respectively
showing that target firms are more similar to their peers than acquirers. Fluidity of
7.6 and 8.3 measuring product changes for acquirer and target peers, respectively, is
slightly higher than the average of 6.9 in Hoberg et al. (2014). This positive difference
may indicate that merging firms are operating in a changing and dynamic environ-
ment. Acquirer average change in fluidity and similarity from before to after the
merger is small and statistically insignificant suggesting that the average merger in
our sample does not have a large effect on the acquirer industry. However, differences
between quartiles suggest meaningful variation in the sample.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Antitrust Review Costs and Risks
In this section, we explore acquirer costs and risks associated with the antitrust
review process. As a first step, we apply the event-study methodology around the
review outcome dates to detect the markets’ evaluation of the antitrust review costs
and risks. In this part of the analysis, we focus on the three first-stage review out-
comes as shown in Figure 4.1: Early Termination, Natural Expiration, and Second
Request. We do so because of the following three reasons. First, these review out-
comes are clearly communicated and, therefore, easily observed and interpreted by
market participants. This also means that we are able to collect reliable data for all
deals. Second, these three review outcomes all materialize within the same fixed time
frame. Firms usually file their HSR premerger documents shortly after the deal pub-
lic announcement and normally receive the outcome by the end of the 30-day waiting
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period. Finally, as shown in Section 4.3.1, a Second Request represents an adverse
review outcome that is equally severe to a Challenge. And, at the time of the Second
Request, the merging firms are not aware whether they will be Challenged or not.
Therefore, we argue, the revelation of first-stage review outcomes provides a good
setting to compare the stock-market reactions and imply differences in regulatory
costs.
We conjecture that the antitrust review process adds to the interim uncertainty of
announced but not yet completed deals, especially when it concerns Second Requests.
This is because of all the extra documentation the companies are requested to provide
to the antitrust agencies and the time it takes to do so. Moreover, extended time
to completion may be associated with other related costs, such as costs of keeping
financing for the deal in place, keeping anxious employees and customers on board
(Bhagwat et al., 2016). To confirm our conjecture, we should see the higher cost and
risk to be reflected in negative abnormal returns for Second Request relatively to the
other two favorable review outcomes, conditional on the outcome revelation not to
be expected by the market at the deal announcement.
We calculate acquirer, target and combined abnormal returns for 41 trading days
around the review outcome revelation dates using the Fama-French 3-factor bench-
mark.29 For some deals, this (−20,+20) review outcome event window may overlap
with the deal announcement and bias our abnormal returns. In order to mitigate
this deal-announcement effect, we exclude all observations for which the (−20,+20)
review outcome event window overlaps with the (−5,+5) deal-announcement event
window. The results are robust to using the market-model benchmark.
Figure 4.3 shows the development of abnormal returns in the window of (−20,+20)
around the review outcome dates. We see that stock prices evolve differently across
the three antitrust review outcomes. Uncertainty is resolved the fastest for Early
Terminations, which is reflected in stable abnormal returns especially for acquirers
and combined firms. Natural Expirations and Second Requests first drop somewhat
together, but then Natural Expirations stabilize, while Second Requests drop signif-
29We use a 254-day estimation window that ends 8 weeks prior to the deal public announcement
and require at least 100 observations in the estimation window.
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icantly further. This suggests that the market is reassured about a positive outcome
in the days before HSR outcome revelation, while it remains skeptical for eventual
Second Requests until the HSR outcome revelation.30 We also see that the negative
review outcome effect for Second Requests is not reversed within 20 days after the
outcome date.
Table 4.2 confirms these conclusions. It reports the acquirer, target, and combined
average abnormal returns across the main three antitrust review outcomes for three
different event windows around the review outcome date: (−1,+1), (−5,+1) and
(−10,+1). We do not see any significant stock price movement for Early Terminations
and Natural Expirations. In contrast, abnormal returns for Second Requests are all
negative and in line with Figure 4.3 decrease with larger event windows. Over the 12
days before the Second Request outcome date, abnormal returns for both acquirer
and target companies drop by at least 2.6%. The drop is statistically significant and
also reflected in a significant drop in return for the combined entity. This drop is also
economically significant given the 0.5% and 4.2% deal-announcement acquirer and
combined abnormal returns, respectively. The last three columns in Table 4.2 show
that the drop in abnormal returns for Second Request is statistically significantly
different from the change for the other two favorable outcomes combined.
As a next step of the regulatory-cost analysis, in Table 4.3 we proxy for the
regulatory cost and increased risk using the number of days to complete and the
probability to withdraw a takeover offer, respectively. We conjecture that an ad-
verse review outcome should be associated with more days in the merging process
that lead to higher cost and higher risks of withdrawal from the merger. In Panel A,
we regress the log of days to complete on review-process dummy variables and a set
of control variables. In all specifications, we control for time and industry dummies.
Specifications 1 and 2 show that Second Requests suffer longer time in the public
merger process than the favorable outcomes of Early Termination and Natural Ex-
piration. The coefficient for the Second Request dummy is positive and significant
30We find anecdotal evidence that merging firms issue reassuring public statements expressing
their expectations that the review process will be favorable. Also, the antitrust agencies often
contact third parties to resolve sticky issues, which might leak to the public domain.
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Table 4.2. Abnormal returns around the review-outcome date
This table shows acquirer, target and combined abnormal returns in percentage points around the
review-outcome dates separately for the three first-stage review outcomes. We have 155, 151 and
61 deals for the review outcome of Early Termination, Natural Expiration and Second Request,
respectively. The abnormal returns are adjusted using the Fama-French 3-factor model where the
estimation window is a 254-day period ending 8 weeks prior to the deal announcement
date.Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * and + indicate significance at the
one-, five-, ten- and fifteen-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (3) − (1)&(2)
Early Termination Natural Expiration Second Request Difference
CAR(−1,+1) (%)
Acquirer 0.05 (0.28) 0.07 (0.20) -0.53 (0.47) -0.58 (0.50)
Target 0.00 (0.25) -0.16 (0.30) -1.52∗∗∗ (0.54) -1.44∗∗ (0.58)
Combined -0.04 (0.25) 0.16 (0.20) -0.78∗ (0.46) -0.83∗ (0.48)
CAR(−5,+1) (%)
Acquirer -0.09 (0.40) 0.02 (0.31) -1.32∗ (0.68) -1.28∗ (0.73)
Target 0.15 (0.32) -0.30 (0.46) -2.12∗∗ (0.84) -2.05∗∗ (0.88)
Combined -0.14 (0.31) 0.12 (0.29) -1.48∗∗ (0.66) -1.47∗∗ (0.70)
CAR(−10,+1) (%)
Acquirer -0.20 (0.47) -0.52 (0.42) -2.78∗∗ (1.17) -2.42∗ (1.21)
Target -0.27 (0.42) -0.52 (0.55) -2.57∗∗ (1.04) -2.18∗ (1.09)
Combined -0.27 (0.38) -0.33 (0.39) -2.65∗∗∗ (0.96) -2.35∗∗ (1.00)
at the 1-percent level. The economic effect is also large. In specification 1, Second
Requests take 1.4-times (e0.877 − 1) longer to complete relatively to the reference
category of favorable outcomes. The effect is somewhat smaller when controlling
for deal characteristics in specification 2: Second Requests take double the time of
favorable outcomes.
In specifications 3 and 4, we partition all Second Requests into Challenged and
Unchallenged Second Requests. We see that both of the coefficients are significant at
the 1-percent level and similar in size. Taking the coefficient estimates in specifica-
tion 4 with a full set of control variables, we see that Challenged Second Request take
110% and Unchallenged Second Request 100% longer than the favorable outcomes.
The last two specifications include the granular set of review outcome dummy vari-
ables with Natural Expiration as the reference category. The coefficient for Early
Termination is the smallest, and the effect is not statistically or economically sig-
nificant. It indicates that Early Terminations take as long to complete as Natural
Expirations (e0.019 = 1.02). Pull & Refiles, Unchallenged and Challenged deals take
29%, 107% and 117% longer, respectively, than Natural Expiration and all the effects
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Table 4.3. Review outcomes and regulatory costs and risks
This table reports regression estimates that characterize the relationship between antitrust-review
outcomes and regulatory costs and risks in M&As. Panel A reports regression estimates for OLS
regressions with the log of number of days from the public deal announcement to completion or
withdrawal of the deal as the dependent variable. Panel B reports average marginal effects for
logit regressions with a dummy variable equal to one for withdrawn deals and zero for completed
deals as the dependent variable. Target industry (Fama-French 5 sectors) and year fixed effects are
included in all specifications. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All variables are defined
in Appendix C.1, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * and + indicate significance
at the one-, five-, ten- and fifteen-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: days to complete
Second Request 0.877∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.037)
Challenged Second Request 0.904∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.096) (0.098) (0.116)
Unchallenged Second Request 0.859∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.025) (0.054) (0.033)
Pull & Refile 0.287∗∗ 0.253∗∗
(0.090) (0.056)
Early Termination 0.093 0.019
(0.055) (0.044)
Deal value 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Relative size 0.242∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
All cash -0.190∗∗ -0.193∗∗ -0.198∗∗
(0.043) (0.046) (0.052)
Horizontal merger 0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.022) (0.020) (0.017)
Tender offer -0.426∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.071)
Hostile 0.321∗ 0.328∗ 0.327∗
(0.147) (0.148) (0.138)
Bidding contest 0.011 0.012 0.002
(0.095) (0.095) (0.121)
Termination fee 1.239 1.198 1.021
(1.139) (1.169) (1.031)
Reverse termination fee -0.457 -0.450 -0.180
(1.104) (1.045) (0.909)
Expected ∆ HHI 2.517 2.430 2.327
(3.865) (3.936) (3.371)
Target HHI -0.015 -0.011 0.013
(0.101) (0.094) (0.087)
Target similarity -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Target fluidity 0.006 0.006 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant 4.575∗∗∗ 4.118∗∗∗ 4.576∗∗∗ 4.120∗∗∗ 4.506∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.154) (0.099) (0.154) (0.082) (0.174)
# obs. 370 344 370 344 370 344
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.603 0.371 0.602 0.382 0.610
continued on next page
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Table 4.3. Review outcomes and regulatory costs and risks (continued)
continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B: withdrawn
Second Request 0.086∗∗ 0.053∗
(0.038) (0.028)
Challenged Second Request 0.036 0.053 0.032 0.049
(0.060) (0.039) (0.073) (0.039)
Unchallenged Second Request 0.113∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.026) (0.021) (0.033) (0.022)
Pull & Refile -0.003 -0.021
(0.037) (0.042)
Early Termination -0.007 -0.004
(0.036) (0.028)
Deal value -0.024∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.024∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Relative size -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
All cash -0.035∗ -0.035+ -0.036∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
Horizontal merger 0.013 0.013 0.010
(0.025) (0.025) (0.020)
Tender offer -0.057∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.014)
Hostile 0.142∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.050) (0.042)
Bidding contest 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.032)
Termination fee 0.178 0.176 0.185
(0.278) (0.308) (0.292)
Reverse termination fee -1.227 -1.228 -1.251
(1.266) (1.250) (1.121)
Expected ∆ HHI 2.893 2.889 2.966∗
(2.042) (2.098) (1.794)
Target HHI -0.326∗ -0.325∗ -0.325∗
(0.171) (0.174) (0.176)
Target similarity 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Target fluidity -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
# obs. 370 344 370 344 370 344
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.501 0.163 0.501 0.163 0.502
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are statistically significant. The increase between Pull & Refile and the two types
of Second Request is economically large. In summary, our results suggest that the
adverse outcomes are associated with higher regulatory costs.
The control variables also reveal some interesting results. Larger, stock and hostile
deals increase the length of the public merger process that includes the antitrust
review. Interestingly, termination fees (direct or reverse) and expected change in
industry concentration have no significant effect.
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows average marginal effects for a logistic regression with
a dummy variable equal to one for all withdrawn deals and zero for all completed
deals as the dependent variable. The first two specifications show that Second Re-
quests increase the probability of a withdrawal by at least 5%, significant at the
10-percent level. This a sizable effect given the unconditional probability of with-
drawal is 8%. Specifications 3 to 6 suggests that both Challenged and Unchallenged
Second Requests are associated with higher probability of withdrawals, though Chal-
lenged deals suffer higher standard errors and, therefore, their marginal probabilities
are not significant.31
The control variables show that large, cash deals, and tender-offer deals with a
high concentration in the target industry are less likely to withdraw. In contrast,
hostile and deals with competing bids after the public announcement are more likely
to withdraw. Specification 6 suggests that deals with higher expected change in the
target industry concentration are also more likely to withdraw.
4.4.2 Lobbying and Review Outcomes
In this section, we explore whether merging firms increase their lobbying expen-
ditures to facilitate a smoother antitrust review process. On the one hand, lobbying
may help firms to achieve antitrust review clearance and get more favorable review
outcomes, which yields a positive correlation between lobbying and the probability
of getting favorable review outcomes. On the other hand, reversed causality is also
possible because acquirer expectations of less favorable review outcomes may also
31It is also possible that acquirers decide to withdraw before they are Challenged in their Second
Request.
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trigger higher lobbying expenditures. It is likely that lobbying strategies change
over the merger process because the merging parties receive more and more precise
information about their deals and the antitrust review process. Therefore, we dif-
ferentiate the effect of lobbying expenditures before and after deal announcements.
The time-varying acquirer lobbying expenditures allow us to capture the dynamics
in lobbying. Figure 4.2 shows that acquirers increase their lobbying expenditures
around deal announcements.
We first run multinomial logistic regressions that assess the effect of pre- and
post-announcement lobbying spending by acquirers on the probability of each of the
mutually-exclusive granular antitrust review outcomes: Early Termination, Natural
Expiration, Pull & Refile, Unchallenged and Challenged Second Request.32 Dis-
tinguishing Challenged Second Requests is in line with the literature (for example,
Ferris et al., 2016). However, in contrast to the literature, we highlight the need
to differentiate four review outcomes that are not challenged: Unchallenged Second
Requests are associated with long delays in completion time (only somewhat shorter
than Challenged Second Requests) but still represent a more favorable and less costly
outcome than Challenged Second Requests. Pull & Refiles represent a very specific
category, where the merging parties strategically play with the HSR premerger fil-
ing process and clear the antitrust review with a delay (see Panel A of Table 4.3).
Finally, Early Terminations are associated with few anticompetitive concerns and
achieve antitrust review clearance fast. Natural Expiration is the default outcome.
Given that we have a set of five outcomes that are not necessarily ordered, a multi-
nomial logistic model fits the setup better than an ordered probit.33 We estimate the
model using Natural Expiration as the reference category and include the full set of
control variables – target pre- and post-announcement lobbying dummies, alterna-
tive acquirer political connections, deal characteristics, product market conditions,
and acquirer characteristics. Our results are robust to excluding target lobbying and
32Their unconditional average probabilities are reported in Panel B of Table 4.1.
33Given that we have five alternative outcomes, a multinomial probit model is infeasible due to
its limitations and complexities of joint probability functions (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 502). We
are unable to achieve converged estimations with a full set of controls. However, multivariate probit
models with fewer control variables yield similar results.
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the alternative acquirer political connections. We also include Fama-French 5 sector
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Table 4.4 reports the average marginal effects of
the lobbying variables on the probability of all five granular review outcomes. The
average marginal effects for all control variables are reported only in Panel A.
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the average effect of the pre-announcement lobbying
– it includes acquirer lobbying expenditures for the four quarters just before the deal
announcement scaled by the acquirer market capitalization – on the probability of
the five granular review outcomes. We see that the average effect is significantly
negative for Challenged Second Requests and significantly positive for Unchallenged
Second Requests, Pull & Refiles and Natural Expirations. This suggests that high
pre-announcement lobbying tends to push deals away from Challenged Second Re-
quests and towards Unchallenged Second Requests, Pull & Refiles, and Natural Ex-
pirations. Pull & Refiles and Natural Expirations are clearly more favorable review
outcomes. Also, Unchallenged Second Requests represent a less costly and there-
fore more favorable review outcome compared to Challenged Second Requests. As
Unchallenged Second Requests are nevertheless associated with higher failure rate
compared to other more favorable review outcomes such as Early Terminations and
Natural Expirations, we reconcile the issue by further splitting Unchallenged Sec-
ond Requests into Withdrawn versus Completed Unchallenged Second Requests (see
Appendix C.5. We confirm that the positive effect of pre-announcement lobbying
is not driven by withdrawn Unchallenged Second Requests. In economic terms, a
one-standard-deviation increase in the lobbying ratio of 3.8 basis points (as reported
in Table 4.1) results in a change of +4.2%, +3.0%, and +3.8% in the probabilities of
Unchallenged Second Request, Pull & Refile, and Natural Expiration, respectively.
This is large relative to the unconditional probabilities of 10.3%, 8.4%, and 37.6%,
respectively.
Focusing now on the target lobbying variables, we see that target lobbying helps to
reduce the probability of Challenged outcomes. Croci et al. (2017) show politically
connected target firms are less likely to be acquired and receive higher takeover
premium. We show that target lobbying also matters for antitrust review outcomes
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but only complementary to acquirer lobbying activities.
Panel B shows the effect of the post-announcement lobbying ratio, which is over
four quarters including the announcement quarter. Note that this period overlaps
with the antitrust review process. We observe that Early Terminations are associated
with a significantly negative average post-announcement lobbying effect, while the
effect is significantly positive for Pull & Refiles and Unchallenged Second Requests.34
So, higher post-announcement lobbying tends to shift deals from Early Terminations
and more towards Pull & Refiles and Unchallenged Second Requests. It implies that
Early Terminations do not need any further lobbying after the deal announcement
– their deals generally raise few antitrust concerns. It also suggests that acquirers
increase lobbying for deals with significant antitrust concerns and perhaps with room
to negotiate so as to avoid an official challenge. The post-announcement lobbying
results highlight the Pull & Refile outcome as a special category compared to Natural
Expiration and Early Termination, suggesting that for this category acquirers lobby
most actively during the antitrust review process to achieve clearance without a
Second Request.
To better understand the dynamics of lobbying around deal announcements,
we explore the post-announcement lobbying conditional on low versus high pre-
announcement lobbying. Accordingly, Panel C of Table 4.4 reports estimations for
a specification interacting post-announcement lobbying with dummy variables in-
dicating pre-announcement lobbying above (below) median – high (low) lobbying
(−4,−1). This specification imitates exploring the post-announcement lobbying ef-
fect in two separate subsamples. We estimate the average marginal effects and stan-
dard errors for the interaction terms according to Ai and Norton (2003).35 First,
we see that higher pre-announcement lobbying is associated with lower probabilities
of Challenged Second Requests and Pull & Refiles and higher probabilities of Nat-
ural Expirations and Early Terminations. This is consistent with Panel A, except
34Panel B of Table C.5 in the Internet appendix shows that the positive effect for Unchallenged
Second Requests is due to the completed deals.
35Since the procedure suggested in Norton et al. (2004) only applies to binomial regressions with
one interaction term, we follow Berger and Bouwman (2013) and estimate the average marginal
effects of lobbying ratio (0,+3) conditional on the value of the dummy, high lobbying (−4,−1).
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for Pull & Refile. Lobbying prior to deal announcements tends to be preemptive
as it increases the probability of more favorable antitrust review outcomes and de-
creases the probability of Challenged deals. The post-announcement lobbying for
these clear-cut favorable outcomes loosens somewhat, marginally significantly for
Early Terminations with high pre-announcement lobbying. Second, results for Pull
& Refile are the most pronounced: the positive post-announcement lobbying effect
is much stronger when pre-announcement lobbying is low (0.167) than when it is
high (0.008), suggesting that firms with low pre-announcement lobbying are catch-
ing up. Together with the negative effect for high pre-announcement lobbying, this
suggests that post-announcement lobbying substitutes for the lack of lobbying before
the announcement.
Table 4.5 reports results for logistic models equivalent to the multinomial logit in
Table 4.4 by contrasting Challenged Second Requests in specification 1-3 and Pull
& Refiles in specification 4-6 to all other outcomes grouped together. We employ
the same set of control variables but again do not report them to save on space. In
specification 1, we see that pre-announcement lobbying exhibits a significant negative
effect on the probability of Challenged Second Requests, which is in line with the
multinomial logit results. The post-announcement lobbying effect in specification 2
is not significant. Specification 3 shows that Challenged Second Requests are asso-
ciated with lower pre-announcement lobbying and the effect of post-announcement
lobbying is positive for deals with low pre-announcement lobbying but negative for
deals with high pre-announcement lobbying. The significantly positive effect for post-
announcement lobbying conditional on low pre-announcement lobbying suggests that
firms with official challenges catch up with their lobbying post announcement in or-
der to manage the complicated review process and complete their deal successfully.
Specification 4-6 contrast Pull & Refiles with all other review outcomes and confirms
that Pull & Refiles represent a special category of favorable outcomes when acquirers
lobby more after the deal announcement to avoid a costly adverse outcome.
In summary, the results in this section suggest that acquiring firms with high
pre-announcement lobbying expenditures tend to achieve more favorable outcomes,
Chapter 4. Lobbying in mergers and acquisitions 133
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which are associated with lower deal-related costs and risks (see section 4.4.1). Pull
& Refile clearly stands out as a special group of firms that manage to avoid a Sec-
ond Request by strategically pulling their HSR pre-merger filing and engaging in
significantly high lobbying concurrently with the antitrust review process. Acquir-
ers receiving Challenged Second Requests seem to lobby less the year before their
deal announcement, but intensify their lobbying as they get drawn into the antitrust
review process, especially when their pre-announcement lobbying was low. 36
This lobbying pattern is consistent with both lobbying hypotheses – information
sharing and regulatory capture – and we are not able to differentiate between them at
this stage. It is possible that acquiring firms lobby to get familiar with the review pro-
cess and transfer information to and from antitrust agencies and politicians and this
information sharing then facilitates a favorable review outcome (information-sharing
hypothesis).37 At the same time, however, it is possible that high pre-announcement
lobbying is successful with favorable outcomes because lobbying accommodates more
lenient assessment of the situation as a result of intervention by an influential politi-
cian (regulatory-capture hypothesis). Similarly, once a deal is announced and merg-
ing firms file their HSR-review documents, they lobby more when they face more
difficulties and costs. Again, merging firms may be after more information sharing
or, alternatively, after political intervention. Even though our analysis in this sec-
tion cannot discriminate between the two alternative channels of lobbying influence,
section 4.4.4 attempts to take the issue further.
Table 4.6 controls for potential bias due to identification issues. When considering
the relationship between lobbying expenditures and antitrust review outcomes, due
36Table 4.5 in the Internet appendix shows that lobbying also has a direct effect on the probability
of withdrawn deals. We observe a significantly positive effect of post-announcement lobbying on the
number of days to complete, which suggests more lobbying for longer and more costly outcomes.
The IV results in Table 4.6 (see the discussion in the later part of this section) further suggest that
the positive effect is due to an endogenous expectation of more adverse outcomes – firms lobby when
expecting more adverse outcomes.
37Medco reflects on its lobbying activities in the merger with Express Scripts: “… the question
was whether Congress would let the FTC do its job, or push them to raise unending red flags on
the deal…. It was no mean feat. There were 80 legislative letters about the deal sent to federal and
state regulators and 30 state attorneys general were involved in the review. And in 2011 and 2012,
the companies spent more than USD 7.5m on federal lobbyists… And working with staff at the FTC
helped speed the process as much as possible.” (How Medco won antitrust approval for a deal Wall
Street considered doomed, Financial Times, April 8, 2013).
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to firms thinking and behaving in a strategic way and triggering lobbying based on
expectations of review outcomes, causality may flow both ways. It is likely that
acquiring firms increase their lobbying expenditures and then, as a result, receive
a favorable review outcome. It is, however, equally likely that the expectation of a
“rough ride” triggers higher lobbying expenditures implying causality from (expected
but then also realized) outcomes to lobbying. Nevertheless, our research question
does not necessarily conjecture a causal relationship between lobbying and review
outcomes. It encompasses both strategic lobbying reflected in the link from lobbying
to review outcomes as well as triggered lobbying with its reverse causality.38
Still, we would like to examine whether lobbying results in better antitrust review
outcomes excluding reverse causality. Moreover, we need to consider potential biases
due to omitted variables or unobserved heterogeneity that may cause correlation
between our lobbying measures and the error term or represent a source of spurious
correlation. For example, lobbying may be higher for firms with certain product types
that are sensitive to legislation and federal actions and, at the same time, product
markets for these products are associated with lower antitrust concerns. If this is the
case, we would find a significant relationship between lobbying and favorable review
outcomes, but in reality, such a direct link does not exist. Our multinomial logit
and binary logit specifications in Table 4.4 and 4.5 include industry fixed effects to
remove any time-invariant industry characteristics. To further mitigate the bias, we
use the instrumental-variable approach.
The usual challenge is to find a suitable instrument that is correlated with our
lobbying measures, but is correlated with review outcomes only indirectly through
the pre- and post-announcement lobbying. We opt for past lobbying expenditures
(scaled by market capitalization) as our instrument.39 Lobbying expenditure is highly
persistent (Kerr et al., 2014), which ensures that the relevance condition of strong
38Even though the two causal channels are closely linked together and hard to disentangle, it
is more likely that the pre-announcement lobbying reflects the preemptive link from lobbying to
review outcomes and the post-announcement lobbying reflects the reverse triggered lobbying based
on expectations once the HSR filing is submitted.
39Igan et al. (2012) argue for the distance to Washington D.C. as a suitable instrument for lobbying
in a cross-section of firms. Unfortunately, the distance to Washington D.C. is in our case very weak
in correlating with acquirer lobbying ratio perhaps because we have only large firms that always
lobby more.
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correlation between the instrument and our main explanatory variable holds. To
ensure the exclusion condition that past lobbying is not directly related to antitrust
review outcomes of the current merger, we require a one-year gap between quarter
−4 before the deal announcement and the past lobbying instrument. In other words,
the past lobbying ratio, our instrumental variable, covers lobbying by the acquirer
over quarters (−12,−9) relatively to the deal announcement. It is unlikely that
companies would increase their lobbying three years before a merger announcement
in order to influence antitrust review outcomes of the merger. Moreover, Figure 4.2
shows that lobbying by acquirers increases significantly relatively to their peers only
starting with quarter four before the deal-announcement date. Therefore, we are
confident that past lobbying reflects exogenous reasons for lobbying that are not
directly related to the particular merger case.
Table 4.6 reports estimates of two-stage IV probit models with Challenged Second
Request and Pull & Refile as dependent variables. The first stage confirms that past
lobbying is highly correlated with pre- and post-announcement lobbying. Concerning
the second stage, we see that for Challenged Second Requests the average marginal
effect of pre-announcement lobbying increases both in magnitude and significance
. The post-announcement lobbying effect remains insignificant. These effects show
that it is the preemptive lobbying that increases chances of favorable review out-
comes. For Pull & Refile, the exogenous pre-announcement lobbying effect is not
significant but we see a significant positive effect for post-announcement lobbying.
Our interpretation of this result is that a Pull & Refile represents a coordinated
action between pulling the original HSR filing and preplanned contemporaneous lob-
bying. It is econometrically unfeasible to apply the IV approach for the five-outcome
multinomial logit model reported in Table 4.4, but we believe that the results for
binomial IV probits in Table 4.6 provide enough evidence that our setup does not
suffer the omitted variable bias.
Using an exogenous instrument, the results in Table 4.6 shed some extra light on
possible causal links between pre- and post-announcement lobbying and review out-
comes. The instrument strengthens the negative effect of pre-announcement lobbying
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Table 4.6. Lobbying and review outcomes: instrumental variable approach
This table shows the average marginal effects of lobbying variables on the probability of an adverse
antitrust-review outcome using the instrumental variable probit approach to control for potential
endogeneity of the lobbying ratio. The dependent variable in the second stage is set to one for all
Second Requests (Challenged Second Requests) and zero otherwise in specifications 1 and 2 (3 and
4). The first stage uses lobbying expenditures over four quarter, which correspond to three years
prior to deal announcement scaled by the acquirer market capitalization (lobbying ratio (−12,−9))
as the instrument in all specifications. All specifications include 340 observations and also controls
for deal characteristics (deal value, relative size, all cash, horizontal merger, tender offer, hostile,
bidding contest, termination fee, reverse termination fee), product market conditions (target HHI,
expected ∆HHI, target similarity, target fluidity), acquirer characteristics (acquirer size, acquirer
market-to-book, acquirer leverage, acquirer tangibility, acquirer liquidity), Fama-French 5 sector
fixed effects, and year fixed effects, which are not reported. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses and clustered at target industry levels. Low LR (4, 1) and high LR (4, 1) are dummy
variables that take value one if lobbying ratio (4, 1) is below or above sample median, respectively.
All other variables are defined in Appendix C.1, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***,
**, * and + indicate significance at the one-, five-, ten- and fifteen-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Challenged Second Request Pull & Refile
Lobbying ratio (−4,−1) (b.p.) -0.031a 0.003
(0.009) (0.003)
Lobbying ratio (0,+3) (b.p.) 0.001 0.015a
(0.008) (0.003)
Target lobbying dummy (−4,−1) -0.101a -0.108a 0.005 -0.004
(0.036) (0.034) (0.052) (0.050)
Target lobbying dummy (0,+3) 0.157a 0.165a 0.040 0.032
(0.057) (0.051) (0.081) (0.077)
Politicians’ ownership dummy -0.018 -0.032b -0.004 -0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
PAC contribution ratio 0.026 0.015 0.092b 0.092b
(0.025) (0.028) (0.046) (0.045)
First stage
Lobbying ratio (−12,−9) (b.p.) 0.960a 0.840a 0.960a 0.840a
(0.052) (0.096) (0.052) (0.096)
Target lobbying dummy (−4,−1) 0.113 0.369 0.113 0.369
(0.221) (0.394) (0.221) (0.394)
Target lobbying dummy (0,+3) 0.251 0.860b 0.251 0.860b
(0.279) (0.347) (0.279) (0.347)
Politicians’ ownership dummy -0.071 0.066 -0.071 0.066
(0.085) (0.302) (0.085) (0.302)
PAC contribution ratio 0.585a 0.287c 0.585a 0.287c
(0.131) (0.170) (0.131) (0.170)
Constant 0.935 3.300a 0.935 3.300a
(0.840) (0.802) (0.840) (0.802)
Wald χ2 1.295 1.883 0.122 2.588
Wald p-Value 0.255 0.170 0.727 0.108
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on the probability of Challenged Second Requests, which suggests that the negative
effect is not reversely triggered by acquirers’ expectations of review outcomes. For
post-announcement lobbying, it is more likely that acquirers increase lobbying in
expectation of particular adverse review outcomes. Accordingly, we do not find a
significant exogenous effect for post-announcement lobbying. Pull & Refile, how-
ever, is driven by post-announcement lobbying. The exogenous effect suggests that
post-announcement lobbying indeed increases the probability of Pull & Refile.
4.4.3 Value Implications of Lobbying
So far, we have established that adverse antitrust review outcomes are associated
with higher acquirer merger costs and risks and that acquirer pre-announcement
lobbying increases the probability of getting a favorable outcome, while higher post-
announcement lobbying is associated with higher probability of adverse review out-
comes. In this section, we push the analysis a step further to show value consequences
of lobbying. In particular, we conjecture that the market takes acquirer lobbying into
account when assessing value consequences of announced mergers. If higher lobbying
is associated with more favorable review outcomes that are in turn less costly and less
risky for acquiring firms, this should also reflect in differential market evaluations of
deals on their announcement.
Table 4.7 shows the effect of pre-announcement lobbying on acquirer, target and
combined deal-announcement abnormal returns over the (–1,+1) event window. The
last column concerns the lobbying effect on the expected completion probability,
which compares the target stock price just after the public announcement with the
initial offer price. Following Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986), the closer is the mar-
ket’s assessment of target value (conditional on all public deal-related information)
to the offer price, the higher is the expected probability of the target being suc-
cessfully acquired. Due to delays in reporting of lobbying expenditures, we consider
only lobbying expenditure based on information available to investors at the time of
the deal announcement. Therefore, we cumulate all acquirer lobbying expenditures
disclosed during the 365-day window before the deal public announcement and scale
it by the market capitalization as of eight weeks before the announcement. We label
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it “disclosed lobbying ratio.”
Panel A of Table 4.7 shows, in line with our conjecture, that higher acquirer
disclosed lobbying is associated with significantly higher acquirer and combined an-
nouncement abnormal returns. The effect of lobbying on the expected completion
probability is also significantly positive. The economic significance is illustrated
based on a one-standard-deviation increase in the lobbying ratio (3.8 basis points as
reported in Table 4.1), which results in a 1.1% and 2.3% increase in announcement
abnormal returns for the acquirer and combined firm, respectively. These results
confirm that acquirer lobbying spending is associated with higher acquirer valua-
tions.40
Next, we attempt to reconcile a conjecture suggested in the literature that lobby-
ing may also be associated with poor corporate governance and unethical practices
(Aggarwal et al., 2012, Borisov et al., 2016). Managers in poorly-governed firms may
(mis)use corporate political resources for private benefits, which in our setup may
imply that lobbying facilitates empire-building mergers that destroy rather than cre-
ate value for their shareholders. Therefore, we want to differentiate the value effect
of lobbying in poor versus good corporate governance firms. We include a dummy
variable indicating entrenched management teams and its interaction term with the
lobbying ratio in Panel B of Table 4.7. Following Bebchuk et al. (2009), we identify
an entrenched management team if the firms has at least four from the following
anti-takeover provisions: staggered board, limits to amend bylaws, limits to amend
charter, super-majority, golden parachutes and poison pill.
The results show that the positive effect of lobbying on acquirer and combined
announcement abnormal returns (in well-governed firms) is slightly increased rela-
tively to Panel A. More importantly, however, we see that the interaction term is
negative and significant for both acquirer and combined abnormal returns suggesting
that the effect of lobbying is significantly weaker in entrenched firms. The overall
effects of lobbying in entrenched firms (lobbying ratio + lobbying ratio × entrenched
acquirer) is zero – the market does not recognize lobbying in entrenched firms as a
40In unreported results, the results are robust to the instrumental-variable treatment.
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value-increasing mechanism, which is consistent with the literature (Aggarwal et al.,
2012, Borisov et al., 2016).41
4.4.4 Market Power Effects of Lobbying
The final but very important question is whether higher acquirer lobbying expen-
ditures accommodate loosening of government objectives in preventing competitively
harmful mergers. If the effect of lobbying on antitrust review outcomes flows through
regulatory capture, merging firms lobby to influence politicians who then favor high-
lobbying mergers and perhaps in the process also approve competitively harmful
deals. In contrast, if lobbying accommodates information sharing, both merging
firms and regulators/politicians gather important information, which allows speedier
favorable outcomes shaped in line with antitrust objectives without compromising
competitiveness.
Table 4.8 explores this issue by regressing measures for change in acquirer market
power from before to after the merger on the lobbying ratios. If lobbying accommo-
dates competitively harmful mergers, the coefficients for the lobbying ratio should
indicate that higher lobbying is associated with increased acquirer market power. We
use four measures of change in acquirer’s market power, all defined based on TNIC3
industries due to Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). The change in TNIC3 industry
market share and change in Herfindahl index of sales-based concentration in target
TNIC3 industry are intuitive and widely used measures for industry competitive en-
vironment with higher values indicating higher concentration and lower competition.
The change in acquirer industry product similarity measures how the merger affects
acquirers’ resemblance to their close peers (Hoberg and Phillips, 2016). Increased
product similarity should indicate higher competition in the product market. Higher
lobbying expenditures through the regulatory-capture channel should then help with
mergers that decrease acquirer’s product similarity. Finally, as higher fluidity reflects
more changes in peers’ product markets and therefore more potential competition,
a positive change in acquirer fluidity should capture an increase in potential com-
41The coefficients for entrenched acquirers are not significant for the expected completion rates,
but this might be because of the significant drop in the number of observations.
Chapter 4. Lobbying in mergers and acquisitions 143
petition (Boone et al., 2016). The regulatory-capture hypothesis would then be
supported by a positive relationship between lobbying expenditures and change in
acquirer fluidity.
Table 4.8 does not directly support the regulatory-capture hypothesis. We see
that all coefficients for pre- and post-announcement lobbying ratio except one are
insignificant suggesting that acquirer lobbying is not associated with changes in ac-
quirer market power. In column 5, the coefficient for pre-announcement lobbying
is positive and significant at the 15-percent level, but it suggests that higher pre-
announcement lobbying is associated with increased acquirer similarity – that is,
with more rather than less competition. Based on these results, we conclude that it
is more likely that higher lobbying is associated with information sharing between
merging firms and the antitrust agencies rather than regulatory capture.
4.4.5 Other Lobbying Measures
In this section, we explore other alternative measures of lobbying expenditures.
First, we differentiate between lobbying that targets government agencies with versus
without possible influence over the antitrust review process. The Senate, House of
Representatives, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are identified
as agencies with possible influence. Unrelated agencies are listed in Appendix C.4. In
line with our expectations, only related lobbying to agencies with potential influence
affects antitrust review outcomes, while unrelated lobbying does not show significant
effects. The results replicating Table 4.4 with multinomial logistic regression for
the set of five antitrust review outcomes are reported in Table 4.9 in the Internet
appendix.
Table 4.9 further considers (i) lobbying expenditures scaled by the total assets
instead of market capitalization; (ii) lobby dummy; and (iii) lobbying expenditures
only in the quarter just before the deal announcement and in the announcement
quarter instead of four quarters both sides of the announcement. All these results
are consistent with our conclusions in section 4.4.2. Unreported results with the
alternative measures support our conclusions in sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4 concerning
value implications of lobbying and market power implications, respectively.
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4.5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of lobbying at the time of mergers and acquisi-
tions, one of the largest and most visible corporate investments. Mergers and acqui-
sitions go through an elaborate regulatory review process and need to be approved
by antitrust agencies. This process exposes firms to regulatory risks and costs that
firms aim to mitigate via the use of political connections. Our analysis uses lobbying
expenditures as its prime measure of political connection because lobbying data is
available at a quarterly frequency and therefore allows for a timely analysis of the
question whether and how political connections influence corporate investments un-
der regulatory uncertainty. One reason why firms may engage in lobbying is to exert
direct influence over the antitrust agencies in hopes to gain more favorable review
decisions (the regulatory capture hypothesis). Another reason for lobbying is that
firms can share information with antitrust agencies allowing the agencies to improve
the efficiency of their decision making (the information sharing hypothesis).
We argue and show that regulatory risks and costs are economically significant.
Merging firms bear direct costs (filing costs, costs of lawyers, in case of deal failure the
payment of breakup fees) and indirect costs (getting stuck in lengthy review processes,
interim uncertainty that makes it difficult to keep the financing for the deal in place
and/or to retain anxious employees and customers). In particular, we show that
in case of a Second Request, an adverse review outcome that requires a full-scale
investigation into the antitrust nature of the deal, triggers a significant and negative
stock price reaction of -2.7 percent for the combined merging firms. In addition,
adverse review outcomes are associated with lengthy and complex regulatory review
processes that are associated with higher interim risks and costs.
We show that acquiring firms with high pre-announcement lobbying expenditures
are able to obtain more favorable review outcomes and thereby able to mitigate
the regulatory risks and costs. Firms are more likely to step up their lobbying
expenditures in the post-announcement period in case they get tangled up into more
lengthy and complex anti-review processes and run more risk of getting adverse review
outcomes. These lobbying patterns are consistent with both lobbying hypotheses ‒
148 Chapter 4. Lobbying in mergers and acquisitions
information sharing and regulatory capture.
Higher acquirer disclosed lobby spending before deal announcement is associated
with significantly higher acquirer and combined announcement abnormal returns.
However, lobbying positively impacts acquirer returns only when it is likely to be
used for the benefit of shareholders (in firms with strong corporate governance) and
not to pursue empire building behavior (in firms with weak corporate governance).
Higher acquirer lobbying expenditures do not seem to influence antitrust agencies
in a way that makes them more likely to approve anticompetitive mergers. Based on
this finding we conclude that it is more likely that higher lobbying is associated with
information sharing between merging firms and the antitrust agencies rather than
regulatory capture.
Taken together, our study documents the regulatory risks in mergers and acqui-
sitions, shows that firms actively manage these regulatory risks, adds to our under-
standing of merger review process, and provides further insights into the benefits and
costs of corporate lobbying.
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Summary
This thesis studies three scenarios related to M&A activities: (i) patterns and
motivations for acquisitions performed by firms in financial distress; (ii) acquisitions
of distressed/failed banks and the role of bidders’ political connections; (iii) regula-
tory friction in general M&As and the pattern and influence of acquirers’ lobbying
efforts.
The first conclusion is that financial distress drives firms to make diversifying
acquisitions. Acquisitions made by distressed firms in recent years are economically
important. The second chapter of this thesis explores the rationale behind such
acquisitions using a natural experiment. Exploiting a recent tax change which re-
duces debt restructuring costs for certain creditors and decreases bankruptcy risk,
the study identifies the causal link between financial distress and acquisitions. In the
event of an exogenous reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, distressed firms
react by cutting cash spending on acquisitions by 41%. Moreover, distressed firms
refocus by decreasing the transaction value of diversifying acquisitions by 63%. The
evidence supports the diversification hypothesis that distressed firms acquire to diver-
sify bankruptcy risk, rather than the growth opportunity hypothesis that distressed
firms acquire to capture external growth opportunities and revive growth. These
findings indicate a new effect of financial distress on investment decisions, that is,
the pressure to meet debt obligations creates an incentive for firms to diversify via
acquisitions.
Next, the thesis focuses on whether lobbying activities affect the resolution of
distressed banks during the Great Recession. Hand-collected information from failed-
bank auctions reveals that lobbying increases a bidder’s probability of winning by 26.4
percentage points. The transfer to lobbying bidders is substantial and is estimated
at $7.4 billion for the Deposit Insurance Fund, which is equal to 16.4% of the total
resolution losses. The post-acquisition operating performance is worse for lobbying
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banks than for their non-lobbying counterparts, suggesting that lobbying results in
a less efficient allocation of failed banks. The results provide new insights into the
bank resolution process and its political economy.
Finally, the scope of the thesis is extended to general M&A activities and how
the regulatory environment affects corporate acquisition activities. Based on de-
tailed hand-collected data on the US antitrust review process for M&As, it shows
that regulatory costs and risks are significant. Mitigating these risks via lobbying by
acquirers may benefit shareholders. An adverse antitrust review outcome leads to a
decline of at least 2.6% in the value of both the acquirer and the target firm. Ac-
quirers strategically adjust lobbying expenditures around the merger announcement.
Pre-emptive lobbying before deal announcements increases the chances of favorable
review outcomes and is valued by shareholders, especially among acquiring firms
with strong corporate governance. Post-announcement lobbying, concurrent with
the antitrust-review process, increases with adverse review outcomes. Nevertheless,
acquirer lobbying does not seem to be used to lure the antitrust agencies into ap-
proving anticompetitive mergers but rather to share information with the agencies.
The results highlight the role of political connections in corporate investments under
regulatory uncertainty.
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift bestudeert drie scenario’s met betrekking tot fusies en overna-
mes: (i) patronen in-, en motivaties voor overnames door bedrijven in financiële
moeilijkheden; (ii) overnames van noodlijdende/mislukte banken en de rol van poli-
tieke connecties van de bieders; (iii) frictie in regelgeving voor fusies en overnames
en patronen in-, en invloed van lobbyactiviteiten van kopers.
De eerste conclusie van deze dissertatie is dat financiële moeilijkheden bedrijven
ertoe drijft om diversifiërende acquisities te doen. Acquisities door noodlijdende be-
drijven zijn de afgelopen jaren van economisch belang geweest. Het tweede hoofdstuk
van dit proefschrift onderzoekt de rationale achter dit type acquisities door gebruik
te maken van een natuurlijk experiment. Met behulp van een recente belastingaan-
passing die herfinancieringskosten voor bepaalde crediteuren vermindert en op die
manier het faillissementsrisico verkleint, toont deze studie een causaal verband aan
tussen financiële moeilijkheden en acquisities. Na een exogene vermindering van de
kans op faillissement, reageren bedrijven in financiële moeilijkheden door hun uitga-
ven aan acquisities met 41 procent te verlagen. Bovendien concentreren noodlijdende
bedrijven zich opnieuw door de transactiewaarde van diversifiërende acquisities met
63 procent te verminderen. Dit bewijs ondersteunt de diversifiëringshypothese dat
bedrijven fusies en overnames doen om faillissementsrisico te diversifiëren, in tegen-
stelling tot de groeimogelijkheidhypothese dat bedrijven in financiële moeilijkheden
acquisities doen om via externe groeimogelijkheden nieuwe groei te creëren. Deze
bevindingen wijzen op een nieuw effect van financiële moeilijkheden op investerings-
besluiten, namelijk dat de druk om aan schuldverplichtingen te voldoen een stimulans
is voor bedrijven om te diversifiëren via acquisities.
Vervolgens onderzoekt dit proefschrift of lobbyactiviteiten de afwikkeling van
noodlijdende banken beïnvloed tijdens de Grote Recessie. Hand-verzamelde infor-
matie van veilingen van noodlijdende banken laat zien dat lobbyactiviteiten van de
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bieder de kans op het winnen van de veiling verhoogt met 26,4 procentpunt. De
overdracht van waarde aan lobbyende bieders is aanzienlijk en wordt geschat op
$7.4 miljard voor het Deposit Insurance Fund, gelijk aan 16,4 procent van de totale
afwikkelingsverliezen. Na een acquisitie presteren lobbyende banken slechter dan
niet-lobbyende banken, wat suggereert dat lobbyactiviteiten resulteren in minder ef-
ficiënte allocatie van mislukte banken. Deze resultaten geven nieuwe inzichten in het
afwikkelingsproces van banken en de politieke economie daarachter.
Tot slot wordt het onderzoeksveld van het proefschrift uitgebreid naar algemene
fusies en overnames en hoe deze worden beïnvloed door regelgeving. Middels hand-
verzamelde gegevens over het antitrustbeoordelingsproces van fusies en overnames
in de VS wordt duidelijk dat kosten en risico’s van regelgeving significant zijn. Het
beheersen van deze risico’s door middel van lobbyactiviteiten door kopers kan aan-
deelhouders ten goede komen. Een negatieve antitrustbeoordeling leidt tot een da-
ling in waarde van tenminste 2,6 procent van zowel de koper als het over te nemen
bedrijf. Kopers passen hun uitgaven aan lobbyactiviteiten strategisch aan op de fu-
sieaankondiging. Preventieve lobbyactiviteiten alvorens de aankondiging verhogen
de kans op een gunstige antitrustbeoordeling en worden gewaardeerd door aandeel-
houders, vooral bij acquisities van bedrijven met een sterke corporate governance.
Lobbyactiviteit na aankondiging van een acquisitie en gelijktijdig met het antitrust-
beoordelingsproces neemt toe bij negatieve antitrustbeoordelingen. Desondanks lijkt
het erop dat lobbyactiviteiten niet worden gebruikt om de mededingingsautoriteit
te verleiden om concurrentievervalsende fusies en overnames goed te keuren, maar
meer om informatie te delen met de mededingingsautoriteit. Deze resultaten bena-
drukken de rol van politieke connecties in bedrijfsinvesteringen onder onzekerheid in
regelgeving.
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Appendix A
Why Do Distressed Firms Acquire?
A.1 Variable Definitions
Table A.1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variable name Definition Source
Dependent variables
Acquisition expendi-
tures
Acquisition spending (AQC) divided by total as-
sets (AT).
Compustat
CapEx Capital expenditures (CAPX) divided by start-of-
period total assets (AT).
Compustat
R&D The sum of research and development expense
and advertising expense (XRD+XAD) divided by
start-of-period total assets (AT). Research and de-
velopment expense and advertising expense are
recorded as zeros when they are missing.
Compustat
Acquisition value Total deal value for acquisitions divided by start-
of-period total assets (AT). Only completed deals
announced in a given period included in SDC Plat-
inum with a positive deal value of over 1% of start-
of-period total assets (AT) and shares acquired or
sought over 50% are considered.
SDC, Compus-
tat
Diversifying-acquisition
value
Acquisition value ratio for diversifying acquisi-
tions only. A diversifying acquisition is where the
primary three-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and
the target do not match.
SDC, Compus-
tat
#Diversifying acquisi-
tion
The number of diversifying acquisitions an-
nounced in a given period. Only completed deals
with deal value over 1% of start-of-period total as-
sets (AT) and shares acquired or sought over 50%
are considered. A diversifying acquisition is where
the primary three-digit SIC codes of the acquirer
and the target do not match.
SDC, Compus-
tat
Acquisition-loan ratio The sum of facility amount for all outstanding
syndicated loans for acquisition-related purposes
divided by start-of-period total assets. The sam-
ple of eligible syndicated loans includes all loans
in Dealscan with non-missing maturity and fa-
cility amounts, and excludes canceled, rumored,
or suspended loans. Acquisition-related purposes
include “Acquis. line”, “LBO”, “Merger”, and
“Takeover” in the primary purpose field. This ra-
tio is replaced with one if it is larger than one.
Compustat,
Dealscan
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Table A.1 Continued:
Variable name Definition Source
New-acquisition-loan
ratio
The sum of facility amount for syndicated loans
starting in a given period for acquisition-related
purposes divided by the start-of-period total as-
sets.
Compustat,
Dealscan
New-acquisition-loan
dummy
An indicator that takes the value of one if the new-
acquisition-loan ratio is positive, and zero other-
wise.
Compustat,
Dealscan
CapEx-loan ratio The sum of facility amount for all outstanding
syndicated loans for acquisition-related purposes
divided by the start-of-period total assets. The
sample of eligible syndicated loans includes all
loans in Dealscan with non-missing maturity and
facility amount, and excludes canceled, rumored,
or suspended loans. Acquisition-related purposes
include “Capital expend.”, “Corp. purposes”, and
“Proj. finance” in the primary purpose field. This
ratio is replaced with one if it is larger than one.
Compustat,
Dealscan
New-CapEx-loan ratio The sum of facility amount for syndicated loans
starting in a given period for acquisition-related
purposes divided by start-of-period total assets.
Compustat,
Dealscan
New-CapEx-loan
dummy
An indicator that takes the value of one if New
CapEx Loan is positive, and zero otherwise.
Compustat,
Dealscan
Option-implied volatil-
ity
Option-implied volatility is calculated at each fis-
cal year end based on the last observations of
each call or put option during the year. I re-
quire the stock options with expiration dates in
at least ten days, but no more than one year,
with positive open interest, with positive best bid
price, and with non-missing expiration dates and
non-missing implied volatilities. I delete options
with bid-ask spreads more than 50% of the aver-
age of bid and ask prices. I only retain near-the-
money options with absolute values of the natu-
ral log of the ratio of the stock daily close prices
to the strike price less than 0.1. For measures
based on last observations, I average the implied
volatilities across all last annual observations for
each eligible call or put options for a stock for
call option-implied volatility or put option-implied
volatility. For volume weighted measures, I aver-
age the implied volatilities weighted by the trading
volumes across all daily observations for eligible
call or put options for call option-implied volatil-
ity or put option-implied volatility. The average
option-implied volatility is the arithmetic mean of
the call and put option-implied volatilities.
OptionMetrics
Independent variables
PostDRC An indicator of whether an observation is after the
time of the debt restructuring change (DRC) on
September 12, 2012.
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Table A.1 Continued:
Variable name Definition Source
Syndicated-loan ratio The sum of facility amount for all outstanding
syndicated loans divided by start-of-period total
assets. The sample of eligible syndicated loans in-
cludes all loans in Dealscan with non-missing ma-
turity, facility amount of over $100 million, and
syndication location in the U.S., and excludes can-
celed, rumored, or suspended loans. This ratio is
replaced with one if it is larger than one.
Compustat,
Dealscan
Syndicated-loan ratio
(all loans)
The sum of facility amount for all outstanding
syndicated loans divided by start-of-period total
assets. The sample of eligible syndicated loans
includes all loans in Dealscan with non-missing
maturity and excludes canceled, rumored, or sus-
pended loans. This ratio is replaced with one if it
is larger than one.
Compustat,
Dealscan
HighSynd An indicator that takes the value of one if a pre-
existing syndicated-loan ratio is in the upper half,
and zero otherwise.
Compustat,
Dealscan
distance-to-default The number of standard deviations of assets be-
tween the market value of total assets and the
default point, following Bharath and Shumway
(2008) and Vassalou and Xing (2004).
Compustat,
CRSP
Estimated default prob-
ability
Normal distribution probability of −distance-to-
default.
Compustat,
CRSP
Assert volatility Asset volatility estimated while calculating Mer-
ton’s distance-to-default , following Bharath and
Shumway (2008) and Vassalou and Xing (2004).
Compustat,
CRSP
Altman’s Z-score The sum of [3.3×pretax income
(NI+XINT+TXT) + 1.4×retained earnings (RE)
+ 1.2×working capital (ACT−LCT) + sales
(SALE)]/book total assets (AT) + 0.6×market
capitalization / total liabilities (LT). Market cap-
italization is calculated based on CRSP monthly
data of prices and shares outstanding matched to
the months of fiscal year ends. Each component
variable is winsorized at the 1-99% level.
Compustat,
CRSP
Distressed An indicator that takes the value of one if
Distance-to-Default in August 2012 is in the upper
tercile, and zero if in the bottom tercile.
Compustat,
CRSP
Other variables
Firm size The log transformation of total assets (AT). Compustat
Leverage Book leverage. The ratio of the value of debt
in current liabilities (DLC) and long-term debt
(DLTT) over total assets (AT).
Compustat,
CRSP
Liquidity The ratio of cash holding (CHE) divided by total
assets (AT)
Compustat
Market-to-book The ratio of the sum of market capitalization plus
the book value of debt (AT−CEQ) divided by to-
tal assets (AT). Market capitalization is calculated
based on CRSP monthly data of prices and shares
outstanding matched to the months of fiscal year
ends.
Compustat,
CRSP
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Table A.1 Continued:
Variable name Definition Source
ROA The ratio of pretax net income (NI+XINT) di-
vided by total assets (AT)
Compustat
Cash flow The ratio of income before extraordinary items
plus depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) di-
vided by start-of-period total assets (AT).
Compustat
Tangibility The ratio of net property, plant, and equipment
(PPE) divided by total assets (AT).
Compustat
Tobin’s q The ratio of market value of assets (AT + market
capitalization − CEQ − TXDB) over replacement
cost of assets (0.9 × AT + 0.1 × market value of
assets).
Compustat
Term premium The monthly difference between the yield on ten-
year U.S. Treasury bonds and two-year U.S. Trea-
sury notes matched to the months of the fiscal year
ends.
Federal Re-
serve Bank of
St. Louis
Credit rating A categorical variable based on Standard & Poor’s
credit rating for the long-term debt, ranging be-
tween 23 levels from “Not Rated” to “AAA.”
Compustat
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Appendix B
Winning Connection? Lobbying and the Resolution
of Failed Banks
B.1 Variable definitions
Table B.1. Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Auction Outcomes:
Win Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bank wins the auction
of a failed bank and 0 otherwise.
Bid Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bank submits a bid in
the auction of a failed bank and 0 otherwise.
Resolution Cost The cost borne by the FDIC in the resolution process of each
failed bank as a percentage of the total assets of the failed bank
at the time of failure.
Net Discount The asset discount of the winning bid expressed as percentage
points of total assets of the failed bank subtracted by deposit
premium, standardized by total assets of the failed bank.
Net Discount Differential Net Discount of the winning bid minus Net Discount of the
cover bid.
Acquirer Net Discount >
Cover Bid
Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition price is
lower than the price of the cover bid in terms of Net Discount,
and 0 otherwise.
All Bank & All Deposits Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bid is a whole-bank
acquisition including all deposits.
Loss-Sharing Agreement Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bid contains any loss-
sharing agreement with the FDIC.
Lobbying Variables:
Lobbying Regulators > 0 Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bank lobbies any
banking regulators, including the Department of Treasury, the
FDIC, Fed, OTS, and OCC, during the current year of bank
failure date, and 0 otherwise.
Lobbying Regulators Log of 1 plus lobbying expenditure on banking regulators dur-
ing the current year of bank failure date.
Active Lobbying Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bank ever lobbied in
our sample period (2007-2014), and 0 otherwise.
Lobbying > 0 Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bank overall lobbying
expenditures in the current year of bank failure date is positive,
and 0 otherwise.
Bank Characteristics:
continued on next page
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Variable Definition
ROA Net income (RIAD4340) divided by the average of total assets
at quarter t and t-1(RCFD3368).
Cost-to-Asset Ratio (ATC) Total expenses of the bank (RIAD4130) divided by the total
assets of the bank in each quarter (RCFD3368).
Size Log of total assets (in thousand dollars) (RCFD2170).
Liquidity Ratio Liquid assets (Cash (RCFD0010) + Fed Funds Sold
(RCONB987 + RCFDB989 + Securities excluding MBS/ABS)
(RCFD1754 + RCFD1773 – (RCFD8500 + RCFD8504 +
RCFDC026 + RCFD8503 + RCFD8507 + RCFDC027) di-
vided by total assets.
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Tier 1 core capital divided by total risk-weighted assets.
NPL Ratio Non-performing loans (non-accrual) and 90 days or more past
due (RCFD1407 + RCFD1403) divided by total loans.
OREO Ratio Other real estate owned (RCFD2150) divided by total assets.
CRE Loans Percentage of Commercial and Real Estate (CRE) loans
(RCFD2746) relative to total loans.
C&I Loans Percentage of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) loans
(RCFD1600) relative to total loans.
Residential Loans Percentage of residential real estate loans (RCFD1797 +
RCFD1798) relative to total loans (RCFD1400).
Core Deposits Total core deposits (transaction accounts + savings deposits +
time deposits less than $100,000) divided by total deposits.
State Bank Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the bank is regulated by
a state regulator and 0 otherwise.
Estimated CAMELS Rating Estimated CAMELS rating provided by SNL Financial.
Proximity to Failed Banks:
Eligible Bidder Indicator that takes the value of 1 if a bank is an eligible bid-
der for a failed bank. An eligible bidder satisfies the following
conditions:
– The bank is a commercial bank or a savings bank operating
in the United States;
– Tier 1 Capital Ratio is below 10% in the quarter prior to the
failure date;
– Estimated CAMELS Rating is not higher than 2 in the quar-
ter prior to the failure date;
– Size is at least twice that of the failed bank if the headquarter
of the bank is in the same state of the failed bank headquar-
ter, four times if in an adjacent state, and five times if in a
non-adjacent state;
– The bank is not a merger target in the quarter of the failure
date.
Distance Log of average pairwise distance in kilometers between all pairs
of branches of the failed bank and the bidding bank.
Distance X Loans Absolute difference in X Loans between the bidder and the
failed bank, with X meaning CRE, C&I, or Residential Loans.
Change in HHI The increase in local deposit market concentration that would
result from a bidding bank acquiring the failed bank, averaged
across the branch network of the failed bank.
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B.2 Auction Winning Likelihood, Endogenous Bidding, and
Bidder Lobbying
Table B.2. Probit with Heckman Sample Selection Results
This reports the results of Heckman-probit regressions. Pr(Win) and Pr(Bid) columns show
coefficient estimations and Marginal Effects columns report the average marginal effects on the
likelihood of winning an auction. Control variables include financial characteristics of bidders in
the quarter prior to failure dates—Size, Liquidity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, NPL Ratio, OREO
Ratio, CRE Loans (%), CRE Loans (%), and Residential Loans (%)—and proximity
measures—Distance and Change in HHI. See Section B.1 for more details about variable
definitions. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th levels. Robust standard errors of
marginal effects are presented in the parentheses and clustered at the level of the failed bank’s
state headquarters. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
(1) (2)
Marginal Marginal
Pr(Win) Effects Pr(Bid) Pr(Win) Effects Pr(Bid)
Lobbying Regulator >0 0.7158∗∗∗ 0.1124∗∗ 0.1578
(0.2157) (0.0489) (0.6207)
Lobbying Regulator 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗ 0.0019
(0.0162) (0.0035) (0.0611)
Size 0.0639 0.0100 -1.4541∗∗∗ 0.0641 0.0101 -1.4552∗∗∗
(0.1123) (0.0205) (0.1931) (0.1126) (0.0207) (0.1920)
Liquidity Ratio 0.0151∗∗ 0.0024 -0.0133∗ 0.0150∗∗ 0.0024 -0.0133∗
(0.0072) (0.0017) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0017) (0.0073)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 0.0218 0.0034 0.0199∗ 0.0219 0.0034 0.0198∗
(0.0150) (0.0025) (0.0114) (0.0151) (0.0025) (0.0115)
NPL Ratio -0.0287 -0.0045 -0.0194 -0.0284 -0.0045 -0.0195
(0.0273) (0.0053) (0.0135) (0.0274) (0.0053) (0.0136)
OREO Ratio -0.0370 -0.0058 0.1023 -0.0379 -0.0060 0.1020
(0.1734) (0.0280) (0.0622) (0.1729) (0.0280) (0.0625)
CRE Loans (%) 0.0086 0.0014 -0.0289∗ 0.0087 0.0014 -0.0288∗
(0.0099) (0.0016) (0.0165) (0.0099) (0.0016) (0.0164)
C&I Loans (%) -0.0044 -0.0007 -0.0250 -0.0045 -0.0007 -0.0248
(0.0083) (0.0013) (0.0154) (0.0083) (0.0013) (0.0153)
Residential Loans (%) 0.0015 0.0002 -0.0279∗∗ 0.0015 0.0002 -0.0279∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0013) (0.0118) (0.0078) (0.0013) (0.0118)
Distance -0.2560∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -1.5296∗∗∗ -0.2542∗∗∗ -0.0401∗∗∗ -1.5299∗∗∗
(0.0908) (0.0075) (0.0799) (0.0910) (0.0075) (0.0801)
Change in HHI -0.0035 -0.0005 0.0148∗∗∗ -0.0035 -0.0006 0.0148∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0007) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0007) (0.0039)
Constant -0.0853 34.1964∗∗∗ -0.0919 34.2103∗∗∗
(2.0391) (3.9736) (2.0461) (3.9516)
Bidder Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Failed Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald χ2 0.0481 0.0446
Wald p-value 0.8263 0.8328
ρ 0.0659 0.0638
Auctions 415 415
Observations 43656 43656
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Appendix C
Lobbying in Mergers & Acquisitions
C.1 Variable definitions
The table uses the following abbreviations: HPDL for Hoberg-Phillips data library;
HSR for HSR annual reports;1; SOPR for the Senate Office of Public Records;2 and
FEC for the Federal Election Commission webpage.3
Table C.1. Variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
Deal characteristics
Deal value Value of the takeover deal in $million. In regressions used
in a logarithmic transformation: log(1 + deal value).
SDC
Relative size The deal value divided by the market capitalization of the
acquirer 8 weeks before the announcement date.
SDC
Takeover premium The offer price relatively to the target stock price 8 weeks
before the deal announcement minus one: Poffer
P−42
− 1.
SDC
All cash A dummy indicating 100% of the payment consideration in
cash.
SDC
Horizontal merger A dummy indicating that the acquirer and the target are in
the same TNIC3 industry. See Hoberg and Phillips (2010,
2014) for more details on the definition of TNIC industries.
HPDL
Pairwise similarity The pairwise product similarity score between the acquirer
and the target in the year prior to the announcement date.
HPDL
Tender offer A dummy indicating the initial bid is a tender offer SDC
Hostile A dummy indicating target’s response is hostile versus
friendly or neutral
SDC
Bidding contest A dummy indicating that the number of bidders (including
the acquirer) after the deal announcement is larger than
one.
SDC
Entrenched acquirer A dummy indicating that the acquirer has at least four from
the following anti-takeover provisions: staggered board,
limits to amend bylaws, limits to amend charter, super-
majority, golden parachutes and poison pill. Missing values
are replaced with zeros.
RiskMetrics
Termination fee (tar-
get)
The fee that the target firm agrees to pay in case it is not
able to merge with the acquirer scaled by the deal value.
Missing values are replaced with zeros.
SDC
continued on next page
1http://cwis.usc.edu/projects/industrydata.
2https://www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm.
3http://www.fec.gov.
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Variable Definition Source
Reverse termination fee
(acquirer)
The fee that the acquirer agrees to pay in case it is not able
to merge with the target scaled by the deal value. Missing
values are replaced with zeros.
SDC
Acquirer announce-
ment AR
The three-day cumulative abnormal return (-1,+1) around
the deal announcement date for the acquirer. Abnormal
returns are computed using the market model.
CRSP
Target announcement
AR
The three-day cumulative abnormal return (-1,+1) around
the deal announcement date for the target. Abnormal re-
turns are computed using the market model.
CRSP
Combined announce-
ment AR
The average of the acquirer and target announcement
abnormal returns (-1,+1) around the deal announcement
date, weighted by the market capitalizations 8 weeks prior
to the deal announcement date.
CRSP
Expected completion
probability
Target stock price at the end of the deal-announcement day
over takeover premium, following Samuelson and Rosenthal
(1986). P+1−P−42
Poffer−P−42 .
SDC
Acquirer characteristics
Acquirer size Market capitalization 4 weeks prior to the announcemnt
dates of the acquiring company in $million; in regressions
used in a logarithmic transformation: ln(market cap).
Compustat
Acquirer market-to-
book ratio
Acquirer market capitalization over total assets:
PRCC×CSHO+AT−CEQ
AT
.
Compustat
Acquirer leverage Debt over market value of total assets:
DLTT+DLTT+PSTK
DLTT+DLTT+PSTK+PRCC×CSHO
Compustat
Acquirer tangibility Book value of property, plant and equipment over the book
value of total assets: PPENT
AT
Compustat
Acquirer liquidity The book value of cash and marketable securities plus re-
ceivables over the book value of total assets: CHE+RECT
AT
Compustat
Antitrust-review outcomes
Early Termination A dummy indicating that the merging firms receive an
Early Termination outcome in the antitrust-review process
before the 30-day waiting period expires. It represents a
favorable outcome.
SEC
Natural Expiration A dummy indicating that the merging firms clear antitrust
review without receiving an Early Termination or a Second
Request. It represents a favorable outcome.
SEC
Second Request A dummy indicating that the merging firms receive a re-
quest for additional information in the antitrust-review pro-
cess. It means the antitrust agencies suspect market-power
issues and will take further steps investigating the merger.
It represents an adverse outcome.
SEC
Challenged (Second
Request)
A dummy indicating that the antitrust agencies file an of-
ficial complaint against the merging parties. Remedy ne-
gotiations follow. It represents an adverse outcome.
HSR
Unchallenged (Second
Request)
A dummy indicating that a deal with a Second Request gets
through the antitrust review without the antitrust agencies
filing an official complaint against the merging parties. It
represents an adverse outcome.
HSR
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Pull & Refile A dummy indicating that the merging firms pull back and
then refile their HSR premerger filings to restart the 30-
day waiting period. Such an action provides more time for
the antitrust agencies to review the submitted documents
without issuing a Second Request.
SEC
Withdrawn A dummy indicating that the acquirer or the target with-
draw from the deal and do not complete the merger.
SDC
Days to complete The number of calendar days to complete the merger from
the deal announcement to the deal completion or with-
drawal date. In regressions used in a logarithmic trans-
formation: log(1 +#days)
SDC
Acquirer lobbying activities
Active lobbier A dummy indicating a positive lobbying expense between
2007 and 2015.
CRP,
SOPR
No previous lobbying A dummy indicating that the acquirer does not lobby dur-
ing 12 quarters prior to the deal-announcement year (–
16q,–5q).
CRP,
SOPR
Lobbying dollars Total corporate spending on lobbying during the specified 4
quarters relatively to the deal announcement in $thousand.
In regressions used in a logarithmic transformation: log(1+
lobbying dollars in $million).
CRP,
SOPR
Lobbying ratio Lobbying dollars scaled by firm market capitalization in $
thousands. lobbying dollarsmarket cap
CRP,
SOPR
Disclosed lobbying ra-
tio (b.p.)
Disclosed lobbying dollars scaled by firm market capitaliza-
tion in $ thousands. Disclosed lobbying filings are filed dur-
ing the one-year period prior to deal announcement dates.
CRP,
SOPR
Related (unrelated)
lobbying ratio
Total corporate spending on lobbying scaled by firm mar-
ket capitalization targeting at related (unrelated) govern-
ment agencies during the specified 4 quarters relatively to
the deal announcement in $thousand. The overall lobby-
ing dollars of a given quarterly lobbying filing are classified
as related if at least one government agency is US Sen-
ate, US House, Department of Justice, or Federal Trade
Commission. The overall lobbying dollars are classified as
unrelated only if none of the targeted government agencies
in the quarterly filing is one of these four agencies. See
Appendix C.4 for an illustration of unrelated government
agencies.
CRP,
SOPR
Lobbying dummy A dummy indicating a positive lobbying expense in a given
4-quarter period
CRP,
SOPR
Politicians’ ownership
dollars
Fractional ownership of acquirer stock by all congressmen
serving in the antitrust subcommittees (of congressional
judiciary committees) in the deal-announcement year.
CRP,
FEC
Politicians’ ownership A dummy indicating that any congressman serving in the
antitrust subcommittees (of congressional judiciary com-
mittees) in the deal-announcement year holds any acquirer
stock.
CRP,
FEC
PAC contribution dol-
lars
Total campaign contributions to current antitrust subcom-
mittee members by the acquirer company in the previous
election cycle.
CRP,
FEC
PAC contribution ratio PAC contribution dollars scaled by market capitalization
in $thousands. PAC contribution dollarsmarket cap
CRP,
FEC
continued on next page
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Variable Definition Source
Product market conditions
Acquirer HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index in the acquirer TNIC3 indus-
try one year before the merger announcement.
HPDL
Target HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index in the target TNIC3 industry
one year before the merger announcement.
HPDL
Expected ∆HHI Expected change in concentration in the acquirer TNIC3
industry for horizontal mergers one year prior to the
deal announcement. Following Eckbo (1992): 2 ×
market shareacquirer × market sharetarget. For non-
horizontal mergers, the value is zero.
Compustat,
HPDL
∆HHI (acquirer) Change in acquirer HHI in the TNIC3 industry from the
year before the merger announcement to the year after the
merger completion. For completed deals only.
HPDL
Acquirer market share The ratio of acquirer total sales over the total sales of all
firms in the target TNIC3 industry one year prior to the
deal announcement.
Compustat,
HPDL
Target market share The ratio of target total sales over the total sales of all
firms in the target TNIC3 industry one year prior to the
deal announcement.
Compustat,
HPDL
∆market share (ac-
quirer)
Change in acquirer market share in the TNIC3 industry
from the year before the merger announcement to the year
after the merger completion. For completed deals only.
Compustat,
HPDL
Acquirer similarity The sum of the pairwise similarities between the acquirer
and all other peers in its TNIC3 industry one year before
the merger announcement.
HPDL
Target similarity The sum of the pairwise similarities between the target and
all other peers in its TNIC3 industry one year before the
merger announcement.
HPDL
∆similarity (acquirer) Change in acquirer product similarity score in the TNIC3
industry from the year before the merger announcement to
the year after the merger completion. For completed deals
only.
HPDL
Acquirer fluidity The degree of competitive threat and competitors’ product
market change in the acquirer TNIC3 industry one year
before the merger announcement.
HPDL
Target fluidity The degree of competitive threat and competitors’ prod-
uct market change in the target TNIC3 industry one year
before the merger announcement.
HPDL
∆fluidity (acquirer) Change in acquirer fluidity in the TNIC3 industry from the
year before the merger announcement to the year after the
merger completion. For completed deals only.
HPDL
C.2 Example SEC filings for antitrust review
On November 23, 2009, Green Mountain Coffee Roasters Inc. (GMCR, Parent, or
Purchaser) announced a friendly all-cash acquisition of Diedrich Coffee, Inc. (the
Company). The deal value was around $290 million. The following quote from SEC
filing Form SC TO-T filed by both GMCR and Diedrich Coffee on December 11,
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2009 shows the date of the premerger filing:
Pursuant to the requirements of the HSR Act, the Company (“Diedrich
Coffee”) filed a Notification and Report Form with respect to the Offer
and the Merger on December 8, 2009 and Parent (“GMCR”), on behalf of
itself and the Purchaser, filed a Notification and Report Form with respect
to the Offer and the Merger with the FTC and the DOJ on December 9,
2009. As a result, the waiting period applicable to the purchase of Shares
pursuant to the Offer is scheduled to expire at 11:59p.m., Eastern Time,
on December 24, 2009.
This quote from SEC filing Form SC TO-T/A filed by both GMCR and Diedrich
Coffee on Dec 24, 2009 shows the reasons for a Pull & Refile decision by the merging
companies:
Effective December 24, 2009, following consultation with the FTC staff,
Parent voluntarily withdrew its HSR Act filing. On or before December
29, 2009, Parent expects to re-file its HSR Act filing. This withdrawal and
re-filing is being undertaken in order to provide the FTC with additional
time to review the information submitted by Parent and the Company.
The SEC filing Form SC TO-T/A filed by both GMCR and Diedrich Coffee on Jan
13, 2010 and a press release issued on the same date suggests an outcome of a Second
Request:
WATERBURY, Vt. and IRVINE, Calif. – January 13, 2010 – Green
Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc. (NASDAQ: GMCR) (“GMCR”) and
Diedrich Coffee, Inc. (Nasdaq: DDRX) (“Diedrich Coffee”) today an-
nounced that they have each received a request for additional information
(“Second Requests”) from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
with respect to the previously announced $35.00 per share cash tender
offer by Pebbles Acquisition Sub, Inc. (the “Purchaser”), a wholly owned
subsidiary of GMCR, to purchase all of the outstanding shares of com-
mon stock of Diedrich Coffee. … GMCR and Diedrich Coffee expect to
promptly respond to their respective Second Requests, and to continue
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to work cooperatively with the FTC as it conducts its review of the pro-
posed transaction. The transaction is expected to be completed in early
2010. As previously announced, the tender offer is scheduled to expire at
midnight, New York City time, on Friday, February 5, 2010. The Pur-
chaser will extend the tender offer’s expiration time as necessary to occur
concurrently with the HSR waiting period’s expiration time.
This quote from SEC filing Form SC TO-T/A filed by both GMCR and Diedrich
Coffee on May 3, 2010 (and a press release issued on the same date) suggests com-
pliance with FTC’s requests for additional information and associated clearance to
complete the merger:
GMCR also noted that, on Friday, April 30, 2010, GMCR certified to
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) that it has substan-
tially complied with the FTC’s request for additional information un-
der the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“Second
Request”), in connection with GMCR’s offer to purchase all of the out-
standing shares of Diedrich Coffee common stock. As a result, GMCR
and Purchaser expect the waiting period applicable to the purchase of
the outstanding shares of Diedrich Coffee common stock pursuant to the
tender offer to expire at 11:59 p.m., New York City time, on Monday,
May 10, 2010.
The transaction was completed and effective on May 11, 2010.
C.3 Sample Distributions
This table reports the distribution of the 370 deals in our sample across years by an-
nouncement dates in Panel A, target industry sectors in Panel B and acquirer indus-
try sectors in Panel C. Each panel reports the total number of deals and frequencies
across five antitrust-review outcomes and withdrawn deals within each calendar year
or industry sector.
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Table C.2. Distribution of merger firms across industries and calendar years
Panel A: Distribution across years
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Withdrawn 0.167 0.089 0.081 0.119 0.019 0.000 0.085
Challenged Second Request 0.083 0.089 0.048 0.068 0.056 0.047 0.068
Unchallenged Second Request 0.062 0.067 0.129 0.085 0.111 0.116 0.136
Pull & Refile 0.062 0.178 0.048 0.119 0.093 0.023 0.068
Natural Expiration 0.354 0.489 0.452 0.390 0.278 0.419 0.271
Early Termination 0.438 0.178 0.323 0.339 0.463 0.395 0.458
# obs. 48 45 62 59 54 43 59
Panel B: Distribution across target Fama-French 5 industry sectors
Consumer Manuf. HiTech Health Other
Withdrawn 0.106 0.098 0.072 0.027 0.185
Challenged Second Request 0.085 0.098 0.022 0.067 0.148
Unchallenged Second Request 0.128 0.134 0.094 0.027 0.222
Pull & Refile 0.106 0.073 0.101 0.080 0.000
Natural Expiration 0.234 0.220 0.424 0.533 0.407
Early Termination 0.447 0.476 0.360 0.293 0.222
# obs. 47 82 139 75 27
Panel C: Distribution across acquirer Fama-French 5 industry sectors
Consumer Manuf. HiTech Health Other
Withdrawn 0.095 0.098 0.073 0.028 0.158
Challenged Second Request 0.119 0.073 0.022 0.070 0.132
Unchallenged Second Request 0.143 0.134 0.102 0.014 0.158
Pull & Refile 0.071 0.110 0.095 0.085 0.000
Natural Expiration 0.214 0.244 0.438 0.563 0.263
Early Termination 0.452 0.439 0.343 0.268 0.447
# obs. 42 82 137 71 38
C.4 Government agencies that are targets of corporate lobby-
ing
Table C.3 reports frequencies and percentages of targeted government agencies in
the lobbying filings between 2007 and 2015 of merging firms in the sample. For
irrelevant government agencies on the right columns, only the top 15 are reported.
The frequencies of unreported government agencies are all under 1%.
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Table C.3. Related and unrelated government agencies regarding to antitrust review
Agencies Frequency %
Relevant government agencies
US Senate 27.64 68043
US House of Representatives 27.51 67730
Dept of Justice 0.88 2173
Federal Trade Commission 0.57 1410
Irrelevant government agencies
Dept of Defense 3.83 9440
Dept of Health & Human Services 2.73 6725
Dept of Commerce 2.71 6681
Executive Office of the President 2.25 5550
Dept of the Treasury 2.25 5550
Office of US Trade Representative 1.93 4770
Dept of State 1.76 4348
Dept of Energy 1.72 4237
White House 1.71 4228
Environmental Protection Agency 1.53 3771
Federal Communications Commission 1.44 3562
Dept of Homeland Security 1.42 3508
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 1.06 2630
Dept of Transportation 1.02 2515
Office of Management & Budget 1.02 2514
(omitted)
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C.5 Lobbying and the refined set of review outcomes: com-
pleted vs. withdrawn Unchallenged Second Requests
We run the multinomial logistic regression with six alternative review outcomes in
Table C.4. Since the number of observations is small in the category of Withdrawn
Unchallenged Second Request (nine observations), the size of the marginal effects on
the probability of Withdrawn Unchallenged Second Request is very small and close
to zero.
C.6 Direct link between lobbying and deal outcomes
Table 4.5 reports the effect of lobbying on deal outcome—deal withdrawn and the
number of days to completion.
Table 4.5. Direct link between lobbying and deal outcomes
This table reports estimates of the marginal effect of lobbying on deal withdrawal in specifications
1 to 4 and estimates of the coefficients when regressing the log of days to completion on lobbying
in specifications 5 to 6. Specification 1 and 2 corresponds to the simple logistic models.
Specification 3 and 4 corresponds to the IV probit models. We do not report the first-stage
estimates. Specification 5 and 6 corresponds to the OLS models. All specifications include also
controls for deal characteristics (deal value, relative size, all cash, horizontal merger, tender offer,
hostile, bidding contest, termination fee, reverse termination fee), product market conditions
(target HHI, expected ∆HHI, target similarity, target fluidity) and acquirer characteristics
(acquirer size, acquirer market-to-book, acquirer leverage, acquirer tangibility, acquirer liquidity),
which are not reported. Industry (Fama-French 5 sectors) and year fixed effects are included in all
specifications. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at target industry
level. All variables are defined in Appendix C.1, winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***,
**, * and + indicate significance at the one-, five-, ten- and fifteen-percent levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
logistic IV probit OLS
Withdrawn log days
Lobbying ratio (−4,−1) (b.p.) -0.031d -0.047b 0.001
(0.021) (0.024) (0.003)
Lobbying ratio (0,+3) (b.p.) -0.030 -0.047c 0.008d
(0.022) (0.028) (0.004)
Target lobbying dummy (−4,−1) -0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.003
(0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.119) (0.119)
Target lobbying dummy (0,+3) -0.008 0.001 -0.011 0.006 0.121 0.108
(0.051) (0.060) (0.043) (0.046) (0.132) (0.128)
Politicians’ ownership dummy 0.027 0.038c 0.019 0.034c 0.185b 0.184b
(0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.056) (0.057)
PAC contribution ratio -0.042 -0.045 -0.035 -0.038 0.001 -0.011
(0.064) (0.063) (0.054) (0.053) (0.046) (0.047)
Constant 4.089a 4.075a
(0.206) (0.202)
Pseudo R2 0.583 0.593
Wald χ2 1.874 2.757
Wald p-value 0.171 0.097
Adjusted R2 0.464 0.466
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This dissertation studies how financial frictions and regulatory costs affect mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
The first conclusion is that financial distress drives firms to make diversifying acquisitions. Acquisitions 
made by distressed firms in recent years are economically important. Exploiting a natural experiment, 
this thesis identifies the causal link between financial distress and acquisitions. The evidence shows that 
distressed firms acquire to diversify bankruptcy risk, rather than to capture external growth opportunities 
and revive growth. The second conclusion of the dissertation is that political connections of banks 
affect the government auctions of distressed banks during the Great Recession. Lobbying financial 
regulators significantly increases a bidding bank’s probability of winning. The post-acquisition operating 
performance is worse for lobbying acquirers than for their non-lobbying counterparts, suggesting that 
lobbying results in a less efficient allocation of failed banks. The results provide new insights into the bank 
resolution process and its political economy. Thirdly, the dissertation shows that the regulatory review 
process for M&As poses significant costs and risk for merging firms. An adverse antitrust review outcome 
reduces shareholder wealth and the probability of deal success. Mitigating such risk via lobbying may 
benefit shareholders. Consistently, acquirers strategically adjust lobbying expenditures around the merger 
announcement. The results highlight the role of political connections in corporate investments under 
regulatory uncertainty.
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